We recently denied a motion to dismiss an appeal under circumstances similar to the present case. Dugal Logging, Inc. V. Arkansas Pulpwood, 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999). We denied the motion to dismiss because appellant did not file the motion to dismiss before the record was filed with the court.
See alsoDavis v. Ralston Purina Co ., 248 Ark. 14, 449 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (holding that the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional but irregularities in the other procedural steps found in Rule 3(e) are merely grounds for such action as this court deems appropriate). In subsequent decisions, we have held that an appellant's failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 3(e) does not render the notice of appeal automatically void. Vimy Ridge , supra ; Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Ark. Pulpwood Co. , 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999) ; Green v. Williford , 331 Ark. 533, 961 S.W.2d 766 (1998). This court has also observed that the procedural steps outlined in Rule 3(e) require only substantial compliance, provided that the appellee has not been prejudiced by the failure to comply strictly with the rule.
Under this court's general superintending control over all courts of the state, we have historically answered and reassigned to the court of appeals cases certified to us by that court where we could answer a preliminary or procedural question that did not materially affect the issues on appeal. SeeDugal Logging, Inc. v. Ark. Pulpwood Co., Inc., 336 Ark. 55, 59, 984 S.W.2d 410, 412 (1999) (" For the reasons above, we deny Riverwood's motion to dismiss, and reassign this case to the court of appeals to decide the remaining issues." ).
Instead, the notice of appeal mentions the summary judgment order entered May 19, 2006. However, the trial court's August 15, 2007 order simply reiterated the previous disposition of the motions for summary judgment, and dismissed with prejudice the defendants unaddressed by the previous order. Under these circumstances, Vimy Ridge's failure to designate the August 15 order in its notice of appeal is not fatal to this appeal. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Sudrick, 49 Ark. App. 84, 896 S.W.2d 452 (1995); see also Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Ark. Pulpwood Co., Inc., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999) (explaining that an appellant's noncompliance with Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 3(e) does not render the notice automatically void). Turning to the merits of this case, we do so by reviewing the trial court's decision in this tax case de novo, but will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Sudrick, 49 Ark.App. 84,896 S.W.2d 452 (1995). See also Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Ark. Pulpwood Co., Inc., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999) (explaining that an appellant's noncompliance with Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 3(e) does not render the notice automatically void).Prejudgment Interest
[8] We note at this point that the Seays contend we should find that WF's motion to dismiss this appeal is untimely. Citing Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999), they assert that WF should have raised the issue of the timeliness of the lodging of the record before the record was filed. WF responds that, because the Seays filed a notice of appeal designating the entire record, it had no reason to believe that the entire record would not be lodged.
Moreover, the factors we consider in determining whether to grant a petition to review neither control nor fully measure our discretion. See id.; see also Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999). Accordingly, although Ms. Maxey initially requested reversal only in regard to the issue of the liability of the Second Injury Fund, we will consider the case on petition for review in its entirety.
It should be noted that motions involving an issue of significant public interest may be certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 1-2(d). Webber v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 334 Ark. 527, 975 S.W.2d 829 (1998); See also, Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999); Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., 335 Ark. 546, 983 S.W.2d 126 (1998).
On January 14, 1999, the supreme court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal and reassigned the remainder of the case to this court. See Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., Inc., 336 Ark. 55, 984 S.W.2d 410 (1999). The issue has thus been decided, and we need not address it further.