Opinion
No. 05-04-01415-CR
Opinion Filed December 19, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F03-52447-SM. Affirm.
Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.
OPINION
Shana Marie Duke waived a jury trial and pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years' imprisonment, probated for six years, and assessed a $1500 fine. In three points of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient, the trial court abused its discretion, and her guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm. In her first point of error, appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support her conviction because the methamphetamine found in a trailer parked behind her house belonged to her husband and the drugs were not in plain view. The State responds that appellant cannot challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence following a guilty plea, and, in the alternative, the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. There is no right to a factual sufficiency review of the evidence to support a guilty plea. See O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). When a defendant pleads guilty, the State must introduce sufficient evidence into the record to support the plea and show the defendant is guilty, and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). We will affirm the trial court's judgment if the evidence introduced embraces every essential element of the offense charged and is sufficient to establish a defendant's guilt. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly possessed with the intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.113(a), (d) (Vernon 2003). The clerk's record contains appellant's signed judicial confession. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the clerk's record is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). During the sentencing hearing, appellant testified that as she walked from her house to a trailer parked in back, police officers stopped her and said she had outstanding traffic tickets. They were also looking for her husband, who was on an electronic monitor, but he had fled the scene. Police searched the trailer and found 192 grams of methamphetamine, a triple-beam scale, and a firearm. Appellant testified her husband was a drug dealer, and the drugs found inside the trailer belonged to her husband. During cross-examination, appellant admitted she had gone from the trailer to the house and back to the trailer right before the officers stopped her. Appellant did not know the officers had her house under surveillance that evening. Appellant further testified (1) she knew there was methamphetamine in the trailer, (2) the drugs were not in plain view on the counter, and (3) the firearm that was found inside the trailer belonged to her husband. Having reviewed all of the evidence, we conclude it embraces all of the essential elements of the offense charged, and is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. See Stone, 919 S.W.2d at 427; see also Barfield v. State, 63 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). We overrule appellant's first point of error. Appellant argues in her second point of error that the trial court abused its discretion in not withdrawing her guilty plea because she denied that she committed the offense. The State responds that the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's guilty plea. When the trial court acts as the fact finder, it is not required to withdraw a defendant's guilty plea sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty because no purpose would be served by doing so. See Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). When a defendant waives her right to a jury trial and enters a guilty plea, it is the trial court's duty to consider all the evidence submitted, and to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. See id. Thus, the trial court had no duty to withdraw appellant's guilty plea in this case. We overrule appellant's second point of error. In her third point of error, appellant argues her guilty plea was involuntary. Appellant asserts she pleaded guilty because she feared her husband, who had been violent towards her on numerous occasions and who was at large at the time she entered her plea. The State responds that appellant has not shown that her guilty plea was involuntary. The record shows the trial court properly admonished appellant orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). At the plea hearing, appellant testified she understood the charges in the indictment and the punishment range for the offense. Appellant testified she was freely and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. As noted above, appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was offered into evidence without objection. Other than appellant's bare assertions, nothing in the record shows her husband threatened or coerced her to enter a guilty plea or that appellant was not aware of the consequences of her guilty plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c); Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). We overrule appellant's third point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.