Opinion
C/A 9:22-cv-01925-MGL-MHC
04-16-2024
Rusty Merritte Dunbar, Plaintiff, v. Bryan Sterling, Annie Rumler, and Brenda Jacobs, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MOLLY H. CHERRY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Rusty Merritte Dunbar (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). ECF No. 1. Defendants Bryan Stirling, Annie Rumler, and Brooklyn Jacobs (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). ECF No. 52. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 55. The matter is ripe for review.
Parties agree that Bryan Stirling's last name is spelled “Stirling.” See ECF No. 52 at 1; ECF No. 55 at 1. However, as neither party has moved to correct the spelling, his name remains in the case caption as it is spelled on CM/ECF.
Defendants note Brooklyn Jacobs is incorrectly identified as “Brenda” Jacobs. See ECF No. 521 at 2 n.1. However, as neither party has moved to correct the identification, her name remains in the case caption as it is noted on CM/ECF.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations arising from an incident that occurred while he was housed at Perry Correctional Institution, a facility run by SCDC. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his First Amendment right to access the courts and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2.
Plaintiff has brought these claims previously before this Court. See Dunbar v. Jacobs, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2020 WL 13747865, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 21, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2021 WL 243115 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2021). Indeed, in his Complaint-and in lieu of stating the facts upon which his claim is based- Plaintiff refers to and attaches the above cited Report and Recommendation for a “full statement of facts.” See ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1. This Court previously framed the facts as follows:
On July 24, 2019, Plaintiff gave Defendant [Jacobs] ninety (90) pages of legal materials for copying purposes. Later the same day, Defendant [Jacobs] returned to Plaintiff's cell to advise him that she would have to contact the previous owner of some of the materials, Walter Jones, an inmate at Kershaw Correctional Institution, before she was able to copy those materials because they “did not pertain to [Plaintiff's] conviction, trial, nor was he a co-defendant” in the matter. On July 25, 2019, Defendant [Jacobs] returned to Plaintiff's cell to advise him that “she'd only copied the portions of legal materials relating to his crime and that under advisement of someone within the Office of General Counsel [, and] pursuant to S.C.D.C. Policy Op. GA-01.03 section 11 [,] she'd already sent Plaintiff's property to the former owner [.]” The legal materials that were not copied consisted of a “legal brief compiled for [Walter] Jones by the Law Office of Tara Dawn Shurling in 2016.”Dunbar, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2020 WL 13747865, at *1 (internal citations omitted), adopted, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2021 WL 243115.
Plaintiff maintains that his state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceedings were denied and dismissed with prejudice because he could not provide supporting documentation to prove his handwritten allegations. ECF No. 1 at 6. He alleges this was because Defendants Rumler and Jacobs confiscated his legal materials pursuant to SCDC Policy OP 6A-01.03 Section 11. ECF No. 1 at 6. He further contends Defendant Stirling is responsible for this as Director of SCDC.
Plaintiff seeks $25,000.00 in compensatory damages for property taken, $350,000.00 from each listed Defendant for a total of $1,050,000.00, as well as court costs and filing fees, and declaratory relief.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 52. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment for three main reasons. Specifically, they argue (1) Plaintiff's action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a viable constitutional claim under § 1983, and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 52-1 at 4-11. The Court agrees the case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which is dispositive of the action.
A. Res Judicata
“The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by [1] claim preclusion and [2] issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.'” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). By barring parties from contesting matters they have already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, “these two doctrines protect against the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Id. (cleaned up) (citation omitted).
