Opinion
364551
05-30-2024
HARRELDEAN B. DUNN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
WDCAC LC No. 18-000057
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Harreldean B. Dunn, appeals by leave granted the order of the Workers' Disability Compensation Appeals Commission (WDCAC) affirming the order of the Workers' Disability Compensation Agency magistrate holding that plaintiff is partially disabled and entitled to benefits under the Workers' Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. We affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Dunn v Gen Motors Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 28, 2023 (Docket No. 364551).
I. FACTS
Plaintiff began working for defendant, General Motors Company, in 1976 as a salaried employee. Over the years, plaintiff held various positions with defendant involving finance and auditing, which required her to work with her hands and particularly to type on a keyboard. In 2003, plaintiff began feeling pain, numbness, and tingling in her hands. In May 2005, plaintiff was diagnosed with symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome, and she was recorded as having a workplace injury on June 6, 2005. In August 2005, Dr. Thomas H. Beird, a certified plastic and hand surgeon, diagnosed plaintiff with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and advised plaintiff to stop working. Plaintiff's last day of work with defendant was November 16, 2005. Dr. Beird thereafter performed surgery on plaintiff's wrists.
Plaintiff was determined to be entitled to workers' compensation benefits of $689 weekly, which defendant paid until May 2015. Defendant also determined that plaintiff was entitled to certain benefits under defendant's pension program. The program identified benefits under the pension as Part A and Part B pension benefits, to be offset by any amounts plaintiff received in workers' compensation benefits. At trial, plaintiff contended that her workers' compensation benefits offset her Part A pension benefits, and as a result she did not receive Part A pension benefits. According to plaintiff, Part B pension benefits were derived from a fund that plaintiff had contributed to, and she received approximately $480 monthly in Part B benefits.
It is unclear from the record which type of pension benefits were Part A benefits and which pension benefits were Part B benefits. At trial, the parties referred to the benefits that plaintiff contributed to and received as Part A. However, the letters that defendant sent to plaintiff regarding the reduction in pension benefits seem to indicate that the employer-sponsored pension funds that plaintiff had not been receiving were Part A. Accordingly, we refer to the employer-sponsored benefits as Part A.
In 2014, defendant sought to ascertain whether plaintiff remained disabled. Neurologist Wilbur J. Boike examined plaintiff and, in a November 20, 2014 independent medical examination (IME) report, opined that plaintiff's duties at work did not cause or exacerbate her carpel tunnel syndrome, and that she could work if she limited repetitive gripping and the use of vibrating tools. On March 9, 2015, John Stokes, a rehabilitation counselor, performed a vocational assessment and wage-earning capacity evaluation of plaintiff. Stokes reviewed the opinions of several physicians regarding plaintiff's work restrictions and identified several jobs that plaintiff was qualified to hold and physically able to perform.
On May 5, 2015, defendant reduced plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits to $262.20 per week on the basis that plaintiff was only partially disabled and had the ability to earn wages. Plaintiff asserted that she should be entitled to receive Part A pension benefits in some amount because her Part A benefit eligibility was no longer fully offset by her receipt of workers' compensation benefits.
On July 16, 2015, defendant sent a letter to plaintiff stating that defendant had overpaid plaintiff pension benefits in the amount of $247,955.53, and requesting repayment. Defendant stated that if plaintiff did not pay the amount in full, defendant would withhold plaintiff's Part A pension benefit payments until the alleged overpayment was fully recouped. In response to an inquiry from plaintiff's attorney, on August 5, 2015, defendant sent plaintiff another letter, stating that defendant had miscalculated the overpayment amount. Defendant stated that it had overpaid plaintiff $131,158.47, which included $98,308.62 in overpaid workers' compensation benefits and $32,849.85 in overpaid pension benefits. Although not entirely clear, the letter suggested that defendant would recoup the overpayment by withholding a portion of plaintiff's pension benefits.
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing an Application for Mediation or Hearing with the Workers' Disability Compensation Agency, challenging defendant's determination that defendant had overpaid plaintiff wage loss benefits, and challenging defendant's reduction of her pension benefits to recoup the alleged overpayment of wage loss benefits. Plaintiff's application was assigned to a magistrate who thereafter conducted a trial.
