Opinion
No. 07-19-00032-CR
07-21-2020
ADRIAN ANTOINE DUNN, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 187th District Court Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-CR-11330 , Honorable Joey Contreras, Presiding
Originally appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Adrian Antoine Dunn, appellant, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he raises three issues challenging his conviction. We affirm.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b) (West 2019).
Background
On the night of July 16, 2012, Rakim Charles called 9-1-1 to report that he had been shot at an apartment complex in San Antonio. The San Antonio Fire Department responded to the call and found Charles in the driver's seat of a car. He had a gunshot wound and no pulse. Despite the efforts of EMS personnel, Charles could not be resuscitated.
In 2018, a Bexar County grand jury indicted appellant for Charles's murder. Appellant pleaded not guilty.
At trial, the State presented testimony from Charles's younger cousin, Laski Charles. At the time of the incident, Laski was living with her then-boyfriend, Kevin Young, in a motel not far from the apartment complex where Charles was killed. Friends of the couple, Christopher Cooper and Raiven Middleton, also lived in the motel. Cooper, appellant, and one of appellant's friends came to Laski and Young's motel room on the evening of July 16, 2012. Laski testified that appellant brought a gun that he was "showing off." The group decided to get marijuana, and Laski called Charles to inquire about purchasing marijuana from him. Charles agreed to the sale.
Young, Cooper, appellant, and appellant's friend left to make the purchase, and Laski stayed in the motel room. According to Laski, they did not leave anything behind, so she believed appellant had his gun with him. Roughly fifteen minutes later, the men returned, emptyhanded, to the room. They told Laski that Charles did not have any marijuana. The men were quiet and seemed to be in a hurry. Appellant went straight to the restroom; when he emerged a few minutes later, he and the other visitors left. Laski later learned that her cousin had been killed that night.
Laski did not see or talk to appellant until weeks later, when she was at her aunt's house. Appellant came to the house and told Laski that he was sorry about what happened. He said he thought Charles was going to pull something out and that he panicked. Laski testified that appellant was essentially telling her the shooting "wasn't [done] intentionally."
Areveoshia Stewart testified that she lived at the apartment complex where Charles was killed. On the night of the murder, she was on the balcony of her apartment when she saw Kevin Young, who she knew, and another man in the parking lot area. Stewart did not get a good look at the other man. She observed Young get into the back seat of a car and the other man lean on the passenger side of the car. Stewart went inside her apartment. Her mother then went outside. Minutes later, her mother returned and said people were shooting outside. Stewart went to her door and saw Young and the other man running away from the parking area.
Eleanor Flynn, a 9-1-1 operator, testified that a man called to report the shooting. When asked if he saw who did it, the man responded that there was a gray Crown Victoria with two black males leaving in it.
The medical examiner testified that the bullet entered Charles's right shoulder and went through his body in a right-to-left, back-to-front, downwards direction.
Eric Roberson, a crime scene investigator for the San Antonio Police Department, testified that he investigated the scene of Charles's murder. He collected fingerprints from the exterior front passenger window and door of the car in which Charles was found. A fingerprint examiner for the San Antonio Police Department testified that she compared appellant's fingerprints to the prints left on the car and determined that the prints on the car were made by appellant.
Roberson also testified that Chris Cooper's girlfriend, Raiven Middleton, owned a 1999 silver Grand Marquis. She took possession of the car at the end of June of 2012. According to Roberson, the Grand Marquis and the Crown Victoria are both vehicles made by Ford and they look very similar.
Eugene Jones, a crime scene investigator with the San Antonio Crime Scene Unit, testified that he processed the vehicle in which Charles was shot. He collected a spent .40 caliber shell casing from the floorboard of the front passenger side of the vehicle.
Jurema Sanchez testified that she purchased a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson firearm at a gun show in 2012. Appellant and three other men were with her when she bought it. On June 4 of 2012, Sanchez's gun was stolen from her car while the car was parked outside of appellant's mother's house. Sanchez reported the theft to police. When Roberson interviewed Jurema Sanchez during the murder investigation, she told him that she believed appellant was responsible for stealing her gun.
