Although the court still refused to allow the People to call Dr. Wortzel during their case-in-chief (because of the Miranda violation), it ruled that they could use his testimony "to rebut any evidence presented that [Liggett] was insane at the time of the alleged offense." Specifically, relying on People v. Branch, 805 P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1991), and Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2007), the court ordered that if Liggett "present[ed] evidence that he was insane at the time of the alleged offense," the People could then "call Dr. Wortzel in rebuttal to opine on [Liggett's] sanity" even though his opinion was "based in part" on statements Liggett made following the Miranda violation. ¶10 Before trial, the People issued subpoenas to Liggett's medical providers seeking information regarding his mental health.
1999). That court also affirmed the denial of a motion for sentence reconsideration, People v. Dunlap, 36 P.3d 778 (Colo. 2001), as well as the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, Dunlap v. Colorado, 173 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2007). The federal district court denied habeas relief. Dunlap v. Zavaras, 2010 WL 3341533 (D. Colo. Aug. 24, 2010).
¶11 In a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, the trial court is the trier of fact and determines the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1061– 62 (Colo. 2007); Kailey v. Colo. State Dep't of Corr., 807 P.2d 563, 567 (Colo. 1991). We defer to a post-conviction court's findings of fact when they are supported by the evidence but review conclusions of law de novo.
¶ 11 In a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, the trial court is the trier of fact and determines the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1061–62 (Colo.2007); Kailey v. Colo. State Dep't of Corr., 807 P.2d 563, 567 (Colo.1991). We defer to a post-conviction court's findings of fact when they are supported by the evidence but review conclusions of law de novo.
This right "can therefore be violated by 'representation that is intrinsically improper due to a conflict of interest.'" Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1070 (Colo. 2007) (quoting in part People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943 (Colo. 1983)).
A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights "can therefore be violated by `representation that is intrinsically improper due to a conflict of interest.'" Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1070 (Colo. 2007) (quoting People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943 (Colo. 1983)).
We defer to a postconviction court's findings of fact if they are supported by evidence in the record, and we review its conclusions of law de novo. See Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo. 2007). ¶ 14 As a matter of first impression, we determine that due process claims arising from delays in resolving motions for postconviction relief should be analyzed under the balancing test set forth in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Although this test was originally applied to issues concerning a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, courts have employed it in the context of due process claims arising from delays in various legal proceedings.
II. AnalysisA. Standard of Review We review a trial court's decision to disqualify a district attorney for an abuse of discretion. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1094 (Colo. 2007) (citing People v. N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 678 (Colo. 2006) and People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 882 (Colo.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062–63 (Colo. 2007).
While in certain circumstances the General Assembly has created special statutory requirements when the prosecutor seeks the death penalty, see, e.g., § 18-1.3-1201(3)(b), C.R.S. (2008); Crim. P. 32.1(d)(2) (outlining special disclosure requirements), it chose not to do so here. See, e.g., Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1094-95 (Colo.2007) (applying disqualification statute to a death penalty case without employing a special standard). Perez argues that we should apply a standard of heightened reliability.