Opinion
5:24-cv-0222 (BKS/TWD)
04-04-2024
ELLIS DAVON DUDLEY, II, Plaintiff, v. TAMARA BURGOS, et al, Defendants.
ELLIS DAVON DUDLEY, II Plaintiff, pro se.
ELLIS DAVON DUDLEY, II Plaintiff, pro se.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review five submissions filed by pro se plaintiff Ellis Davon Dudley, II (“Plaintiff”), as well as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 2. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends Plaintiff's pleadings be dismissed.
II. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. No. 2. Upon review, Plaintiff's IFP application demonstrates economic need. See id. Therefore, he is granted permission to proceed IFP.
III. PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSIONS
Plaintiff's first submission is captioned “Ellis Davon Dudley II Plaintiff, V. Tamara Burgos & Department of Social Service Defendant.” Dkt. No. 1. The document is titled “NOTICE OF REMOVAL” and purports to remove to this Court “all claims and causes of action in the civil action styled IV-D Support Tamara Burgos against Ellis Dudley Jr. File# 58133 Docket#F-02393-21 CSMS # CB66356V1 . . . now active in the Onondaga County Family Court . . . pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, 28 U.S.C. 1441, 42 U.S.C. 660.” Id. Next, Plaintiff lists fourteen “grounds for removal” which appear to invoke this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See id. at 1-2. The document further states “A copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon defendants to date in the State Court Attached as Exhibit A are all instruments filed under this situation.” Id. at 2.
Citations to Plaintiff's submissions will refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic filing system. Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's other actions currently pending in this District. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Dudley v. Hochul et al, No. 5:24-CV-0048 (DNH/ML), on January 11, 2024. Plaintiff also commenced a third action, Dudley v. Montaque, No. 5:24-CV-0222 (BKS/TWD), on February 14, 2024, the same day as the instant matter. Dudley v. Montaque, was deemed related to the instant matter and directly assigned to the undersigned by text order dated February 29, 2014. See Dudley v. Montaque, No. 5:24-CV-0222 (BKS/TWD), Dkt. No. 4.
The next two submissions appear to contain materials related to two Onondaga County Family Court cases. See generally, Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 1-2. The first documents appears to be a petition filed by Plaintiff naming Defendant Burgos as the Respondent, accompanied by a notice of motion, supporting affidavit, order to show cause, and request for immediate temporary relief. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1-5. The second exhibit contains what appears to be a letter to Plaintiff confirming his employment and pay rate, an income withholding order, two orders of support, and transcripts of appearances before Onondaga County Family Court. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 156.
Plaintiff also submitted a “CIVIL COVER SHEET.” See Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1. He listed “Tamara Burgos” as the Defendant and identified “Department of Social Services” as Burgos' attorney. Id. Plaintiff indicated this Court has federal question jurisdiction over the matter. Id. Concerning the nature of this suit, Plaintiff selected the following options: Negotiable Instrument; Recovery of Overpayment; Other Contract; Contract Product Liability; Personal Injury - Product Liability; Other Fraud; Commerce; and Constitutionality of State Statutes. Id. Plaintiff did not indicate an origin for this matter, but identified “42 U.S.C. 1981” as the statute under which he filed and listed “Contract Product Liability” as a brief description. Id. His sole listed demand is for “full Disclosures.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff listed Docket Number “F-06437-22” as a related case before Judge “Patricia DeRue.” Id.
Plaintiff's final submission is captioned “CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL.” Dkt. No. 1-4 at 1. The document indicates Plaintiff served a copy of the “Notice of Removal and Exhibits” on “Tamara Burgos” by depositing a copy of the documents in a mailbox on February 14, 2024. Id.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to dismiss an IFP complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
V. ANALYSIS
Even affording Plaintiff's filings a liberal construction, his submissions are difficult to decipher and fail to provide sufficient factual information for the Court to review or for the Defendant(s) to have notice of any claims against them. Therefore, the Court recommends this action be dismissed.
As an initial matter, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 3, but Plaintiff has not submitted a complaint in this action. While a plaintiff's initial filing(s) need not be titled “complaint,” see, e.g., Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13-CV-0760 (MAD/DEP), 2013 WL 5652495, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2013) (construing the plaintiff's initial filings as a complaint), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, 2014 WL 3670609 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014), the Plaintiff's submissions here fall short of the Federal Rules' pleading requirements.
Under Rule 8, a pleading must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977)) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff's submissions lack any such statement.
Significantly, none of Plaintiff's submissions contain any factual allegations against Burgos or the Department of Social Services, despite the fact that both are listed as defendants in the caption. See generally, Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4. Because Plaintiff has failed to enumerate allegations against either defendant, he has failed to state a claim, therefore, dismissal is warranted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See generally, Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (Although the Court is “obligated to draw the most favorable inferences that [the Plaintiff]'s complaint supports, we cannot invent factual allegations that he has not pled.”); see also, e.g., Drawhorne v. Aloise, No. 6:23-CV-1278 (TJM/TWD), 2023 WL 8188396, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2023) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against an individual where the plaintiff listed the individual “as a defendant in the caption of his complaint but fails to assert any allegations against him or her.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 532572 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2024); Joseph v. Annucci, 7:18-CV-7197, 2020 WL 409744, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2020) (dismissing claims against defendants that were “named in the caption only” where “[t]he body of the Complaint does not contain any factual allegations naming them, or indicating that they violated the law or injured Plaintiff in some manner.”).