Somewhat confusingly, caselaw sometimes uses the term “res judicata” to refer specifically to claim preclusion, while the term “collateral estoppel” is used to mean issue preclusion. See In re Varat Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 n.5 (noting the terms claim preclusion and issue preclusion “have replaced a more confusing lexicon[:] Claim preclusion describes the rules formerly known as ‘merger' and ‘bar,' while issue preclusion encompasses the doctrines once known as ‘collateral estoppel' and ‘direct estoppel'”). The undersigned reiterates that the doctrine of res judicata is an umbrella term that “generally refers to the law of former adjudication,” which encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See In re Varat Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d at 1315 n.5; Orca Yachts, L.L.C. v. Mollicam, Inc., 287 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The doctrine of res judicata encompasses two concepts: 1) claim preclusion and 2) issue preclusion[.]”).
Claim preclusion “forecloses ‘successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.'” Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). Claim preclusion bars claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior litigation. Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 2008). To invoke the doctrine of claim preclusion, Defendants must establish three elements: “1) the prior judgment was final and on the merits, and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of due process; 2) the parties are identical, or in privity, in the two actions; and, 3) the claims in the second matter are based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier proceeding.” Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999).
Privity between parties asks “whether the interests of one party are so identified with the interests of another that representation by one party is representation of the other's legal right.” Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 491 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Nash Cnty. Bd. of Ed. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting privity requires a “person so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the subject matter involved” (citation omitted)). Courts impose this requirement because “[a] person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate' the claims and issues settled in that suit.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892.
In Taylor, the Supreme Court of the United States identified six instances in which nonparty preclusion may be justified. See Duckett v. Fuller, 819 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 2016) (detailing the six instances in Taylor by which a nonparty may be bound by a judgment in an action).
The Fourth Circuit has adopted the transactional approach for deciding whether the cause of action in the prior suit is the same as the later suit. Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1058 (4th Cir. 1991). The question “is whether the claim presented in the new litigation ‘arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.'” Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc., 519 F.3d at 162 (quoting Pittston Co., 199 F.3d at 704). “Transaction,” for claim preclusion purposes, “connotes a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.” Pittston Co., 199 F.3d at 704. “Among the factors to be considered in deciding whether the facts of the current and prior claims ‘are so woven together' that they constitute a single claim ‘are their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes.'” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b (1982)).
On the other hand, issue preclusion “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Issue preclusion acts to bar claims when: “(1) the issues litigated in the first action are, in substance, the same as the issues in the second action; (2) the issues were actually determined; (3) the issues were necessary to a final judgment; and (4) the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.” Ali v. Jeng, 86 F.3d 1148, 1996 WL 293181 at *2 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (4th Cir. 1987)).
A defendant's use of issue preclusion precludes a plaintiff from “bring[ing] piecemeal litigation by naming different defendants and alleging new causes of action, when all of his claims arise from the same operative facts.” See id. at *3; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979) (“Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely switching adversaries. Thus defensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
In this case, the doctrine of res judicata clearly applies. However, Defendants conflate claim and issue preclusion into one analysis, arguing that Plaintiff's action is “barred by the doctrine of res judicata or application of collateral estoppel.” See ECF No. 52-1 at 8. Although Defendants' conclusion is correct, the Court finds that claim preclusion is applicable to Defendant Jacobs, while issue preclusion is applicable Defendants Stirling and Rumler. With the above in mind, the Court addresses the issues with regard to the individual Defendants below.
1. Defendant Jacobs
Here, when comparing the prior case to the present case, the elements of claim preclusion are met. First, summary judgment was granted in the 2020 case; thus, it was decided on the merits. See Dunbar v. Jacobs, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2021 WL 243115, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2021) (adopting the December 2020 Report and Recommendation and granting summary judgment); see also Shoup v. Bell & Howell Co., 872 F .2d 1178, 1181 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that Fourth Circuit jurisprudence finds summary judgment dismissal to be a final adjudication on the merits). Second, Defendant Jacobs was a party defendant in the 2020 case and is again named as a defendant in the current case.
Finally, Plaintiff's current § 1983 claims are identical to the claims raised in the 2020 case; namely, that Defendant Jacobs violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Indeed, Plaintiff incorporated the prior Report and Recommendation into his Complaint to set forth the facts for which his current claims are based. See ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1. The additional attachment of important portions of the record from the prior case to the Complaint renders this abundantly clear, if not obvious. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1-10, 1-11, 1-12.
