Neither side requested oral argument or filed additional briefs, therefore the cause was resubmitted on brief of the State of Alabama filed in support of its petition for the writ. See Duncan v. City of Scottsboro, 267 Ala. 259, 104 So.2d 447; Orr v. State, 269 Ala. 176, 111 So.2d 639. In brief filed here in support of the petition is a statement to the effect that the State of Alabama filed in this court a motion to strike "the reporter's transcript of the evidence."
No brief has been filed in this court by counsel for Orr. See Duncan v. City of Scottsboro, 267 Ala. 259, 104 So.2d 447. After further consideration of the Alabama cases cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, particularly the case of Gidley v. State, 19 Ala. App. 113, 95 So. 330, we find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by that court to the effect that the conjunction of "(1) a spontaneous communication by the court to the jury at the beginning of a court day, apparently following deliberations by the jury on the prior afternoon for some three or four hours, (2) an emphasis on the public expense, (3) a statement that the court expects a verdict, (4) a statement that the taxpayers (a term which could also mean the 'people') expect a verdict, and (5) a statement that the taxpayers do not expect an exhibition of obstinancy," [Ala.App., 111 So.2d 639] requires the reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
The prosecution for violation of municipal ordinances is statutory and quasi-criminal in nature. Duncan v. City of Scottsboro, 267 Ala. 259, 104 So.2d 447 (1958); Donahey v. City of Montgomery, 43 Ala. App. 20, 178 So.2d 832, cert. denied, 278 Ala. 708, 178 So.2d 837 (1965). Since there is no statute requiring an arraignment in the prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance, an arraignment is not required.
The writ was first denied but on rehearing the writ was issued. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded to us. Duncan v. City of Scottsboro, 267 Ala. 259, 104 So.2d 447. Submission of the cause was set aside, the case was restored to the docket and the appellant granted sixty days in which to file brief if he so desired.