The State also presented evidence related to a shooting at a gas station in June of 2012, a few weeks before Charles was killed. Bianca Rodriguez testified that on June 7, 2012, she witnessed a shooting at a Shell gas station in San Antonio. Rodriguez was sitting in the passenger's seat of her father's vehicle at a gas pump when she heard a loud noise. Rodriguez then saw a light from a gun and realized the sound was gunfire. She saw two cars, which she described as "older models" that were silver or white, speeding out of the gas station parking lot. Rodriguez and her father later discovered that a bullet had ricocheted off their vehicle.
Sergeant Matthew Overton investigated the scene of the Shell gas station shooting. He testified that shell casings and a bullet were recovered from that crime scene.
Sanchez testified that, after her gun was stolen, she overheard Chris Cooper say that someone had threatened to kill appellant's brother. Sanchez later heard Cooper and appellant say that they shot at someone at a Shell gas station. However, Sanchez also testified that appellant told her he had nothing to do with the Shell shooting.
Roberson asked the crime lab to compare shell casings from the gas station shooting to the shell casing recovered from the scene of Charles's murder. David Pendleton, a forensic scientist and firearms examiner at the Bexar County Criminal Investigation Laboratory, did so, and determined that they were all fired from the same firearm.
Following a week-long trial, a jury found appellant guilty of murder and assessed punishment at life imprisonment.
Analysis
Issue 1: Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues in his first issue that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. In particular, appellant claims that the facts connecting him to the crime were "tenuous at best."
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). "[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction." Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). We are mindful that "[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no higher standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson." Id. When reviewing all of the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is whether the jury's finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906-07 n.26 (discussing Judge Cochran's dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 448-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single evidentiary standard of review). "[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony." Id. at 899. Further, we note that direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Under subsection 19.02(b) of the Penal Code, a person commits murder
if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b). In determining whether the State satisfied its burden of proving the statutory requirements beyond a reasonable doubt, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 607-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under this standard, we cannot reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. at 608. Instead, we must honor all findings that are supported by the evidence and by any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. If the record reveals conflicts in the evidence, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the judgment that was actually rendered. Id.
Circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and it alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In this case, the record contains considerable circumstantial evidence establishing that appellant was the offender.
As set forth above, the evidence begins with the fact that appellant had the opportunity to commit the murder. He and Kevin Young were among the group of men who went to meet Charles on the night he was killed. Although they went to buy marijuana from Charles, they returned to the motel room emptyhanded and, as Laski testified, "everything just started getting weird." In addition, appellant brought a weapon to the motel room and apparently took it with him when he left to meet Charles. The gun used in Charles's murder was the same type of gun used in the gas station shooting in which appellant was involved. Next, appellant's fingerprints were found on the passenger side of Charles's car. A witness had observed Kevin Young in the backseat of Charles's car and another man leaning against the passenger side of the car just minutes before shots were fired. Another witness observed men leaving the scene in a vehicle that looked like the one owned by Young's girlfriend. Finally, after the shooting, appellant expressed remorse about the incident to Laski.
Although appellant challenges the credibility of some of this witness testimony, the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. As such, the jury is free to believe all, some, or none of a witness's testimony. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Monreal v. State, 546 S.W.3d 718, 724-25 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref'd). Furthermore, "we permit juries to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Based on the cumulative force of all the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence, the jury had a rational basis for concluding that appellant was responsible for the murder of Rakim Charles. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's first issue is overruled.
Issue 2: Admission of Gas Station Shooting Evidence
By his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the shell casing and other evidence related to the Shell gas station shooting. We review a trial court's decision whether to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its determination lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
On appeal, appellant claims evidence of the shooting was inadmissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b). Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it tends to make a fact of consequence in determining the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 401. Under Rule 404(b), relevant evidence of a person's character or character trait is inadmissible in certain circumstances. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). Finally, even if evidence is relevant under Rule 401 and admissible under Rule 404(b), it may nevertheless be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. TEX. R. EVID. 403.