Dr. Wilbur J. Boike testified by deposition that on August 30, 2017, he examined plaintiff and, consistent with his IME of plaintiff in 2014, opined that plaintiff's carpal tunnel symptoms did not arise from her employment, and that plaintiff could work as long as she avoided repetitive gripping and the use of tools that vibrate. On January 26, 2018, Dr. Steven Newman, who specializes in neuromusculoskeletal diseases and neurorehabilitation, evaluated plaintiff. Dr. Newman testified by deposition that plaintiff should limit gripping and the use of fine motor skills with her hands, including typing, to 10% of her time. Dr. Newman recommended that plaintiff not return to work that involved typing.
Dr. Beird testified by deposition and opined that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome was caused or worsened by her employment with defendant. Medical records from plaintiff's visits to Dr. Beird showed that plaintiff experienced no significant improvement in her carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms from 2005 through 2017. Dr. Beird opined that plaintiff could return to work with restrictions, including limitations on repetitive gripping, grasping, or using tools that vibrated. Dr. Beird opined that plaintiff could type, but could not spend a significant portion of her day typing.
Rehabilitation counselor John Stokes filed an addendum to his original report. Stokes determined that there were several jobs for which plaintiff was qualified and was able to perform, but whether plaintiff was capable of earning wages depended on which physician's opinion was found to be controlling regarding plaintiff's medical status. Stokes testified by deposition that, based on the least restrictive work restrictions placed on plaintiff, she could earn as much as $751.60 a week. However, Stokes could not identify any jobs for which plaintiff was qualified and could perform that paid as much as plaintiff's preinjury wage.
On February 5, 2018, vocational rehabilitation counselor Barbara Feldman conducted a Stokes evaluation assessing plaintiff's qualifications, training, and ability to work. Feldman opined that based upon the varying work restrictions recommended by Dr. Beird, Dr. Boike, and Dr. Newman, there were no jobs in plaintiff's geographic area that plaintiff could perform that would pay her preinjury wage. Feldman opined that the most plaintiff could earn was $800 per week under the least restrictive work restrictions offered by the physicians.
Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich. 266; 750 N.W.2d 129 (2008).
Defendant moved that the magistrate determine that the agency lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's allegation that defendant was attempting to recoup previously-paid workers' compensation wage loss benefits from her pension. Defendant argued that because the recoupment involved only the withholding of pension benefits, any state law relevant to plaintiff's claim regarding the withholding of the pension benefits was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 USC 1001 et seq. Plaintiff argued that the agency had subject-matter jurisdiction because defendant was attempting to recover alleged overpaid workers' compensation benefits in a manner contrary to Michigan law.
Plaintiff also contended that the testimony from medical and vocational experts established that she was totally and permanently disabled, and that Exhibit 10, which she had offered at trial, was an admission by defendant that she is totally and permanently disabled. Exhibit 10 outlined defendant's Part A pension program as follows, in pertinent part:
An employee who has 10 or more years of eligibility service may be retired prior to age 65 for total and permanent disability. An employee shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled only if such employee makes [an] application for total and permanent disability retirement on a form approved by General Motors and (i) the employee is not engaged in employment or occupation for remuneration or profit, and (ii) on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to General Motors the employee is found to be wholly and permanently prevented from engaging in regular employment or occupation for remuneration or profit as a result of bodily injury or disease, either occupational or non-occupational in cause ....
Plaintiff argued that because defendant determined that she was entitled to pension benefits under this section, defendant conceded that she was totally and permanently disabled, and that the admission was dispositive of whether she was totally and permanently disabled for purposes of workers' compensation benefits.
The magistrate issued an opinion and order finding that plaintiff suffers from bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome caused or worsened by her employment with defendant. The magistrate found that plaintiff is partially disabled and has some wage-earning capacity. On the basis of the vocational expert testimony, the magistrate found that plaintiff was able to earn $600 weekly, and, after applying the applicable formula for calculating partial-disability benefits, determined that plaintiff was entitled to $362.41 weekly in workers' compensation benefits beginning May 4, 2015. The magistrate also determined that the Workers' Disability Compensation Agency did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the validity of defendant's reduction of plaintiff's pension benefits to recoup the alleged overpayment.
