Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-2035 SECTION: "R"(4).
November 17, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by defendant Rodney J. Strain, Jr., in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish, (the "Sheriff"). Sheriff Strain argues that the Court lacks admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 because commercial vessels can not navigate the Pearl River Navigational Canal. Although Sheriff Strain does not specify the basis for his motion, the Court interprets it as a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Sheriff Strain's motion.
I. Background
This case arises from a boating accident that occurred on April 12, 1998, when plaintiff Timothy Dunaway's recreational motor boat struck a submerged sandbar in the Pearl River Navigational Canal, injuring Mr. Dunaway. Completed in 1956 by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the canal is part of the Pearl River Navigational Project, which consists of fifty-eight miles of waterway extending from Lake Pontchartrain to the Pearl River in Bogalusa, Louisiana. The canal itself is a twenty-two mile waterway connecting two sections of the Pearl River. Although the primary purpose of the canal had been to facilitate commercial shipping, the canal was placed in a limited operational status in 1975 due to a decline in commercial traffic, and the Corps of Engineers discontinued maintenance dredging. In 1988 and 1989, the Corps of Engineers began dredging to "reopen" the waterway to commercial traffic, but a 1995 preliminary injunction stopped those dredging efforts. That same year, Congress restricted further dredging and placed the canal in caretaker status. Although a court lifted the injunction in 1998, the Corps of Engineers has not resumed dredging. Consequently, silt has accumulated in the canal.
Sheriff Strain now moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims. He argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because silt in the Pearl River Navigational Canal impedes commercial navigation.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
As Sheriff Strain does not specify the basis for his motion, the Court must first determine the appropriate legal standard. Plaintiff suggests the Court should apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because Sheriff Strain asks the Court to consider matters outside the pleadings. The Court disagrees and finds that the appropriate legal standard is Rule 12(b)(1), which governs challenges to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), "[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). A district court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three bases: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). Furthermore, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
When examining a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), which does not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of action, the district court has substantial authority "to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Clark, 798 F.2d at 741. Accordingly, the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits. See Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1261. Moreover, a court's dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and the dismissal does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum. See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977).
B. Admiralty Jurisdiction
Federal admiralty jurisdiction exists "if the tort occurs on navigable waters and the tort bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654 (1982)). See also Guillory v. Outboard Motor Corp., 956 F.2d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("Suits lacking any relationship to either navigable waters or traditional maritime activity are without admiralty jurisdiction."). As Sheriff Strain concedes that plaintiff was engaged in a traditional maritime activity when his vessel struck the sandbar, the Court will limit its consideration to whether the canal is "navigable." (Def.'s Reply Mem. at 1.)
The test whether a particular body of water is "navigable" for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction was first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball in the context of rivers. The Supreme Court held:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). Applying this test four years later in The Montello, the Supreme Court explained:
[T]he vital and essential point is whether the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a channel for useful commerce. If this be so the river is navigable in fact, although its navigation may be encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural barriers, such as rapids and sandbars.The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 443 (1874). The Supreme Court subsequently held that this test applies to all bodies of water, natural as well as artificial. See In re Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632, 3 S.Ct. 434, 435 (1884). See also Sanders, 861 F.2d at 1377. In other words, when determining a court's admiralty jurisdiction, "navigable waters of the United States are those waters capable, in fact, of navigation in interstate travel or commerce . . . ." Sanders, 861 F.2d at 1377.
Here, Sheriff Strain contends that the Pearl River Navigational Canal is not susceptible to use by commercial traffic. To support this contention, Sheriff Strain relies on the deposition testimony of Dennis Norris and Kenneth Parker that the canal is not being maintained for commercial interests and that the channel is silted in places. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A at 149, Ex. B at 11-12.) In response, plaintiff posits three arguments in support of navigability. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 6.) First, at the time of the accident, he had been actively navigating his vessel on this waterway. Second, finder the indelible navigability doctrine, "if a body of water has ever been part of the navigable waters of the United States, it always remains so, even if any and all navigation has ceased to exist on the waterway." (Id.) Third, the canal in its present condition is commercially navigable because a towboat pushed a commercial barge over the entire length of the canal a few weeks after plaintiff's April 12, 1998 accident.
The Court will address each of plaintiff's contentions in turn. First, the determination of navigability in fact turns on the capability of a waterway to be used in commerce, not in recreation. See Sanders, 861 F.2d at 1377-78. See also 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-3 (2d. ed. 1994) (As long as commercial activity is proved, the particular mode of travel or type of craft . . . is unimportant, but recreational boating, fishing, and waterskiing alone will not be sufficient."). Accordingly, evidence of plaintiff's recreational boating is insufficient to establish the requisite commercial navigability for admiralty jurisdiction.
Second, the indelible navigability doctrine derives from cases decided under the Commerce Clause, which held that construction of man-made obstacles did not divest Congress of jurisdiction over an otherwise navigable waterway. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291 (1940). This argument confuses the admiralty and nonadmiralty jurisprudence regarding navigable waters. Navigability under the commerce clause focuses on historic navigability, while admiralty jurisdiction turns on current navigability. See, e.g., United States v. Harrell, 926 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1991) (analyzing historic navigability in context of Commerce Clause); Alford v. Appalachian Power Co., 951 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 1991) (assessing the "present configuration" of a body of water to determine whether it is navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction). As plaintiff invokes the Court's admiralty jurisdiction in this case, the Court rejects plaintiff's invitation to base its jurisdiction on the historic navigability of the canal.
Third, plaintiff posits that it is now possible for commercial vessels to navigate the canal. Although such a determination is a question of fact, both parties agree that a shortly after plaintiff's accident, a tugboat pushed a commercial barge through the entire twenty-two miles of the Pearl River Navigational Canal. (Pl.'s Statement Uncontested Facts at 1.) Notwithstanding that successful voyage, Sheriff Strain argues that the canal is not navigable because the barge ran aground on a sandbar during its transit. While sandbars may render the canal difficult to navigate, the undisputed evidence before the Court is that a commercial barge successfully transited the entire canal. That transit proves that the canal is navigable in fact. Therefore, the Court denies Sheriff Strain's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant Sheriff Strain's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.