Opinion
No. 3:02cv0086 AS
May 31, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On January 30, 2002, pro se petitioner, Thomas Duncan, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison (ISP) in Michigan City, Indiana, filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Response filed on behalf of the respondent by the Attorney General of Indiana on May 16, 2002, demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The petitioner filed a Traverse on May 28, 2002, which this Court has carefully examined.
The petitioner is a convicted felon serving a sentence imposed by a court in the State of Indiana. He has been the subject of a conduct adjustment board (CAB) proceeding which is designated as ISP-01-10-0481. The Attorney General of Indiana in the Appendix to the Response has placed before this Court Exhibits 1 through 9, both inclusive, which provide detail with regard to the aforesaid disciplinary proceeding. That proceeding sanctioned this petitioner with a deprivation of 180 days of earned credit time, and a demotion to credit time earning class II. These sanctions implicate Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Generally, the sanction of one year in disciplinary segregation does not implicate Wolff. For ease of reference, see the authorities collected in this Court's recent published decision in Hoskins v. McBride, 3:01cv0272 AS (N.D.Ind. May 22, 2002). The administrative appellate procedures have been exhausted.
These proceedings commenced at the ISP on October 2, 2000, when an offender reported to two correctional officers that he, the offender, had been attacked by a black man with a lock in a sock. The victim inmate was injured on the left side of his head, requiring seven stitches. Later, the inmate, apparently having some change of heart, stated that the injuries resulted from a fall. An investigation ensued, resulting in charges, a hearing and decision. There was some delay in attempting to get a statement from the alleged victim inmate. The hearing included attendance by the petitioner and a lay advocate. Much is made of the conflicting statement given by the alleged victim. The CAB relied on the conduct report Internal Affairs filed, and the species of the inmate's statement that implicated this petitioner. Apparently, his contrary assertions were ignored.
This Court has taken the trouble to examine the in camera material. The procedural requirements of Wolff are certainly present here. In general, the "some evidence" test in this circuit has been met. The problem here is a particularized one which relates to a serious concern that this Court has with regard to the non-disclosure of certain items that were sealed. However, one needs to go quite carefully in this regard, and notwithstanding this Court's concerns with such cases as Gaither v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2000), and Chavez v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1991), the Court, after a careful review, finds that the evidence is sufficient under Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) and its progeny in this circuit under the "some evidence" rubric. Also, the sealed material appears to be within the outer boundaries of Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986). Certainly, his argument about the so-called ADP guidelines are largely a variety of state law argument covered by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). See also Hester v. Mc Bride, 966 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.Ind. 1997). In a somewhat close case, there has been compliance with the basic demands of due process under Wolff, and there is no showing of violations of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. See Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 489 U.S. 1088 (1989). Specifically, there is no showing of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, the petition is considered and now DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.