Rackner answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the MFLSA "does not contemplate an action for wrongful discharge" because the statute does not contain specific language prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee for refusing to share tips. Relying on our decision in Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 2014), the district court stated that "if the Legislature had intended for employees [to] be able to sue for wrongful discharge, it would have included that language explicitly in the MFLSA." Absent language to that effect, the district court refused to recognize a wrongful-discharge cause of action.
Holden Farms, Inc. , 347 F.3d at 1061. Under both Michigan law and Minnesota law, the cause of action for retaliation is a public-policy exception to the presumption that an at-will employee may be dismissed at any time for any reason. SeeKimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgmt. Ltd. , 278 Mich.App. 569, 753 N.W.2d 265, 268 (2008) ; Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014). The origins of the cause of action in the at-will-employment context indicate that retaliation claims can be (and ordinarily are) resolved without reference to any contract between the parties.
Under the principle of judicial restraint, we are generally reluctant to recognize a new common-law right or remedy. SeeDukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 2014) (acknowledging that deciding questions of public policy is a role " โusually better performed by the legislatureโ " (quoting Nelson v. Productive Alts., Inc. , 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 n.5 (Minn. 2006) )).
But we have been reluctant to do so. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 2014). This is because "[t]he public policy of a state is for the legislature to determine and not the courts.
In other words, the Legislature has already provided a judicial remedy for violations of the Official Records Act within the Data Practices Act. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d 147, 153 (Minn. 2014) ("[A]doption of a new cause of action is particularly inappropriate when the Legislature has already provided other remedies to vindicate the public policy of the state"). Under these circumstances, there is no reason to imply a separate, additional, cause of action under the Official Records Act.
But we have never recognized a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge for an employee's reporting of violations of the law. And we limited the Phipps wrongful discharge tort in Dukowitz v. Hannon Security Services, 841 N.W.2d 147 (Minn.2014). In Dukowitz, we held that Phipps created a narrow public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule, thus limiting the common law cause of action to discharges caused by an employee's good-faith refusal to violate the law.
"The plain language of the statute therefore creates a mandatory duty for a district court to award a 'reasonable' amount of costs and disbursements to the prevailing party." Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 155 (Minn. 2014).
"We generally review a district court's award of costs and disbursements for an abuse of discretion." Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 155 (Minn. 2014). The use of "shall" in section 549.04 means that the duty to award reasonable disbursement s to a prevailing party is mandatory. Id.; see also Quade &Sons Refrigeration, Inc. v. Minnesota Min. &Mfg. Co., 510 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn.App. 1994) ("The [district] court does not have discretion to deny costs and disbursements to the prevailing party.")
We review an award of costs and disbursements pursuant to either statute for an abuse of discretion. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 155 (Minn. 2014); see also Quade & Sons Refrigeration, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 510 N.W.2d 256, 260-61 (Minn.App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1994).
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014). In doing so, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law."