Opinion
NO. 09-11-00041-CR
02-15-2012
BOBBY JOE DUKE, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 11-01-00198-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Bobby Joe Duke, Jr., was convicted by a jury for the offense of continuous violence against the family. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11 (West 2011). On appeal, Duke argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present certain testimony over Duke's Confrontation Clause objections. We find error in the admission of the challenged testimony, but we conclude that it was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
On May 28, 2010, Patricia Michon was driving on Highway 105 when she saw a woman running down the road flagging traffic. Michon thought she knew the woman and turned around; however, she was mistaken. The woman, Mary Cox, was hysterical and crying and asked Michon to help her. Cox told Michon her boyfriend had just beat her up. Cox had scratch marks and a swollen and blackened eye. Michon told Cox to get into the truck, drove her to a nearby Shell station, and called 911. She told the dispatcher that she had just picked up a woman on the side of the road who had been beaten up. The dispatcher asked for her location and sent an officer to the scene.
Deputy Kyle Albritton was dispatched to a Shell station in response to the call. Albritton testified that Cox had multiple bruises on her arms, a swollen black right eye, and her nose appeared to have been bleeding. Cox was "hysterical" and "crying." Cox told Albritton "Bobby beat me up," and that Bobby had assaulted her over the "past couple of days." Defense counsel objected under the Sixth Amendment on Confrontation Clause grounds to testimony regarding anything Cox said to Albritton at the scene. The trial court overruled the objections. Albritton looked at Cox's injuries and took pictures. Both Cox and Michon filled out voluntary statements. EMS was called to the scene and transferred Cox to the emergency room at Conroe Regional Medical Center. When Cox was released from the emergency room she went to stay at a local women's shelter, where she stayed for roughly a week.
Thereafter, on June 16, 2010, events transpired between Duke and Cox that again resulted in a call to 911. On the night of the second incident, Garrett Wolfhagen, a patrolman on the night shift for the Conroe Police Department, responded to a domestic violence call around 1 a.m. The caller, Charity Wesley, informed the 911 operator that there was a man beating a women inside a car in the parking lot at the Motel 6. When Wolfhagen arrived on the scene another officer, Officer Valles, was already there. Valles was speaking to Duke. Wolfhagen began speaking with Cox and Wesley and learned that Cox had wanted to leave Duke and planned to stay with Wesley. Cox asked Wesley to help Cox park her car around the other side of the motel to make it look like Cox had left the motel. According to Wesley, while the women were moving Cox's car, Duke jumped through the passenger side window where Wesley was sitting, and started beating Cox, who was in the driver's seat. Wesley exited the car and called 911. After Wolfhagen spoke with Cox and Wesley, he talked to Duke and placed Duke in his patrol car. Duke denied assaulting Cox and stated that she had received her injuries scrapping for metal when she was accidentally hit in the face by a 2-by-4. Duke was arrested on the scene.
A jury convicted Duke of the offense of continuous violence against the family. Duke was sentenced to fifteen years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This appeal followed. In one issue, Duke argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce hearsay statements from Cox and Wesley over his Sixth Amendment objections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
Duke contends that the admission of certain testimony by Officer Albritton and Officer Wolfhagen, concerning statements made by Cox and Wesley regarding the two alleged incidents of family violence, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. "The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'" Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1152, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011). The Confrontation Clause is binding on states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Confrontation Clause bars "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). "It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006).
The Court in Crawford recognized that statements made during police interrogations may be testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153. In Davis the Court held:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstancesDavis, 547 U.S. at 822. In determining whether the primary purpose of an interrogation is "'to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,'" the court must objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occurred and the statements and actions of the parties during the encounter. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). Therefore, the relevant inquiry is not subjective, but rather focuses on "the purpose that reasonable participants would have had," under the circumstances. Id. The Court in Bryant emphasized that during an ongoing emergency the focus is "on 'end[ing] a threatening situation.'" Id. at 1157 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 832). The rationale behind this principle is that statements made by parties requesting police assistance to end an ongoing emergency are much less likely to be fabricated than statements made to police for other purposes. See id. Additionally, a conversation that begins as an interrogation to assess the need for emergency assistance may evolve into a conversation that elicits testimonial statements. Id. at 1159. The Supreme Court in Bryant elaborated:
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides police with information that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute. It could also occur if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as in Davis, flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the public.Id. The Court explained that the primary purpose of an interrogation may often be determined by considering the contents of the questions asked by the interrogating officers and the answers given by the parties. Id. at 1160-61.
