Opinion
Nos. 111,806 111,807.
2015-03-27
James R. DUDLEY, Appellant, v. PMC Board Member Deputy Warden Paul SNYDER and Unit Team Manager, Robert Sapien, Appellees.
Appeal from Butler District Court; John E. Sanders, Judge.Joshua S. Andrews, of Cami R. Baker & Associates, P.A., of Augusta, for appellant.Michael J. Smith, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellees.
Appeal from Butler District Court; John E. Sanders, Judge.
Joshua S. Andrews, of Cami R. Baker & Associates, P.A., of Augusta, for appellant. Michael J. Smith, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellees.
Before LEBEN, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BUKATY, J.
The district court summarily dismissed James R. Dudley's K.S.A. 60–1501 petition on grounds that it was untimely filed. Dudley appeals arguing the court erred because the time for filing his petition should have been tolled pursuant to K.S.A. 60–515 due to a legal disability he was under during the time period within which he had to file. We agree with Dudley and reverse the dismissal and remand the case to the district court for reinstatement on the active docket.
In November 2013, Dudley was an inmate at the El Dorado Correctional Facility (EDCF). At a disciplinary hearing conducted by the facility on November 21, 2013, he was found guilty of one count of threatening or intimidating and two counts of violation of published orders. Dudley filed an appeal to the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections (Secretary). On December 24, 2013, Dudley received notice that the Secretary had approved the hearing officer's decision.
On January 8, 2014, Dudley set a fire in his cell and was found guilty of arson. As a result, prison authorities transferred him to a More Restricted Area (MRA) where the only property allowed in his cell was a blanket and boxer shorts.
Prior to being transferred to MRA, Dudley apparently had prepared a petition in which he claimed relief under K.S.A. 60–1501 for violations of his due process rights during the disciplinary proceedings referred to above. On January 13, 2014, Dudley sent the following written request to unit team manager Robert Sapien: “I need to file my 60–1501 [petition], that you have in your office, with the courts this week. I cannot do this if you are preventing me from handling my legal work. Please fix this.” Sapien gave the following written response: “You remain on MRA status due to your Behavior. Your continued poor Behavior as displayed on 1–10–2014 is not helping you any. Work with Unit Team and Mental health staff in a positive way with your concerns.”
On January 21, 2014, Dudley filed another written request, stating: “I am currently being denied to send any legal mail to the courts and or my attorney due to being placed on MRA status. I would like this to be corrected as I believe that it is not right.” The response to Dudley's request stated: “This is to curb aggressive behavior and at this time does not seem to be occurring. Please work with the seg review board.”
On January 30, 2014, Dudley's restrictions were modified, which allowed him to read and review legal documents “as officer time/tasks/duties permit.” On February 6, 2014, Dudley finally filed his K.S.A. 60–4501 petition alleging the due process violations in connection with the disciplinary hearing on November 21, 2013. The case was assigned number 2013 CV–51 in the district court. He named James Heimgartner, the warden at EDCF, as the defendant. The same day, Dudley also filed a motion requesting that he be permitted to file his petition outside of the 30–day limitation prescribed in K.S.A. 604501(b) on grounds the prison staff denied him access to the materials necessary to prepare and mail the petition. The district court directed the warden to respond to Dudley's motion to file out of time. In response, the warden argued the petition should be dismissed as untimely because Dudley could not show that his access to the court had been impaired such that he was operating under a legal disability pursuant to K.S.A. 60–515.
On April 3, 2014, the district court denied Dudley's request to file his petition out of time and summarily dismissed his K.S.A. 604501 petition. In its order, the court noted that the petition was filed outside the 30–day statute of limitations due to Dudley's own illegal actions.
We note in passing that Dudley had also filed another K.S.A. 60–1501 petition in which he alleged the conditions of his confinement while in MRA status constituted cruel and unusual punishment (case No.2014–CV–28). He apparently filed it within the 30–day period. The district court dismissed that case for Dudley's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Although he mentions the case in his brief, he does not challenge the dismissal. As such, he has waived any challenge to it. See Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. Kimball, 292 Kan. 885, 889, 259 P.3d 676 (2011) (An issue not briefed by the appellant is deemed waived and abandoned.).
Dudley argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his K.S.A. 60–1501 petition in case No.2014–CV–51 as untimely. As we stated, he contends the time for filing his petition should have been tolled due to a legal disability under K.S.A. 60–515.
An appellate court exercises de novo review over a district court's summary dismissal of a K.S4.A. 60–1501 petition. Johnson v.. State, 289 Kan. 642, 649, 215 P.3d 575 (2009). Additionally, resolution of Dudley's argument involves statutory interpretation, a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. Cady v. Schroll, 298 Kan. 731, 734, 317 P.3d 90 (2014).
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 60–1501(b) provides that an inmate shall file a petition for writ of habeas corpus within 30 days from the date the administrative action he or she complains of is final. Here, the parties do not dispute that the administrative action at issue was deemed final when Dudley received notice of the Secretary's decision on December 24, 2013, that approved the hearing officer's decision. That meant Dudley was required to file his K.S.A. 60–1501 petition in the district court by January 23, 2014. He did not file the petition in case No.2014–CV–51 until February 6, 2014, obviously more than 30 days after the administrative action became final.
It appears that Dudley had prepared his petition and it was in an office of one of the employees of the correctional facility ready to be mailed on January 8, 2014, more than 2 weeks before the 30–day statute of limitations would run. He inquired twice, once on January 13 and then again on January 21, about obtaining access to his mail and getting his petition filed. Both times staff at the facility denied him access to his petition until January 30, 7 days after the statute of limitations period had expired.
Clearly, our appellate courts have viewed the 30–day limit in K.S .A.2014 Supp. 60–1501(b) as a statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions. See Battrick v. State, 267 Kan. 389, 401, 985 P.2d 707 (1999) (characterizing 30–day period in K.S.A. 60–1501 as statute of limitations); Taylor v. McKune, 25 Kan.App.2d 283, 286, 962 P.2d 566 (1998) (same); Knittel v. Kansas Prisoner Review Board, No. 111, 552, 2014 WL 6777450, at *3 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion) (omission of jurisdictional language in K.S.A. 60–1501[b] supports conclusion that 30–day filing period is a statute of limitations), rev. denied March 12, 2015. The significance of these holdings lies in the fact that statutes of limitations do not impose jurisdictional bars, may be waived, and are also subject to equitable exceptions. Knittel, 2014 WL 6777450, at *3.
Here, we conclude that an equitable exception to the 30–day filing period should be made. During the majority of the 30–day window, Dudley was unable to freely access his legal materials, including the very petition that the district court dismissed as untimely. The record reflects that Dudley made several attempts to gain access to or mail the petition but was prevented from doing so by the EDCF staff. The fact that Dudley's own actions placed him in this position is irrelevant under the plain language of K.S.A. 60–515(a), which provides that a prisoner is deemed to be under legal disability if the prisoner lacks access to the court for purposes of bringing an action. See Bulmer v. Boling, 27 Kan.App.2d 376, 378, 4 P.3d 637, rev. denied 269 Kan. 931 (2000).
As we stated, the statute of limitations began to run on December 24, 2013. It continued to run until January 8, 2014. Dudley was under a legal disability from that date until January 30, 2014, during which time the statute was tolled. The statute then began to run again until Dudley filed his petition on February 6, 2014. We conclude that under these circumstances Dudley had filed his petition within the required 30 days from the date of the action he complained about.
We reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand the case to the district court for reinstatement on the active docket.
Reversed and remanded with directions.