Opinion
2:20-cv-02935-SAL-MGB
03-28-2022
Corey Duggins, # 52710-056, Plaintiff, v. Officer Padilla; Officer Ratley; and Warden M. Travis Bragg, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Corey Duggins (“Plaintiff”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The instant case centers around an injury Plaintiff sustained while cleaning the staff dining room at the Federal Correctional Institution in Bennettsville, South Carolina (“FCI Bennettsville”). According to Plaintiff, an exterior door leading to the dining room had been left open, so he “moved to close the door by placing his hand upon it.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 2.) Plaintiff claims that the exterior door abruptly closed on his hand, severing the tip of his middle finger. (Id. at 3.)
In the “Injury Report” completed shortly thereafter, Plaintiff's supervisor referenced submitting “another work order for the door to be repair [sic] again to make sure the door is opening and closing correctly.” (Dkt. No. 22-2 at 3.) Based on this statement, Plaintiff contends that the door was not operating properly at the time of his accident, and that “either a previous order was ignored or a previous repair did not remedy the problem; either way, the Defendant should have known an improperly working door could be a threat to inmate and staff safety.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 3.) More specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ratley, who served as FCI Bennettsville's Safety Manager, was responsible for ensuring the proper completion of any work orders involving inmate safety. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Padilla, who served as the institution's Food Service Administrator, was responsible for training inmates-like Plaintiff-in their “assigned duties, ” including “opening/closing this door.” (Id.) And finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bragg, the then-Warden of FCI Bennettsville, was responsible for training Defendants Ratley and Padilla and is therefore liable for their actions. (Id. at 4)
Based on the above, Plaintiff alleges that he was “exposed to physical harm due to the deliberate indifference of Ratley, and the failure to train/supervise of Padilla.” (Id.) He claims that the injury to his finger has “caused loss of sensation in the affected digit, ” “affected his ability to grip, type, and any other action involving the middle finger, ” and resulted in “nightmares regarding this incident.” (Id.) He seeks $20,000 in damages. (Id. at 5.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After reviewing the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 22), the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 19.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the Amended Complaint by filing a second amended complaint, which he did after receiving an extension from the Court. (See Dkt. Nos. 25-28.) Unfortunately, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 28) is noticeably less detailed and does not contain the supplemental documents previously included with the original pleadings (see Dkt. Nos. 22-1, 22-2). The undersigned therefore decided, in an abundance of caution, that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 28) and Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 22) should be considered together, as one pleading. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing “the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities”) (internal citations omitted). Despite this liberal construction, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff still fails to allege an actionable claim in the instant case.
Upon filing his Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend/Correct (Dkt. No. 10) and a proposed amended complaint (Dkt. No. 10-1) seeking to revise the spelling of Defendant Padilla's name. Other than this revision, the proposed amended complaint was substantively the same as the original pleading. The undersigned therefore granted Plaintiff's motion and directed the Clerk of Court to refile Plaintiff's proposed pleading (Dkt. No. 10-1) as the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 22).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
Any further references to the “Complaint” herein encompass Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and its attachments (Dkt. Nos. 22, 22-1, 22-2) and Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 28), unless specified otherwise.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff appears to bring this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which established a direct cause of action against federal officials for violation of certain federal constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 389. A Bivens claim is essentially the federal counterpart to a claim brought against a state official pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-20 (1982); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994); see also Hoffman v. Tuten, 446 F.Supp.2d 455, 459 (D.S.C. 2006) (noting that case law pertaining to § 1983 claims generally applies to Bivens claims). Thus, to establish a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant did so under color of federal law. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (setting forth requirements for § 1983 claim under color of state law); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (“In [a previous case], we reserved the question whether violation of [the Constitution] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today we hold that it does.”).
Plaintiff does not expressly identify which of his constitutional rights were violated. Based on his allegations, however, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff intends to raise a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants for failing to protect him from harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (“The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must prove that the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at 834 (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). A culpable state of mind is “one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury. Jones v. Antonelli, No. 6:19-cv-3036-MBS-KFM, 2020 WL 6292486, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 15, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5557841 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2020); Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004).
