Indeed, "FERC's exclusive jurisdiction extends over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy." Duke Energy Trading Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001). The scope of this authority is not amenable to case-by-case analysis, but rather represents a bright-line rule:
Appellant, of course, had an "absolute right" to dismiss his claims without prejudice. See Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). Standing alone, his choice to exercise that right would not evince bad intent.
However, the government's original notice of appeal was of an interlocutory order, which did not dispose of the entire case. See Duke Energy Trading Mktg., LLC v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a '"final decision' . . . 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but to execute the judgment'" (quoting Coopers Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978))). Because "an interlocutory appeal is permissive, not mandatory," the government was not obligated to appeal the district court's dismissal of its complaint before the court issued its final order in the case.
The act of filing a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) “closes the file.” Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).
Pate v. Cheng, No. CV-14-02202-TUC-CRP, 2015 WL 795061, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2015) (quoting Am. Soccer Co., Inc. v. Score First Enters., 187 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999), and Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The language of Rule 41(a)(1) is unequivocal. It permits a plaintiff to dismiss an action 'without order of court.'"); Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We have held that Rule 41(a)(1)(i) grants plaintiffs 'an absolute right to dismiss without prejudice' claims against one or more defendant, and requires no action on the part of the court.") (quoting Pedrina). In Pedrina, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the unqualified nature of the plaintiff's right to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i):
A Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal, if filed prior to the service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, is effective automatically upon filing and does not require a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 587-88 (7th Cir. 2011); Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). "Once the notice of dismissal has been filed, the district court loses jurisdiction over the dismissed claims and may not address the merits of such claims or issue further orders pertaining to them."
A Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal, if filed prior to the service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, is effective automatically upon filing and does not require a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 587-88 (7th Cir. 2011); Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). "Once the notice of dismissal has been filed, the district court loses jurisdiction over the dismissed claims and may not address the merits of such claims or issue further orders pertaining to them."
ereign interest); Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998)(plaintiff's claims for prospective relief in employment discrimination suit did not implicate special sovereign interest); Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1998) (relief sought by school districts and public school students to enjoin changes to state management of land trust for public schools was not equivalent to quiet title action); Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of N.M. v. Dept. of Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 612-13 (10th Cir. 1998) (suit by irrigation district to enjoin state to pay district a share of net profits under recreational land lease with United States did not entail special state sovereignty interest, and relief sought was not equivalent to quiet title action); Summit Med. Assoc. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999) (state lacked special sovereignty interest to impose criminal penalties for partial-birth and post-viability abortions); cf. Duke Energy Trading and Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2001)(governor's emergency power to take private property a core state sovereignty interest, although lawsuit merely implicating that power did not trigger Coeur d'Alene ); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 1998) (state power to tax property is a core sovereignty interest, and lawsuit seeking recertification of state property tax assessment was fully as intrusive as retroactive money judgment). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has likewise declined to extend Coeur d'Alene.
A dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) "of a remaining defendant does not render a previous order finally dismissing another defendant 'non-final' for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Duke Energy Trading & Mktg, L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). The filing of the notice "unjoin[s]" the defendant(s) who are the subject of the notice, id. at 1049, and "automatically terminates the action as to [them],"
See Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 836-37, 852-53; TANC, 295 F.3d at 932-33.See Duke Energy Trading Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1056-59 (9th Cir. 2001). We note that Wah Chang is not attacking the contract it had with PacifiCorp; it seeks damages against the Energy Companies only. Cf. Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at 652-53 (an attempt to reform a contract might be sustainable, but damages are not available).