Plaintiff appealed the magistrate's order to the WDCAC, contending that the magistrate erred by finding that plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled, that the magistrate failed to consider plaintiff's Exhibit 10, which plaintiff argued was an admission of a party opponent under MRE 801(d)(2), and that the magistrate erred by determining that the agency did not have subject-matter jurisdiction regarding defendant's recoupment of plaintiff's wage-loss benefits by withholding plaintiff's pension benefits.
The WDCAC remanded the matter to the magistrate, directing the magistrate to address plaintiff's Exhibit 10 to provide a complete record on appeal. On remand, the magistrate found that Exhibit 10 was not an admission by defendant under MRE 801(d)(2) because it was not a "statement" made by a "declarant" and likely included hearsay within hearsay. The magistrate further held that even if plaintiff's Exhibit 10 were an admission, it was not dispositive on the issue of disability, but rather was only one piece of evidence that could be rebutted.
The WDCAC affirmed the magistrate's order, specifically affirming the magistrate's finding that plaintiff suffered from a disability arising from her employment with defendant, that plaintiff was partially disabled, and that plaintiff's Exhibit 10 did not establish that plaintiff was totally disabled for purposes of determining eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The WDCAC also determined that the agency lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether defendant was improperly withholding plaintiff's pension payments. Plaintiff now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of a decision of the WDCAC (formerly, the MCAC) is governed by MCL 418.861a(14), which provides that "[t]he findings of fact made by the commission acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive." Cramer v Transitional Health Services of Wayne, 512 Mich. 23, 41; 1 NW3d 9 (2023), quoting MCL 418.861a(14). If there is any evidence supporting the [WDCAC's] factual findings, the judiciary must treat those findings as conclusive. Mudel v Great Atlantic &Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich. 691, 709-710; 614 N.W.2d 607 (2000). We review de novo questions of law involved in the WDCAC's decision. Cramer, 512 Mich. at 41. A decision of the WDCAC "is subject to reversal if it is based on erroneous legal reasoning or the wrong legal framework." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. EXHIBITS 7 AND 10
Plaintiff contends that the WDCAC erred by determining that plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 10 do not constitute an admission by defendant under MRE 801(d)(2) that established that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled for purposes of workers' compensation benefits. We disagree.
A worker claiming workers' compensation benefits must establish entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. MCL 418.851. To establish entitlement to benefits, a worker must show that a work-related injury caused the worker to become disabled. See Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich. 266, 281; 750 N.W.2d 129 (2008). MCL 418.301 defines "disability" as "a limitation of an employee's wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal injury or work-related disease." In Stokes, 481 Mich. at 297, our Supreme Court explained that "[t]he claimant must show more than a mere inability to perform a previous job. Rather, to establish a disability, the claimant must prove a work-related injury and that such injury caused a reduction of his maximum wage-earning capacity in work suitable to the claimant's qualifications and training." The Court set forth a four-part test, id. at 297-298, now codified at MCL 418.301(5) as follows:
(5) To establish an initial showing of disability, an employee shall do all of the following:
(a) Disclose his or her qualifications and training, including education, skills, and experience, whether or not they are relevant to the job the employee was performing at the time of the injury.
(b) Provide evidence as to the jobs, if any, he or she is qualified and trained to perform within the same salary range as his or her maximum wage earning capacity at the time of the injury.
(c) Demonstrate that the work-related injury prevents the employee from performing jobs identified as within his or her qualifications and training that pay maximum wages.
(d) If the employee is capable of performing any of the jobs identified in subdivision (c), show that he or she cannot obtain any of those jobs. The evidence shall include a showing of a good-faith attempt to procure post-injury employment if there are jobs at the employee's maximum wage earning capacity at the time of the injury.
A worker must also establish wage loss and not merely a reduced capacity to earn wages. Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich. 144, 160 n 11, 160-161; 648 N.W.2d 144 (2002). A worker who retains a partial capacity to work is considered "partially disabled." Nichols v Howmet Corp, 306 Mich.App. 215, 221; 855 N.W.2d 536 (2014).
