โข 1 In reviewing the dismissal of an action under section 2-615, the court must accept all well-pled facts and reasonable inferences as true and must interpret the allegations of the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. ( Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433.) The dismissal should be affirmed if it appears that no set of facts from the complaint could be proven that would entitle plaintiff to relief. Turner v. Rush Medical College (1989), 182 Ill. App.3d 448, 537 N.E.2d 890.
Under these circumstances, we consider that Fennessey had a duty either to warn those rightfully on the premises of the danger or to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable unauthorized entries by those with a master or grandmaster key. (See Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 98; Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 551.) Having failed to do so, they breached their duty and can be held responsible for the reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third persons which are proximately caused by their negligence.
Further, the dispositions documented, if any, are generic and include such dispositions as "Information for Officers Only," "Report Made," "Checked Area No Activity," "Citation Issued," and "Arrest Made." ยถ 68 Plaintiff cites Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority, 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975), and Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1986), to support her proposition that a landlord who has prior notice of criminal activity has a duty to protect his tenants from the criminal actions of third parties. Our review of these cases reveals that they offer plaintiff no support. ยถ 69 In Stribling, the plaintiffs lived in an apartment building.
As a result, we find that it is the plaintiff who has waived his argument. Plaintiff further contends that an issue of fact exists as to his right to recover by virtue of a second exception to the general rule regarding a landlord's liability for criminal assaults on his tenants by third parties, which may occur when a landlord is negligent in maintaining the property, and the condition of the premises facilitates the criminal acts. ( Rowe, 125 Ill.2d at 224, 531 N.E.2d 1358; Cross, 82 Ill.2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472; Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Management, Inc. (1989), 186 Ill. App.3d 820, 542 N.E.2d 902; Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433; Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47.) "While a landlord is not an insurer and cannot be held liable for harm done by every criminal intruder ( Trice v. Chicago Housing Authority (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 97, 100, 302 N.E.2d 207), prior incidents similar to the one complained of and which are connected with the physical condition of the premises may impose a duty of reasonable case [ sic]." ( Duncavage, 147 Ill. App.3d at 97-98, citing Stribling, 34 Ill. App.3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47.)
( Grimwood v. Tabor Grain Co. (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 708, 474 N.E.2d 920.) None of these factors is present in this case. Plaintiff contends in the alternative that Illinois decisions have deviated from a strict application of the special relationship rule, and argues that all persons are under a duty to refrain from any action which facilitates a foreseeable criminal act. ( Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433, appeal denied (1987), 113 Ill.2d 573, 505 N.E.2d 352; Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47.) In Duncavage, the complaint alleged that a criminal's entry of an assaulted tenant's apartment was facilitated by the landlord's failure to properly light the exit area of the building, to remove a ladder stored by the landlord in the yard near the tenant's window, and to properly maintain a lock on the window used to gain access to the apartment.
210 ILCS 45/3-602, 3-603 (West 2006). In that sense, the Act is more akin to that considered by the court in Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1986). In Duncavage, the court dismissed a survival action claim for punitive damages under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) ( 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006)), stating: "[t]he circumstances here fall short of the requirements of Froud.
While at one time criminal acts were presumed unforeseeable, the law has developed to recognize that criminal acts may become foreseeable in a variety of circumstances so that liability may still attach to a landowner. Compare, generally, Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Ill. App. 585, 603 (1952) ("An independent act of negligence or wilfulness by a third person is an occurrence which a defendant is not bound to anticipate"), with Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 96 (1986) ("proximate cause may be treated as a matter of law in undisputed fact situations in which a court has deemed an intervening event to be so unforeseeable that the first wrongdoer could not have reasonably anticipated a third party to act and cause harm to another. *** [H]owever, if the criminal act might reasonably have been foreseen at the time of the negligence, the causal chain is not automatically or necessarily broken"); see also Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 376-77 (1943) (holding criminal acts to be foreseeable when persons prone to criminality are known to loiter near a premises); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74 (1954) (holding criminal acts foreseeable based on the defendant's creation of a condition that facilitates the crime); Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority, 34 Ill. App. 3d 551 (1975) (holding criminal acts to be foreseeable based on the occurrence of prior criminal acts on the premises).
A landlord owes a duty to its tenants to maintain the common areas in a reasonably safe condition. Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 96, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1986). Public entities, including schools, owe a duty of ordinary care to individuals upon their property.
Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 53 Ill. App.3d 472, 474, 368 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1977). Although Lowrie has been applied in numerous Illinois cases (see, e.g., Immergluck, 53 Ill. App.3d 472, 368 N.E.2d 803 (professional services and buildings); Dubin v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center, 74 Ill. App.3d 932, 393 N.E.2d 588 (1979) (X-radiation and electricity); Heller v. Cadral Corp., 84 Ill. App.3d 677, 406 N.E.2d 88 (1980) (condominium unit); Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App.3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980) (storage tank); Walker v. Shell Chemical, Inc., 101 Ill. App.3d 880, 428 N.E.2d 943 (1981) (guardrail incorporated into a building); Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill.2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983) (asbestos); Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 118 Ill. App.3d 520, 455 N.E.2d 142 (1983) (conveyor); Hubbard v. Chicago Housing Authority, 138 Ill. App.3d 1013, 487 N.E.2d 20 (1985) (steam pipes incorporated into building); Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1986) (lights, windows and window locks incorporated into building)), none have addressed the particular question presented here. Accordingly, we address the plaintiffs' argument that a stack is a product that suffers from defective "unitization" as an issue of first impression and look for guidance in our decision to similar cases from other jurisdictions. For reasons that follow, we find that a stack is not a "product" within the meaning of section 402A and the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant on the strict product liability count of plaintiffs' complaint. In Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Corp., 14 Wn. App. 642, 544 P.2d 107 (1975), a longshoreman employed to assist in moving the defendant corporation's wood pulp out of port storage facilities for further shipment brought action, inter alia, on a theory of strict liability for injuries received when he was struck by bales falling from a disintegrating eight-bale unit of pulp.
Defendants also argue that dismissal of plaintiff's negligence count was appropriate because plaintiff did not allege that prior criminal conduct occurred in the building which would have put defendants on notice that their failure to exercise due care would create a dangerous condition on the premises. Defendants urge that Rowe v. State Bank (1988), 125 Ill.2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358, and Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433, relied upon by plaintiff in support of her negligence claim, are factually distinguishable from the case at bar. Defendants also note that in Rowe and Duncavage there had been previous incidents of violent criminal activity and assert that these decisions reaffirm a "prior incidents" requirement.