In reviewing a trial court's determination regarding whether a statement is testimonial, we apply a hybrid standard of review. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We defer to the trial court's determination of historical facts, but review de novo the trial court's legal determination regarding whether the statement is testimonial. Id.
Appellant argues that statements made by Cox to Officer Albritton regarding the May 28 incident, and statements made by both Cox and Wesley to Officer Wolfhagen regarding the June 16 incident, were testimonial and should have been excluded in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. Our review of the record reveals that appellant did not object to the testimony of Officer Wolfhagen on Confrontation Clause grounds. Generally, to preserve error regarding the admission of evidence, a timely and specific objection must be made to the trial court. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To preserve a claim that evidence was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, a party must make a timely objection on those grounds in the trial court. Id. Appellant did not preserve his complaint regarding Officer Wolfhagen's testimony for review. See id.; see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Therefore, we need not determine whether statements made by Cox and Wesley on June 16 were testimonial.
To convict appellant of continuous violence against the family, the State must establish both incidents of violence alleged in the indictment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.11(a); § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2011); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.003 (West 2011). Therefore, we turn to appellant's complaint regarding Officer Albritton's testimony of the May 28 incident. Appellant argues that Cox's statements to Officer Albritton at the Shell station were testimonial in nature.
Supreme Court Precedent
In Davis v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether statements made in two domestic violence cases, Washington v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) and Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), were testimonial in nature. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. The relevant statements in Davis were made over the phone to a 911 emergency operator, whereas the relevant statements in Hammon were made at the scene to officers who responded to the 911 call. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817-20.
In Davis, a 911 operator answered a call that was terminated before anyone spoke. Id. at 817. The operator reversed the call and Michelle McCottry answered. Id. During the conversation, the operator ascertained that McCottry was involved in a domestic violence disturbance with her former boyfriend. Id. McCottry told the operator, "'He's here jumpin' on me again.'" Id. She stated that she was in a house and that he was "'usin' his fists.'" Id. at 818. When asked for the name of the perpetrator she told the operator it was Adrian Davis. Id. The audiotape of the call established that Davis ran out of the house while McCottry was on the line with the operator. Id. The Court noted that the initial interrogation during a 911 call is conducted primarily "to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance." Id. at 827. In Davis, the Court recognized that McCottry was "speaking about events as they were actually happening" rather than describing events that had already occurred. Id. Moreover, the Court concluded that "any reasonable listener would recognize that McCottry . . . was facing an ongoing emergency." Id. The Court stated, "[a]lthough one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry's call was plainly a call for help against a bona fide physical threat." Id.
In addition, the Court found that the nature of the questions asked and answered during the interrogation in Davis was such that, when viewed objectively, elicited statements necessary to "resolve the present emergency," rather than to learn what had happened. Id. The Court also found significant that in Davis the declarant's answers "were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe." Id. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Id. at 828. Therefore, the Court held that the statements in Davis were not testimonial. Id. at 829.
In Hammon, the statements at issue were made at the scene to officers who responded to a domestic disturbance call. Id. at 819. When officers arrived at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon, they found Amy alone on the front porch. Id. She appeared frightened but told them that nothing was wrong. Id. Amy gave them permission to enter her home where officers observed a gas heating unit with a partial glass front, glass on the ground in front of the heating unit, and a flame emitting from the unit. Id. Hershel told officers that he and Amy had argued but everything was fine now. Id. At that time, Amy came back inside the home. Id. One officer talked with Hershel while the other talked with Amy in another room. Id. At trial, the State called the officer who had questioned Amy to the stand to testify. Id. The defense objected on Confrontation Clause grounds. Id. He testified that Amy told him she had been assaulted and described the events that had taken place. Id. at 820.