At trial, appellant objected to anticipated testimony from the detective who recovered the spent shell casings from the gas station shooting because the evidence was not relevant, "[b]ecause there's nothing linking [appellant] to that spent shell casing." The trial court stated that the evidence would be admitted conditionally. Following this discussion, Bianca Rodriguez was called to testify about the shooting. The State then called Jurema Sanchez. As she took the witness stand, trial counsel for appellant stated, "And, Judge, I just want to lodge my running objections to all of this testimony based on the reasons elicited and prompted before." The trial court responded, "It's noted."
A "point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial." Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 403 because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. However, he has not preserved this complaint for our review. In the trial court, appellant did not object on the Rule 403 basis that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect; rather, he claimed that the evidence had no probative value at all, because the shooting could not be linked to him. A specific Rule 403 objection must be raised to preserve error because such an objection is not implicitly contained in a relevancy or Rule 404(b) objection. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 200 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd). Therefore, appellant's argument under Rule 403 must fail.
Appellant's argument under Rule 404(b) fails for the same reason. At trial, appellant did not object to the gas station shooting evidence under Rule 404(b). The general relevancy objection made by appellant does not operate to preserve an extraneous offense claim under Rule 404(b). See Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Thus, we reach appellant's relevancy objection under Rule 401. Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence "more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." TEX. R. EVID. 401. "Evidence need not by itself prove or disprove a particular fact to be relevant; it is sufficient if the evidence provides a small nudge toward proving or disproving some fact of consequence." Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
In this instance, we find no error in the admission of the evidence. Appellant presented a defensive theory that there was nothing connecting him to Charles's death. In closing, appellant's counsel reinforced this theory of the case, calling it "a case where they have no evidence that ties [appellant] to this murder." The State offered evidence of the gas station shooting to make that connection, by showing that appellant acknowledged his involvement in the gas station shooting and that a gun used in that shooting was the same gun used to kill Charles. Therefore, the evidence was relevant to a fact of consequence in this case.
We conclude that the trial court's decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and, thus, will not overturn the decision. Appellant's second issue is overruled.
Issue 3: Admission of Hearsay Evidence
In his final issue, appellant asserts that his rights of cross-examination and confrontation were violated by the admission of hearsay.
Appellant's complaint is directed at two pieces of testimony. First, he asserts that the trial court erred by allowing a detective to testify that the person who sold Raiven Middleton her car told him that Middleton took possession of the vehicle at least a month before the shooting. Appellant asserts that he was denied his right to confront and cross-examine the seller of the vehicle. At trial, however, appellant made no objection to this testimony from the detective. Because there was no objection, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
Second, appellant asserts the trial court erred by allowing Jurema Sanchez to testify that she overheard Chris Cooper say that a threat had been made against appellant's brother. At trial, Sanchez was asked if she had a conversation with appellant about the gas station shooting, and responded:
A: I didn't have a conversation with him. It was just overheard that the - not even the defendant. Actually, it was Chris Cooper stating that someone had threatened to kill the defendant's brother. 12 Q: Okay. Who was that - when you say the defendant's brother, who are they referring to? A: Terrence Rice. Q: Terrence Rice. Okay. And is that Adrian's - or is that the defendant's - A: That's the defendant's brother, which is my cousin also. Q: Okay. And so there had been some incident where someone had threatened Terrence Rice. A: Yes. I don't know if they threatened him like
At that point, appellant's trial counsel objected on the grounds of speculation and hearsay. Counsel for the State answered that "the statements that were made related to the brother are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted." Upon advising counsel for the State to "put it into context," the trial court said to "go ahead." The State then elicited testimony from Sanchez that, after she heard about the threat, "all the homeboys" left and when they returned, she overheard Cooper say "there was a drive-by [shooting] done" at a Shell gas station.
Sanchez was later impeached with her prior statement to police, in which she stated that both appellant and Cooper said that they shot at a man at the gas station.
A statement that is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d) (defining hearsay). The statement made by Cooper was not offered to prove that there was a threat made against appellant's brother, but rather to show appellant's state of mind in consequence of the statement. Thus, the statement was not hearsay. Consequently, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence. Appellant's third issue is overruled.
Conclusion
Having overruled all three of appellant's issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judy C. Parker
Justice Do not publish.