Here, the Complaint does not allege that Defendants Ratley and/or Padilla actually knew the exterior door in the staff dining room was broken, or that either of them caused it to malfunction. Rather, Plaintiff claims that they should have known that the door was a risk to inmate safety. As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, these allegations state, at best, a claim for negligent maintenance of prison equipment. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4.) Allegations of mere negligence, however, are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety under the Eighth Amendment. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) (explaining that even if government official's lack of due care leads to serious injury, negligence “does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct” the United States Constitution is designed to prevent); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 (1986).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims regarding Defendants' alleged failure to ensure the proper functioning of the staff dining room door are subject to summarily dismissal. See, e.g., Holmes v. Van Doran, No. 0:11-cv-01325-JMC-PJG, 2012 WL 2018267, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 2026752 (D.S.C. June 5, 2012), aff'd, 490 Fed.Appx. 572 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that general negligence with respect to maintenance of a prison facility is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference); Hubbard v. Eberstein, No. 7:12-cv-00531, 2013 WL 150328, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2013) (suggesting that even if prison officials are aware of malfunctioning equipment, such negligent conditions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment); Arnold v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 843 F.Supp. 110, 113 (D.S.C. 1994) (declining to “give constitutional recognition to run-of-the-mill negligence actions” where prisoner was injured by a steam pot that was functioning improperly).
Although the Complaint appears to be limited to Bivens, the undersigned notes that to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert an independent claim of negligence against Defendants, his claim is undermined by the administrative records attached to his pleadings, which demonstrate that prison officials evaluated the exterior door involved in Plaintiff's accident and found “results of normal operation.” (Dkt. No. 22-2 at 8.) Indeed, “[t]he door was [] inspected by both the Facility and Safety Managers and appeared to be working as designed. In addition, door handles are located on both sides of the door and should be used when opening and closing the door.” (Id.) Plaintiff “did not use the door handles to open the door or hold the door” at the time of the accident. (Id. at 9.) Based on the above, it was determined that “no hazards existed with the door, ” and that “[a]ttention to detail [would] prevent such injuries” in the future. (Id. at 4.) Thus, it appears that the prison staff, far from being negligent, adequately checked the equipment at issue and confirmed that there were no issues with the door's operation. To be sure, even Plaintiff acknowledged that the door typically operated properly, and that the exterior door apparently closed due to “gust of wind” or a “vacuum” of air caused by the opening of a nearby interior door. (See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 4, stating that “usually the door just stays there when you pull it;” see also Dkt. No. 22 at 3; Dkt. No. 22-2 at 8.) In other words, the door slammed shut because of an unexpected environmental circumstance-not negligent maintenance.
However, even if Plaintiff could somehow demonstrate that Defendants acted negligently, any such claim is barred by the Inmate Accident Compensation Act (“IACA”), which is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner who is injured while performing a work assignment. See 18 U.S.C. § 4126; see also 28 C.F.R. § 301.319 (“Inmates who are subject to the provisions of these Inmate Accident Compensation regulations are barred from recovery under the Federal Torts Claim Act. . . . Recovery under the Inmate Accident Compensation procedure was declared by the U.S. Supreme Court to be the exclusive remedy in the case of work-related injury.”); Wright v. Hanson, No. 8:17-cv-02805-DCC, 2020 WL 255701, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2020) (explaining that the IACA precludes recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act for a prisoner's work-related injuries and any negligent treatment of those injuries). (See also Dkt. No. 22-1 at 1, Bureau of Prisons Injury Report, informing Plaintiff that if he still experiences some degree of impairment at the time of his release from federal custody, he may file a claim for Inmate Accident Compensation.)
Finally, it is well-established that the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in a Bivens action. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (“In a Bivens suit, there is no respondeat superior liability.”); Doe v. United States, 381 F.Supp.3d 573, 610 (M.D. N.C. 2019) (explaining that a defendant “must have directly and personally participated in violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights” in order be liable under a Bivens). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. In the instant case, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Bragg appear to be based solely on his supervisory role over Defendants Padilla and Ratley: “Warden M. Travis Bragg was responsible for the training of Defendants Ratley and Padilla, and thus is responsible for this injury respondeat superior.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 4 (errors in original).) This is the extent of Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Bragg. Thus, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, the Complaint fails to allege the necessary personal involvement required under Bivens and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Bragg are therefore subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4.)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that despite availing himself of the opportunity to amend his pleadings, Plaintiff still fails to allege a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).