Additionally, the Court notes “[u]nder New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal departments like the Department of Social Services are not amenable to suit . . . and no claims lie directly against the Department.” Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 55 F.Supp.2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations omitted).
In any event, this Court would likely be barred from providing the relief Plaintiff seeks. From what the Court can glean, Plaintiff's contentions in the instant matter relate to Onondaga County Family Court orders requiring Plaintiff to pay child support to Defendant Burgos and another individual. See generally, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4-10. It appears Plaintiff's aim is to vacate these orders, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3, 5, however, this Court may not adjudicate claims involving such issues.
Plaintiff's submissions indicate on May 11, 2021, Defendant Burgos filed a petition in Onondaga County Family Court alleging Plaintiff is chargeable with the support of a child. See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4. On February 23, 2022, Support Magistrate Jeffrey A. Domachowski ordered Plaintiff to provide payment in an amount of $295.00 bi-weekly to Burgos, with such payments to commence on March 4, 2022. See id. at 5-6. Additionally, on November 14, 2022, Myra Montaque filed a petition in Onondaga County Family Court alleging Plaintiff is chargeable with the support of a second child. See id. at 7. On April 13, 2023, Support Magistrate Patricia L. DeRue ordered Plaintiff to provide payment in an amount of $146.00 weekly to Montaque, with such payments to commence on May 12, 2023. See id. at 9-10.
“First, in the event the underlying family court proceedings are pending, such claims are likely barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.” Walker v. O'Connor, No. 1:22-CV-0581 (DNH/TWD), 2022 WL 2341420, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Amato v. McGinty, No. 1:21-CV-0860 (GLS/TWD), 2022 WL 226798, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2805462 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022). “Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44). “Younger abstention is required when three conditions are met: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated in that proceeding; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims.” Id. (citing Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2001)). Courts in this circuit have found these conditions to be satisfied in matters involving child support issues. See, e.g., Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F.Supp.2d 350, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying the Younger abstention doctrine to dismiss claims which arose from “pending state court proceedings involving child support.”) (citation omitted); Tomczyk v. New York Unified Ct. Sys., No. 2:19-CV-2753, 2019 WL 2437849, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2019) (“[T]his Court abstains under Younger from interfering in Plaintiff's ongoing state-court proceedings, involving divorce and child support issues and ‘implicat[ing] a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'”) (citing Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013)). “Accordingly, to the extent that the child support issues are continuing in Family Court, the Court should abstain from interfering with that process.” Bowman v. Morris, No. 8:19-CV-0097 (BKS/DJS), 2019 WL 5150196, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3759174 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019).
“Second, in the event the relevant underlying state court proceedings are concluded, such claims are likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Walker, 2022 WL 2341420, at *6. “Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks authority to review a final state court order or judgment where a litigant seeks relief that invites the federal district court to reject or overturn such a final state court order or judgment.” Porter v. Nasci, No. 5:24-CV-0033 (GTS/TWD), 2024 WL 1142144, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2024) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005); Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021)). “This includes when a litigant seeks relief that invites a federal district court to reject or overturn a final decision of a New York Family Court as to a child support dispute brought in that state court.” Id. (citing Sims v. Kaufman, No. 1:23-CV-7927, 2024 WL 757338, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2024)) (additional citation omitted); see also Fernandez v. Turetsky, No. 14-CV-4568, 2014 WL 5823116, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that “[c]ourts have repeatedly invoked the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine in cases . . . in which plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support arrears.”), aff'd, 645 Fed.Appx. 103 (2d Cir. 2016). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge a final judgment of Onondaga County Family Court, any such claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wagner, No. 1:22-CV-0833 (DNH/ML), 2022 WL 17406092, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022) (“Plaintiff's claims, while not entirely clear, seem to challenge an order . . . in which the Family Court determined that he owes child support .... Plaintiff's claims for relief are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ....”) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17403441 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 23-68, 2023 WL 4445323 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2023).
Finally, under the domestic relations exception to the jurisdiction of federal courts, cases involving divorce, alimony, and child custody remain outside this Court's jurisdiction. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006); see also, e.g., Oliver v. Punter, No. 2:22-CV-3580, 2022 WL 3228272, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022) (“The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees ....This exception also extends to child support determinations and the enforcement thereof.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim involving issues of child custody and support. See Rotondo v. New York, No. 5:17-CV-1065 (GLS/DEP), 2017 WL 5201738, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017) (“[I]t is manifestly clear that plaintiff's claims implicate the domestic-relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. Plaintiff challenges a state-court's determination denying him relief from a family court's child support order, and plaintiff's requests for relief include removal of the family court proceeding to federal court.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 5198194 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2017); Cruz v. New York, No. 5:17-CV-0510 (BKS/TWD), 2017 WL 6021838, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6001833 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2017) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that “[c]laims involving child custody, support, and visitation brought in federal district court in this Circuit have regularly been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.”).
Although this Court has serious doubts, it is not clear whether Plaintiff could assert a cognizable cause of action against either defendant by way of a better pleading. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution and in deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned recommends the action be dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to avail himself of an opportunity to amend, any amended pleading must set forth a short and plain statement of the facts on which he relies to support any legal claims asserted, which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue, and over which this Court has jurisdiction. Of course, Plaintiff may also pursue his claims in state court if appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED, and it is
Although Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP has been granted, Plaintiff will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in the future regarding this action, including, but not limited to, copying and/or witness fees.
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide to Plaintiff a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.