The Supreme Court concluded that it was clear from the circumstances in Hammon that the interrogation was part of an investigation into a possible criminal offense that had already occurred. Id. at 829. There was no ongoing emergency. Id. The Court noted that the officer testified that he had not heard any arguing or witnessed anyone throw or break anything. Id. The Court found significant that when the officers arrived, Amy was outside the home and told them she was fine. Id. at 819, 830. Amy told them, "there was no immediate threat to her person." Id. The Court stated, "[w]hen the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) 'what is happening,' but rather 'what happened.'" Id. When viewed objectively, the circumstances indicate the primary objective of the second interrogation (which elicited the challenged statements) was to investigate a possible crime. Id.
In concluding that the statements in Hammon were testimonial, the Court stated,
What we called the 'striking resemblance' of the Crawford statement to civil-law ex parte examinations, . . . is shared by Amy's statement here. Both declarants were actively separated from the defendant—officers forcibly prevented Hershel from participating in the interrogation. Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. And both took place some time after the events described were over. Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently testimonial.Id. at 830-32 (footnote omitted).
. . . [W]e find the comparison [of Hammon] to Davis unpersuasive. The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, not only unprotected by police (as Amy Hammon was protected), but apparently in immediate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past. McCottry's present-tense statements showed immediacy; Amy's narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the danger she described.
In Michigan v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court addressed the nature of statements made to officers responding at the scene of a potential crime. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. The Court elaborated on the "ongoing emergency" standard it addressed in Davis. Id. The challenged statements in Bryant were made at the crime scene to officers who responded to a radio dispatch indicating that a man had been shot. Id. at 1150. At the scene, officers found Anthony Covington lying on the ground next to his car in a gas station parking lot. Id. Covington had a gunshot wound to his abdomen, appeared to be in great pain, and spoke with difficulty. Id. The officers asked him "'what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.'" Id. Covington's conversation with police lasted only five to ten minutes until emergency medical services arrived on the scene. Id.
The Court recognized that whether an ongoing emergency exists "is a highly context-dependent inquiry." Id. at 1158. The Court noted that in Davis and Hammon officers responded to domestic violence calls, in which there was "a known and identified perpetrator, and, in Hammon, a neutralized threat." Id. Additionally, because Davis and Hammon were domestic violence cases, the Court "focused only on the threat to the victims and assessed the ongoing emergency from the perspective of whether there was a continuing threat to them." Id. The Court in Bryant distinguished domestic violence cases, which have "a narrower zone of potential victims" from cases involving threats to public safety, such as in Bryant where an unknown shooter remained at large when officers responded at the scene. Id.
The Court also emphasized that "the duration and scope of an emergency may depend in part on the type of weapon employed[,]" noting that in Davis and Hammon "the assailants used their fists, as controlling the scope of the emergency," whereas Bryant involved the use of a gun. Id. The Court reiterated that in Hammon "removing Amy to a separate room was sufficient to end the emergency[,]" but recognized that removing the victim from the assailant may not end the emergent threat in every case. Id. at 1159. The Court in Bryant also found the victim's medical condition an important factor in the primary purpose analysis "to the extent that it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a testimonial one." Id. Just as it did in Davis, the Court emphasized that a circumstance yielding non-testimonial statements may evolve into one that elicits testimonial statements. Id. The Court explained that this evolution may occur when "a declarant provides police with information that makes clear that what appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an emergency or that what appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute . . . [or] if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, . . . flees with little prospect of posing a threat to the public." Id. Under such circumstances, the court should exclude the portions of any statement that becomes testimonial. Id.
In its analysis, the Court considered the importance of informality that may exist in an encounter between a victim and officers responding at the scene, recognizing that generally, "formality suggests the absence of an emergency[.]" Id. at 1160. The Court found significant that in Bryant, the police questioning "occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion." Id. Finally, the Court explained that in addition to the circumstances in which an encounter with police occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant and the interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose. Id. "In many instances, the primary purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately ascertained by looking to the contents of both the questions and the answers." Id. at 1160-61. The Court stated, "[a]s the context of this case brings into sharp relief, the existence and duration of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public." Id. at 1162. Applying these principles to the facts at issue in Bryant, the Court held that "Covington's identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not testimonial hearsay," and therefore, were not barred from admission at trial. Id. at 1165-67.
