Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-02-005 SCD
Submitted: June 2, 2002
Decided: September 10, 2002
ORDER
This 10th day of September 2002, upon consideration of Petitioner's opening brief, Respondent's answering brief, and the record in this case, it appears that: (1) Petitioner, James H. Duncan ("Duncan"), has filed an appeal from the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("UIAB") affirming an Appeals Referee's decision on November 27, 2001, ordering repayment of unemployment funds wrongfully, although non-fraudulent, received by Duncan for the weeks August 25, 2001, through September 15, 2001. (2) Duncan had for a period of years prior to November 1998, secured employment through the Wilmington Senior Center. At some point during his tenure with the Senior Center, Duncan was directed to Randstad, a local temporary agency specialized in providing employers with short term or job specific temporary employees. Randstad placed Duncan with the Wilmington office of Chase Manhattan Bank, where his performance and dedication remains unquestioned. The record is clear that beginning November of 1998, through the end of his employment on August 17, 2001, Duncan was an exemplary temporary employee and served both Randstad and Chase Manhattan Bank admirably. (3) On August 19, 2001, two days after Duncan's job at Chase Manhattan Bank expired, he filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The claim became effective on August 20, 2001, after Duncan signed the required form UC-410, acknowledging his responsibility to repay all disbursed unemployment benefits in the event of disqualification. See A-9. (4) Pursuant to this claim, it was preliminarily determined that Duncan was entitled to $153.00 per week, less the Federal taxes of $15.00 that he elected to have withheld. Thereafter, for the first three weeks on August 25, September 1, and September 8, 2001, Duncan received three net unemployment disbursements of $138.00 each. See A-10. Though the record is not precisely clear as to when, at some point, it was determined that Duncan was in fact entitled to $165.00 per week. The fourth check was then issued in the correct amount for the week of September 15, 2001, for $165.00 less $17.00 in Federal Tax. See A-10. Thereafter, an additional three checks were issued on September 27, 2001, for $12.00 each less the $1.00 Federal tax withholding making up for the deficiency in disbursement pursuant to the original assessment of $153.00. It is undisputed that Duncan received a total of seven separate disbursements totaling $660.00. (5) After the aforementioned disbursements to Duncan, a Claims Deputy contacted Randstad during a routine audit and learned that Duncan's assignment with Chase Manhattan had ended, and Duncan had requested four weeks of leave for rest and medical purposes before beginning his next assignment. On October 9, 2001, the Claims Deputy determined that Duncan was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits, having voluntarily left employment. Duncan thereafter had ten days to appeal before the determination became final on October 19, 2001. Duncan failed to appeal. See A10-11. (6) On October 22, 2001, Duncan was notified by mail, that "due to non-fraudulent actions, an overpayment of benefits has been issued in the amount of $660.00, for 4 week(s) beginning 08/25/2001 to 09/15/2001." See A3. Recoupment, as agreed to by Duncan in his signed form UC-410, was ordered. Duncan timely appealed pro se the recoupment order. A hearing was held on November 27, 2001, before an Appeals Referee. Duncan's appeal was denied and he was again ordered to satisfy the overpayment of $660.00. See A18-20. (7) On December 27, 2001, Duncan appealed the Appeals Referee's decision to the UIAB. The UIAB affirmed the Appeals Referee's decision citing "there is no evidence of error on the part of the Department. . ." See A-29. Duncan then appealed to this Court for review of the UIAB's decision. (8) The function of this Court on review of an UIAB decision is to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is that which is relevant to a reasonable person, or that which adequately supports a reasonable conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make factual findings. (9) The time for filing an appeal is an express statutory condition of jurisdiction that is both mandatory and dispositive. "The appellate jurisdiction of a court cannot be invoked or properly exercised unless an appeal is perfected within the time period fixed by law." Therefore, Petitioners failure to timely appeal the Claims Deputy decision regarding eligibility for unemployment insurance necessarily precludes review of the underlying merits of that decision. As a matter of law, the Referee properly excluded such evidence, as did the UIAB, and such evidence has no relevance to this Courts review. Petitioners Opening Brief continues to forward arguments with respect to the merits of the Claims Deputy's decision regarding denial of the unemployment claim, and they will not be entertained here. (10) There was sufficient evidence presented below to support the UIAB's conclusions. Duncan was in fact afforded unemployment compensation. Duncan both accepted and received the unemployment compensation. A Claims Deputy thereafter determined that Duncan was not eligible for such benefits. The record demonstrates that Duncan failed to timely appeal the Claims Deputy's determination. The record further shows that the Department of Labor representative satisfactorily proved that seven checks totaling $660.00 were in fact issued to, and received by Duncan. Petitioner does not challenge the accuracy of the $660.00 deficiency.
The Claims Deputy cited DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3315(1) (2001): "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (1) For the week in which he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week thereafter until he has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount."
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3318(b) provides in part
Unless a claimant. . . files an appeal within 10 calendar days after such Claims Deputy's determination was mailed to the last know addresses of the claimant and the last employer, the Claims Deputy's determination shall be final. . .
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3325 reads in relevant part
Any person who has received any sum as benefits under this chapter to which it is finally determined that the person was not entitled shall be liable to repay in cash said overpayment, to the Department for the Unemployment Compensation Fund. . .
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960).
Boughton v. Div. of Unemployment Ins., 300 A.2d 25, 26-27 (Del.Super. 1972); See also Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (Del.Super. 1979).
Oceanport Indus. Inc., v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
Keith v. Dover City Cab Co., 427 A.2d 896 (Del.Super. 1981); see also Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 1985 WL 189318 (Del.Super.).
See Draper King Cole v. Malave, 743 A.2d 672, 673 (Del. 1999) (refusing to hear merits on appeal citing that the Delaware Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to review a UIB decision when appeal was not timely filed from UIB to Superior Court); see e.g. Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1989), accord Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988).
See Draper King Cole, 743 A.2d at 673, citing Giordano v. Marta, 723 A.2d 833, 837 (Del. 1988); see also Riggs v. Riggs, 539 A.2d 163 (Del. 1988).
(11) Therefore, the only issues for this Court upon review of the UIAB decision below are whether the record supports the UIAB's finding that (i) the overpayment was directed to the correct individual, and (ii) the amount of the overpayment assessed is accurate. The record is clear and well documented and both of the above questions are easily answered in the affirmative.
The record supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision below is AFFIRMED.