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Dunlap v. People

112 Citing cases

  1. Liggett v. People

    529 P.3d 113 (Colo. 2023)   Cited 4 times

    Although the court still refused to allow the People to call Dr. Wortzel during their case-in-chief (because of the Miranda violation), it ruled that they could use his testimony "to rebut any evidence presented that [Liggett] was insane at the time of the alleged offense." Specifically, relying on People v. Branch, 805 P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1991), and Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2007), the court ordered that if Liggett "present[ed] evidence that he was insane at the time of the alleged offense," the People could then "call Dr. Wortzel in rebuttal to opine on [Liggett's] sanity" even though his opinion was "based in part" on statements Liggett made following the Miranda violation. ¶10 Before trial, the People issued subpoenas to Liggett's medical providers seeking information regarding his mental health.

  2. Dunlap v. Clements

    476 F. App'x 162 (10th Cir. 2012)   Cited 3 times
    Describing Mickens' rule as presuming prejudice after a party demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest exists and that the conflict impaired the representation

    1999). That court also affirmed the denial of a motion for sentence reconsideration, People v. Dunlap, 36 P.3d 778 (Colo. 2001), as well as the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, Dunlap v. Colorado, 173 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2007). The federal district court denied habeas relief. Dunlap v. Zavaras, 2010 WL 3341533 (D. Colo. Aug. 24, 2010).

  3. West v. People

    2015 CO 5 (Colo. 2015)

    ¶11 In a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, the trial court is the trier of fact and determines the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1061– 62 (Colo. 2007); Kailey v. Colo. State Dep't of Corr., 807 P.2d 563, 567 (Colo. 1991). We defer to a post-conviction court's findings of fact when they are supported by the evidence but review conclusions of law de novo.

  4. West v. People

    341 P.3d 520 (Colo. 2015)   Cited 23 times
    Concluding that a supreme court opinion implicitly overruled an earlier opinion, making the current case's overruling explicit

    ¶ 11 In a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, the trial court is the trier of fact and determines the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1061–62 (Colo.2007); Kailey v. Colo. State Dep't of Corr., 807 P.2d 563, 567 (Colo.1991). We defer to a post-conviction court's findings of fact when they are supported by the evidence but review conclusions of law de novo.

  5. People v. Samuels

    228 P.3d 229 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that a probation officer's reasonable suspicion that the defendant had violated his probation conditions was sufficient to justify a search, and rejecting contention that a warrant or showing of probable cause was required

    This right "can therefore be violated by 'representation that is intrinsically improper due to a conflict of interest.'" Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1070 (Colo. 2007) (quoting in part People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943 (Colo. 1983)).

  6. People v. Shari

    204 P.3d 453 (Colo. 2009)   Cited 17 times
    In People v. Shari, 204 P.3d 453 (Colo. 2009), the Supreme Court of Colorado stated that "[t]he comments to Rule 1.11 make clear that a government attorney's individual conflicts are not imputed to the entire government agency for which he works."

    A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights "can therefore be violated by `representation that is intrinsically improper due to a conflict of interest.'" Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1070 (Colo. 2007) (quoting People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943 (Colo. 1983)).

  7. People v. Hardin

    405 P.3d 379 (Colo. App. 2016)   Cited 10 times
    Deferring to postconviction court’s determinations as to the "weight and credibility to give to the testimony of witnesses at a Crim. P. 35(c) hearing"

    We defer to a postconviction court's findings of fact if they are supported by evidence in the record, and we review its conclusions of law de novo. See Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo. 2007). ¶ 14 As a matter of first impression, we determine that due process claims arising from delays in resolving motions for postconviction relief should be analyzed under the balancing test set forth in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Although this test was originally applied to issues concerning a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, courts have employed it in the context of due process claims arising from delays in various legal proceedings.

  8. People v. Loper

    241 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2010)   Cited 7 times
    In Loper, the victim's mother was a probation officer in the judicial district of the prosecution and may have influenced the decision to initiate the case against the defendant, but there was no evidence that the resulting trial would be unfair.

    II. AnalysisA. Standard of Review We review a trial court's decision to disqualify a district attorney for an abuse of discretion. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1094 (Colo. 2007) (citing People v. N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 678 (Colo. 2006) and People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 882 (Colo.

  9. People v. Garner

    381 P.3d 320 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 3 times

    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062–63 (Colo. 2007).

  10. People v. Perez

    201 P.3d 1220 (Colo. 2009)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that the district court had erred in disqualifying the entire district attorney's office based on an assistant district attorney's prior representation of the defendant and the consequent appearance of impropriety because the appearance of impropriety was not a proper ground for disqualification and the record showed that the assistant had no confidential information to pass on to other prosecutors working on the case

    While in certain circumstances the General Assembly has created special statutory requirements when the prosecutor seeks the death penalty, see, e.g., § 18-1.3-1201(3)(b), C.R.S. (2008); Crim. P. 32.1(d)(2) (outlining special disclosure requirements), it chose not to do so here. See, e.g., Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1094-95 (Colo.2007) (applying disqualification statute to a death penalty case without employing a special standard). Perez argues that we should apply a standard of heightened reliability.