Primary Purpose of the Police Interrogation
We now turn to the challenged statements in the present case. Appellant argues that Officer Albritton's testimony regarding statements made by Cox to Albritton at the Shell station on May 28 were testimonial hearsay. At trial, Albritton testified, "[o]n the scene Mary Cox verbally told me what happened to her the past couple of days. She said she was at her house . . . the past couple of days that her boyfriend, Bobby, had been abusing her, beating her up, punching her, and had sexually assaulted her." Albritton testified that immediately after he arrived at the scene, Cox told him, "Bobby beat me up." Albritton further stated, "[s]he said she got punched in the face several times . . . [by] Bobby."
Based on our review of the record, and our application of relevant Supreme Court authorities set forth above, we conclude Cox's statements to Officer Albritton at the Shell station were not made under circumstances that objectively indicate the primary purpose of the interrogation was to employ police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. Like Davis and Hammon, the present case involves a domestic violence dispute, in which there was a known identified perpetrator. Appellant was still "at large" at the time of the interrogation, in the sense that he was not being detained or separated from Cox by the police, and the record does not otherwise establish his whereabouts during the interrogation. Nevertheless, his identity was known, and Cox had removed herself from his presence and the residence where the assaults had occurred. At the time she spoke with Officer Albritton, Cox had been aided by a good Samaritan who had removed her from the side of the highway. Testimony in the record established that Michon was concerned for Cox's safety when she picked her up on Highway 105, and that Cox stated appellant would kill her if he found out she called the police. However, there is nothing in the record from which we could conclude that Cox was in immediate danger when Officer Albritton arrived at the Shell station. We conclude based on the record before us, for the purposes of our analysis, Cox was no longer in immediate danger at the time she made the statements to Officer Albritton. Just as removing Amy Hammon to a separate room was sufficient to end the emergency in Hammon, Cox's emergency had ceased by the time Officer Albritton arrived at the Shell station.
Though the interrogation took place in a public place, prior to the arrival of EMS, the interrogation did not exhibit the type of informality as the police interrogation in Bryant. Albritton testified that he arrived on the scene, talked to Cox and Michon, looked at Cox's injuries, and asked them if they wanted to fill out voluntary statements, which both did. The nature of the questions asked and answered during the interrogation also indicate that the emergency was no longer ongoing. Albritton testified that he asked Cox what had happened and she told him "what happened over the past couple of days[.]" Although Cox was injured, her injuries were not such that they shed light on her ability to have any purpose in responding to police questions. Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. The testimony establishes that Cox's eye was swollen, she was bruised, and her nose had been bleeding; however, the record does not indicate that her condition appeared to be life threatening. Likewise, although the testimony indicates that Cox was hysterical and crying when Albritton arrived on the scene, she was able to articulate what had happened. We conclude, that at the time of the interrogation, the emergency had ended. The interrogation elicited information from Cox about what had happened at a point in time after the described events had ceased. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 832.
We conclude that the statements made by Cox to Officer Albritton at the Shell station on May 28 were testimonial hearsay. Therefore, the admission of such testimonial hearsay was in violation of the Confrontation Clause. We now determine whether this error was harmful.
HARMFUL ERROR ANALYSIS
Confrontation Clause error is subject to a constitutional harm analysis. Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under a constitutional harm analysis, error requires reversal unless the reviewing court can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). In conducting this analysis, "we must 'calculate, as nearly as possible, the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the other evidence.'" Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d at 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). If, in light of the other evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the error materially affected the jury's deliberations, the error is harmful and the judgment must be reversed. Id.; see also Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the following factors as relevant in determining whether constitutional error may be declared harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) how important the out-of-court statement was to the State's case; (2) whether the out-of-court statement was cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence that corroborates or contradicts the out-of-court statement on material points; and (4) the overall strength of the State's case against the defendant. Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 (quoting Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In conducting this analysis we will not consider whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence, but rather the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a factor that contributed to the jury's verdict. Id. In other words, we review the record to determine whether the error adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process that led to the conviction. Id.
We may also consider the source and nature of the error, to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and the weight the jury may have afforded the erroneously admitted evidence. Id. Taking these things into consideration, we ask "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the Crawford error moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion" on the relevant issue. Id. If we are able to satisfy ourselves, to a level of confidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the conviction, we may affirm the judgment. Id.