Plaintiff argues that her Exhibits 7 and 10, authored by defendant, were admissions under MRE 801(d)(2), and when read together they are dispositive of whether plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled for purposes of workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 is a letter dated May 22, 2006, from defendant to plaintiff stating: "This is to inform you that your application for Total and Permanent Disability retirement (T&PD) has been reviewed. Based on the medical evidence submitted, the Corporation has determined that you are totally and permanently disabled." Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, entitled "General Motors Salaried Retirement Program," states that a salaried employee is eligible for a total and permanent disability pension when, "on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to General Motors the employee is found to be wholly and permanently prevented from engaging in regular employment or occupation for remuneration or profit as a result of bodily injury or disease ...." Plaintiff argues that Exhibits 7 and 10 are admissions under MRE 801(d)(2) that together demonstrate that defendant admitted that plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled for purposes of defendant's pension benefits and therefore also for purposes of workers' compensation benefits.
We disagree that defendant's statements are dispositive of whether plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the WDCA. Whether a statement is an admission of a party-opponent under MRE 801(d)(2) is relevant only to the admissibility of the statement into evidence. Generally, the rule against hearsay prohibits a party from offering as evidence an out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. MRE 802; MRE 801(c). However, an opposing party statement, previously referred to as an admission of a party-opponent, is not considered to be hearsay and is therefore not excluded as such. MRE 801(d)(2). In this case, plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 10 were admitted into evidence, and defendant has not challenged the admission of the exhibits on appeal. Because the admissibility of the exhibits is not challenged, whether the statements were exempted from the hearsay prohibition as admissions of a party opponent is not at issue.
Rather, plaintiff's challenge on appeal regarding the exhibits is what importance the magistrate and the WDCAC should have placed upon the exhibits in determining whether plaintiff is disabled under the WDCA. Plaintiff argues that the magistrate and the WDCAC erred because they refuse to find the exhibits dispositive of whether plaintiff was disabled under the WDCA. We disagree.
Regardless of whether a statement is an "admission" for evidentiary purposes under MRE 801(d)(2), it is not an "admission" in the sense that it is definitive evidence establishing a fact. Radtke v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 453 Mich. 413, 421; 551 N.W.2d 698 (1996). An "evidentiary admission is not conclusive but is always subject to contradiction or explanation." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, whether an employee is disabled, either partially or totally, for purposes of the WDCA, is determined by whether the claimant demonstrates disability by presenting evidence relevant to his or her medical condition and the relevant vocational opportunities available, not by whether the employer declares the claimant to be disabled or not disabled. We note that if, for example, defendant in this case had determined that plaintiff was not disabled under the terms of defendant's pension, that determination would not be conclusive on the issue of whether plaintiff were disabled under the WDCA.
Here, the WDCAC affirmed the opinion of the magistrate; on the basis that the magistrate's findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, the WDCAC accepted the magistrate's decision that plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 10 were of little evidentiary weight and that the opinions of the experts regarding plaintiff's medical condition and vocational opportunities were more persuasive. The WDCAC observed that the eligibility criteria for total and permanent disability under defendant's pension program differed from the criteria for finding a total and permanent disability under the WDCA and as a result, defendant's statements in Exhibits 7 and 10 were not dispositive regarding plaintiff's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits under the statutory criteria.
The WDCAC did not err when it upheld the magistrate's decision. The magistrate's finding that plaintiff is partially disabled is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. See Cramer, 512 Mich. at 41. Each of the magistrate's findings was based on the opinion of a physician or vocational expert and was made with comparison to the other expert opinions. The WDCAC reviewed the entire record and determined that the magistrate's findings were adequately supported by evidence. Accordingly, the WDCAC was required to consider the magistrate's findings conclusive. Id. This Court, in turn, is required to treat the factual findings of the WDCAC as conclusive in the absence of fraud. Id., quoting MCL 418.861a(14); in accord Mudel, 462 Mich. at 702. We therefore affirm the decision of the WDCAC that plaintiff is partially disabled for purposes of workers' disability compensation benefits.