Consequently, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars the entire action as to Defendant Jacobs.
2. Defendants Stirling and Rumler
Here, the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to Defendants Stirling and Rumler. First, the Complaint raises the same issues as in the 2020 case; namely, that SCDC policies which govern the ability to confiscate legal materials which belong to another inmate violate Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Defendants argue claim preclusion also applies to Defendants Stirling and Rumler, as “it is absolutely indisputable that the present parties [Defendants] Stirling and Rumler are in privity with Defendant Jacobs insofar as their interests in this matter.” ECF No. 52-1 at 8. Defendants do not cite any case law but maintain privity exists because all three Defendants are employees of SCDC, arguing “the common interest of each is to uphold the actions and enforcement of regulations again under attack by Plaintiff.” ECF No. 52-1 at 8. It appears that Defendants contend Defendant Jacobs sufficiently represented their interests in the 2020 case, such that it was “adequate” for purposes of nonparty preclusion. This Court cannot make such a finding. As the Supreme Court made clear in Taylor: “[a] party's representation of a nonparty is ‘adequate' for preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of the nonparty and her representatives are aligned; and (2) either the party understood [himself or] herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty. In addition, adequate representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been represented.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 900 (internal citations omitted). Although Defendants allege that the parties' interests align, there is no indication that Defendant Jacobs represented Defendants Stirling and Rumler through a class action mechanism or other type of representational action, such that Defendant Jacobs functioned as Defendants Stirling's and Rumler's trustee, guardian, or fiduciary. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (noting “[Representative suits with preclusive effect on nonparties include properly conducted class actions, and suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries” (internal citations omitted)). Just because all three Defendants work for SCDC does not mean Defendant Jacobs was the “virtual representative” of Defendants Stirling and Rumler. To the extent Defendants appear to advocate for an expansive or liberal interpretation of virtual representation, the Supreme Court expressly rejected that notion in Taylor. See id. at 896-904 (noting, ultimately, that “we disapprove the theory of virtual representation on which the decision below rested”).
Second, this Court already determined the issues Plaintiff raises in this action. Specifically, this Court previously found that Plaintiff had failed to show that he was denied access to the courts as a result of Defendant Jacob's refusal to copy the legal brief from Mr. Jones' case. Dunbar, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2020 WL 13747865, at *4, adopted, No. CV 9:19-2232-MGL-MHC, 2021 WL 243115. As to the SCDC Policy that prohibited Plaintiff from having legal materials of other inmates, this Court found the Policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such that Defendant Jacobs did not violate Plaintiff's due process rights when she confiscated the legal materials and returned it to Walter Jones. Id. at *5. Further, this Court found that “[b]ecause South Carolina provides an adequate remedy for the alleged deprivation of property, Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated, even if it is assumed that Defendant mishandled his personal property.” Id. Thus, this Court already determined the critical issues with regard to Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims now presented in this case.
Third, this Court's determination of the issues Plaintiff now raises were necessary to the final judgment in the 2020 case. See Id. Fourth, and finally, Plaintiff clearly had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the 2020 case. Indeed, the 2020 case was resolved at the summary judgment stage: Plaintiff had the ability to conduct discovery and present evidence, such that he was provided ample opportunity to litigate the issues surrounding the confiscation of the legal materials.
Consequently, the issues that Plaintiff raises in this case were already litigated in the 2020 case. Plaintiff may not relitigate those same issues against different defendants. Plaintiff had the opportunity to name Defendants Stirling and Rumler in the prior action, but he chose not to. Accordingly, issue preclusion prevents Plaintiff from now suing Defendants Stirling and Rumler.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 52, be GRANTED.
The parties are directed to the attached Notice for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).