Our review of the record indicates that Cox's statement that appellant assaulted her is cumulative of other evidence establishing the same. Significantly, Michon was called as a witness at trial. Michon testified that she was driving down Highway 105 when she saw a woman she believed she knew running down the road flagging traffic. Michon did not know Cox, but picked her up after Cox asked for Michon's help. Michon stated that Cox was crying and hysterical. Michon testified, "I asked her what was going on and she said that her boyfriend had just beat her up. And she was pretty bruised up and everything, I guess, from a previous incident[.]" Michon explained that she told Cox to get into the truck. Upon further discussion regarding what happened, Cox told Michon her boyfriend, "Bobby Joe Duke," assaulted her. Michon explained that she checked out Cox's injuries and called the police. A recording of the 911 call made by Michon was also introduced into evidence and published to the jury. Cox told Michon she was afraid Duke would kill her if he found out she called the police.
In addition to testifying regarding what Cox told her, Michon further testified about an encounter she had with appellant at the same Shell station the following day. The day after the May 28 incident, Michon was back at the Shell station with some friends. She testified that appellant came into the store and asked her friend, Cheryl, if she had seen Cox. Though Michon testified that she did not know appellant, she stated that her friend Cheryl was acquainted with appellant. During a discussion regarding Cox, appellant told Cheryl that he had "accidentally hit [Cox] with a 2-by-4." Appellant stated that he was "picking it up and he had told her to move and she didn't and that's how she got her black eye." Michon testified, based on her observation of Cox's injuries the previous day, she did not believe Cox was accidentally hit with a 2-by-4.
In addition to Michon's testimony, the State introduced evidence that appellant assaulted Cox on May 28. The State introduced medical records from Cox's admission to the emergency room on May 28 following the incident. The medical records state that the patient was "assaulted at home," and came in complaining of back, tailbone, and head pain. The records further indicate that she was observed to have "multiple contusions and bruises to [the] face in stages [of] healing." The EMS report includes a narrative, which states that the medic arrived on the scene to find a female who had been assaulted at a different location and was picked up by a good Samaritan. The report states that the patient advised EMS that "her husband beats her up all the time . . . when he started punching her in the face and head tonight . . . she got scared he would kill her and she ran away." Testimony further established that Cox was picked up at the ER by someone from Montgomery County Women's Shelter and taken to the shelter were she stayed for roughly a week.
While Albritton's testimony was important to the State's case, Cox's statement came in through Michon's testimony and medical records from her emergency room visit on May 28. Therefore, Albritton's testimonial statements were cumulative of other evidence. Additionally, other evidence presented corroborates Cox's story about what happened on that evening. Specifically, Michon testified that the following day she overheard appellant tell her friend he accidentally hit Cox with a 2-by-4. Appellant further admitted inflicting some of the injuries, though he contended it was accidental. Detective Todd Hoff with the Montgomery County Sheriff's office testified that he interviewed appellant, who reiterated his story that Cox was accidentally hit in the face with a 2-by-4. Hoff testified that he did not believe appellant's story that the injury was accidental. Cheryl Briggs from the Montgomery County Women's Center testified that when Cox arrived on May 28 she had more injuries than any other woman Briggs had ever seen come to the shelter. This evidence at least partially corroborates Cox's statement that she was assaulted by appellant.
Photographs taken by Officer Albritton on May 28 were admitted into evidence, which also showed Cox's injuries. Appellant did not testify at trial or present any witnesses. The only evidence in the record that contradicts Cox's statements is testimony regarding appellant's contention that he accidentally hit her in the face. In total, the State presented testimony from fourteen witnesses, as well as twelve evidentiary exhibits, to prove up the May 28 and June 16 assaults. Seven of those witnesses offered testimony relevant to establishing the May 28 assault, and eight exhibits were presented to help establish the May 28 assault. Our review of the record indicates the State presented a strong case against appellant.
Cox's statements came in through Michon's testimony, as well as through documentary evidence presented at trial. Photographs taken immediately upon Officer Albritton's arrival at the Shell station depict a badly beaten Cox. Medical records from May 28 indicate that Cox told emergency medical responders that her husband had inflicted the injuries. Testimony further established that Cox did not immediately return home following the incident, but instead resided at a local women's shelter for roughly a week.
From our review of the record, we are satisfied, to a level of confidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the constitutional error did not affect the integrity of the judgment in this case. The admission of Officer Albritton's testimony regarding statements made by Cox was harmless error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). We overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Do not publish Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.