C. ERISA PREEMPTION
Plaintiff contends that the WDCAC erred when it concluded that it did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim that defendant is wrongfully reducing plaintiff's pension benefits to recoup allegedly overpaid workers' compensation benefits. We disagree that the WDCAC erred by determining that the agency lacks jurisdiction over defendant's distribution of plaintiff's pension benefits, but we conclude that the WDCAC failed to make adequate factual findings regarding the alleged overpayment of workers' compensation benefits to plaintiff.
The Workers' Disability Compensation Agency has exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the WDCA. Harris v Vernier, 242 Mich.App. 306, 320; 617 N.W.2d 764 (2000). MCL 418.841(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Any dispute or controversy concerning compensation or other benefits shall be submitted to the bureau and all questions arising under this act shall be determined by the bureau or a worker's compensation magistrate, as applicable....
In addition, "an administrative agency possesses the jurisdiction to address any questions within its remit ...." Allen v Charlevoix Abstract &Engineering Co, 326 Mich.App. 658, 663; 929 N.W.2d 804 (2019). Under MCL 418.851, "the worker's compensation magistrate at the hearing of the claim shall make such inquiries and investigations as he or she considers necessary."
The WDCA does not authorize double compensation to an injured employee. Fisher v Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hosp, 329 Mich.App. 555, 560; 942 N.W.2d 706 (2019). Rather, MCL 418.354(1) provides for the reduction of the amount of workers' compensation benefits an employer is obligated to pay an employee to offset amounts the employee receives from other forms of disability compensation, such as a pension plan maintained by the employer. Smitter v Thornapple Twp, 494 Mich. 121, 138; 833 N.W.2d 875 (2013). An employer may file an action to recoup workers' compensation benefits that are overpaid to an employee. See Ross v Modern Mirror &Glass Co, 268 Mich.App. 558, 559; 710 N.W.2d 59 (2005). MCL 418.354 establishes the procedures for an employer to recoup workers' compensation benefit overpayments. MCL 418.354 provides, in pertinent part:
(9) . . . The employer or carrier shall calculate the amount of the overpayment and send a notice of overpayment and a request for reimbursement to the employee. Failure by the employee to reimburse the employer or carrier within 30 days after the mailing date of the notice of request for reimbursement allows the employer or carrier with the approval of the agency to discontinue 50% of future weekly compensation payments under section 301(7) or (8), 351, or 835. The compensation payments withheld shall be credited against the amount of the overpayment. Payment of the appropriate compensation benefit shall resume when the total amount of the overpayment has been withheld.
(10) The employer or carrier taking a credit or making a reduction as provided in this section shall immediately report to the agency the amount of any credit or reduction, and as requested by the agency, furnish to the agency satisfactory proof of the basis for a credit or reduction.
An employer's ability to recoup workers' compensation benefit overpayments is time-limited. Under MCL 418.833(2), "[w]hen an employer or carrier takes action to recover overpayment of benefits, no recoupment of money shall be allowed for a period which is more than 1 year prior to the date of taking such action." See also Fisher, 329 Mich.App. at 560.
Plaintiff initiated this action alleging in part that the "[e]mployer is attempting to recover previously paid wage loss benefits from employee pension in contravention of §354(9)(10) and §433(2) of the Act." Defendant contends that the agency does not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether defendant is improperly withholding plaintiff's pension benefits because ERISA expressly preempts state regulation of pension plans. See Dorko v Dorko, 504 Mich. 68, 73; 934 N.W.2d 644 (2019). Under 29 USC 1144(a), ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" regulated by ERISA.
The exclusive remedy for claims involving ERISA plans lies in ERISA § 502, 29 USC 1132. Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208-209; 124 S.Ct. 2488; 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004). "[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted." Id. at 209. However, a cause of action is not preempted if it arises from a legal duty that does not stem from ERISA, and the claim to enforce a right could not have been brought under § 502. Id. at 210. This Court has held that MCL 418.354 is not preempted by ERISA. See Scheuneman v Gen Motors Corp, 243 Mich.App. 210, 216-217; 622 N.W.2d 525 (2000). The central rationale is that MCL 418.354 does not alter in any way the amount of benefits that are payable under an ERISA plan, but rather reduces the amount of workers' compensation benefits that are payable by reference to amounts paid out by ERISA plans. Id. at 215-216.
