After Dwight Nails was charged with crimes including child molestation, a trial court denied his application for public funds on the ground that he was represented by private counsel. We granted Nails’ interlocutory application to determine whether the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision in Duke v. State , 311 Ga. 135, 856 S.E.2d 250 (2021), requires further proceedings on the question of his status under the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, OCGA § 17-12-1 et seq. ("IDA"). Because the trial court never ruled on the questions of whether Nails is actually indigent under OCGA § 17-12-2, whether his counsel is representing him on a pro bono basis at the present time, and whether he could have access to "state-funded ancillary defense services by contracting with either the [Georgia Public Defenders Council ("GPDC")] or the appropriate circuit public defender," Duke , 311 Ga. at 144 (2) (b), 856 S.E.2d 250, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings on these issues.

May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Duke v. State, 311 Ga. 135, 140 (2) (a), 856 S.E.2d 250 (2021) ("[W]e must consider the meaning of [a] phrase [contained in a statute] in conjunction with the rest of the sentence" in which it appears.); Cook, 317 Ga. at 660 (1), 893 S.E.2d 670 ("For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question."

Other state statutes are less explicit, requiring courts to construe whether the statute limits ancillary services to indigent defendants with court-appointed counsel or allows payment for indigent defendants with privately retained counsel. See, e.g. , Tran v. Super. Ct. , 92 Cal.App.4th 1149, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506, 509–11 (2001) (considering Cal. Penal Code § 987.9 ); State v. Wang , 312 Conn. 222, 92 A.3d 220, 237–40 (2014) (considering Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51–292 ); Duke v. State , 311 Ga. 135, 856 S.E.2d 250, 256–58 (2021) (considering whether Georgia's Indigent Defense Act, which allowed the director to contract with outside consultants as necessary to provide services contemplated by the chapter, applied to services requested by pro bono counsel); State v. Brown , 139 N.M. 466, 134 P.3d 753, 757–60 (2006) (considering whether New Mexico's Indigent Defense Act, which provides "necessary services ... of representation" to "needy persons" applied to pro bono counsel (omission in original) (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31–16–3(A) )). Where the statute is not clear, some courts have interpreted their state's statutes to allow state funding for indigent defendants with retained counsel as a matter of statutory construction.

See Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 2.Roberts v. Unison Behavioral Health , 312 Ga. 438, 443 (2) (b), 863 S.E.2d 99 (2021), citing Duke v. State , 311 Ga. 135, 140 (2) (a), 856 S.E.2d 250 (2021) ("When interpreting a statute, we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and reasonable way, while also giving meaning to all words in the statute."). In ordinary usage, the word "victim" is defined as "one that is acted on and usually adversely affected by a force or agent," and "one that is injured [or] destroyed ... under any of various conditions [such as a car crash or murder]."

The GTCA does not define "nature," so we look to the ordinary meaning of that word in context. See Duke v. State , 311 Ga. 135, 140, 856 S.E.2d 250 (2021) ("When interpreting a statute, we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and reasonable way, while also giving meaning to all words in the statute." (citations omitted)).