An examination of New York appellate court decisions involving similar injuries indicates that the jury's award of $100,000 was not, as a matter of law, excessive. See, e.g., Duff v. Mariani, 248 A.D.2d 905, 670 N.Y.S.2d 615 (3d Dep't 1998) (evidence supported award of $100,000 for past pain and suffering where plaintiff had sustained injuries resulting in 15% loss of use of right knee and foot); Urquhart v. New York City Transit Authority, 221 A.D.2d 336, 633 N.Y.S.2d 206 (2d Dep't 1995) ($375,000 award for past and future pain and suffering was excessive to the extent it exceeded $150,000, where plaintiff suffered torn meniscus of the knee and was developing arthritic changes as a result of the injury); Hulsen v. Morrison, 206 A.D.2d 459, 614 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1994) (award of $175,000 for past and future pain and suffering was excessive to the extent it exceeded $75,000, where plaintiff suffered radioculopathy and arthritic changes in neck region, herniated disk in lower back, and a grade-three chondromalacia in his right knee); Holshek v. Stokes, 122 A.D.2d 777, 505 N.Y.S.2d 664, (2d Dep't 1986) ($250,000 award to plaintiff who suffered permanent, arthritis-producing injury to knees excessive to the extent it ex
This evidence satisfied plaintiffs' burden of proving with reasonable certainty that the cost of hiring this employee was a direct result of plaintiff's injuries. It further demonstrated that he had lost $54,017.50—half of the total cost of her employment through 2011, while the farm was jointly owned—as past lost profits, and that he would continue to lose profits for this reason on a 100% basis from 2012, when he assumed sole ownership, through the remainder of his working life (see Duff v. Mariani, 248 A.D.2d 905, 907, 670 N.Y.S.2d 615 [1998] ). The jury's award of damages for past lost profits reveals that it accepted plaintiffs' proof that plaintiff's injuries prevented him from contributing his labor to the farm business and resulted in lost profits.
Here, plaintiffs alleged and the trial evidence demonstrated that the accident, in which plaintiff was struck in the face by a pipe while assisting in the dismantling of scaffolding, happened both "in or about the place where [Atlantic's] work [wa]s being performed or in the vicinity thereof . . . while [Atlantic] was performing the work" and "while any of [Atlantic's] property, equipment or personnel [we]re in or about such place or the vicinity thereof by reason of or as a result of the performance of the work." In light of the injuries sustained by plaintiff Michael Ulses, including a fractured nasal septum, disc injuries and post-concussion syndrome, the trial court also properly determined that the damage awards for past and future pain and suffering were excessive; however, those awards were only excessive to the extent indicated (see generally Cassutov City of New York , 23 AD3d 423; Smith v Monro Muffler Brake, 275 AD2d 1028; Martino v Triangle Rubber Co., 249 AD2d 454; Duff v Mariani, 248 AD2d 905). Similarly, while the trial court was justified in determining that the award for past loss of services and society was excessive, that award should only have been reduced to $75,000 (see generally Sienicki v 760 W. End Ave. Owners , 23 AD3d 271).
Two individuals testified with respect to plaintiff's significant limitations and Frontera's testimony supported plaintiff's complaints as he stated that plaintiff had a decreased range of motion in her neck and back and that such a substantial limitation was a permanent disability. Although an examination of comparable cases reveals a broad range of verdicts, the jury's award in this case was not so disproportionate with other awards as to require reduction (see, Osiecki v. Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., supra, at 313; Duff v. Mariani, 248 A.D.2d 905;Niles v. Shue Roofing Co., 244 A.D.2d 820; Diorio v. Scala, 183 A.D.2d 1065). MERCURE, J.P., CREW III, PETERS and CARPINELLO, JJ., concur.
The award of damages is not excessive, but is justified by plaintiff's suffering and anxiety in the immediate aftermath of the accident, in which plaintiff was pinned in the vehicle; the painful and slow-healing fracture of plaintiff's neck; the permanent pain and limitation in plaintiff's neck as a result of the injury; plaintiff's well-founded fear of sustaining a reinjury that could result in paralysis; and other serious injuries and scarring to plaintiff's face and leg. The award does not "deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (CPLR 5501 [c]; see, Ruso v. Osowiecky, 256 A.D.2d 839; Barrowman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 A.D.2d 946, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 817; Duff v. Mariani, 248 A.D.2d 905, 906-907; cf., Skow v. Jones, Lang Wooton Corp., 240 A.D.2d 194, 195; Leonard v. Unisys Corp., 238 A.D.2d 747, 750; Adams v. Romero, 227 A.D.2d 292; Peck v. Tired Iron Transp., 209 A.D.2d 979, 980; Brown v. Stark, 205 A.D.2d 725).