In this case, plaintiff claims that defendant recouped workers' compensation payments under the guise of withholding pension payments. The only evidence in the record regarding defendant's recoupment of overpayments is the two letters that defendant sent to plaintiff regarding the alleged overpayments and the withholding of pension benefits. Defendant's July 16, 2015 letter to plaintiff simply stated, without explanation, that plaintiff had been overpaid $247,955.53 in pension benefits and that, if plaintiff did not send defendant a check for the full amount, defendant would withhold plaintiff's pension payments, with the exception of Part B payments, until the amount was recovered. Defendant's August 5, 2015 letter to plaintiff stated that the actual amount plaintiff owed was $131,158.47, and "[t]his overpayment amount includes Workers Compensation overpayment of $98,308.62 and pension overpayment of $32,849.85." The letter further states:
Please be informed that your Monthly Worker's Compensation (WC) Offset was larger than the retirement entitlement; therefore, your benefit was reduced l00% with the exception of the Part B Primary benefit.
Since your monthly Worker's Compensation Offset was larger than the retirement benefit entitlement, there is a Worker's Compensation overpayment on the account.
A review of the record does not provide an explanation for defendant's conflicting references to a workers' compensation benefit overpayment and a workers' compensation payment offset in the letters.
The WDCAC was required to examine the whole record from the magistrate's proceedings and determine whether competent, material, and substantial evidence supported the magistrate's findings. MCL 418.861a(3) and (4). Further, the WDCAC was required to perform a "qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review." MCL 418.861a(13). Review of the magistrate's decision by the WDCAC requires "a highly fact- intensive examination." Mudel, 462 Mich. at 701. If the record is insufficient for the WDCAC to properly review the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the WDCAC must remand the case to the magistrate for further factual development. Id. at 710-712. If the magistrate did not make a finding necessary to resolve an issue, but the record on appeal to the WDCAC is sufficient, the WDCAC may make the necessary finding. Id. at 711.
The WDCAC affirmed the magistrate's determination that the agency lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to fashion a remedy in this case that implicates pension payments. However, the WDCAC did not engage in a highly fact-intensive examination of the circumstances to address the adequacy of the magistrate's resolution of plaintiff's assertion that defendant was improperly recouping an alleged overpayment of workers' compensation benefits by reducing pension benefits exclusively regulated under ERISA. Under MCL 418.354(9) and (10), any attempt by an employer to recoup workers' compensation benefit overpayments must be reported to the agency, along with satisfactory proof provided by the employer to the agency of the basis for the credit or reduction. It is, therefore, implicit that the agency has the authority to decide whether an employer is recouping workers' compensation benefits in violation of the statute. Accordingly, the WDCAC was required to perform a qualitative and quantitative analysis to determine whether the magistrate sufficiently addressed plaintiff's allegation that defendant was recouping alleged workers' compensation overpayments through improper means.
Here, the gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that defendant wrongfully determined that plaintiff received an overpayment of workers' compensation benefits and is using means to recoup overpayments that are not authorized by MCL 418.354. Although the WDCAC cannot order a remedy that implicates pension benefit payments, whether an overpayment of workers' compensation benefits occurred and to what extent and the manner in which it may be recouped are questions arising under the WDCA. We therefore remand this case to the WDCAC, which on remand should determine whether the record is sufficient to make the necessary findings to determine the issue and, if not, remand this case to the magistrate. See, e.g., Jordan v Dep't of Health &Human Servs, 510 Mich. 369, 378-379; 987 N.W.2d 119 (2022).
We affirm the decision of the WDCAC that plaintiff is partially disabled for purposes of workers' disability compensation benefits. We remand to the WDCAC for further proceedings to determine whether plaintiff has received an overpayment from defendant of wage loss benefits, and if so, to what extent and the manner in which defendant can recoup the overpayment of wage loss benefits. We do not retain jurisdiction.