Duckworth v. Oliver

5 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. Reed

    229 Ga. App. 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    See Wingard, supra at 641. Cf. Duckworth v. Oliver, 112 Ga. App. 371 ( 145 S.E.2d 115) (1965). Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Reed on this issue.

  2. Panter v. Miller

    299 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times
    In Panter v. Miller, 165 Ga. App. 266 (299 S.E.2d 185) (1983) we held that the defendant, by withdrawing part of his pleadings, does not eliminate admissions in those pleadings from the evidence which may be considered by the jury.

    At no time did his counsel attempt to clarify either the dates on which he frequently used the Granada which was involved in the accident or whether such borrowings occurred before or after he left home. Further, no attempt was made to determine whether he had to ask permission to borrow the Granada before each use. See Duckworth v. Oliver, 112 Ga. App. 371 ( 145 S.E.2d 115) (1965). In his affidavit, he claimed that he did not reside in his father's household, asked permission to borrow the car on that specific occasion and had not borrowed it in over two years.

  3. Faircloth v. German

    297 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)

    Under those circumstances, the evidence demands the conclusion that the truck was not furnished to the family within the meaning of the family purpose doctrine. Duckworth v. Oliver, 112 Ga. App. 371 ( 145 S.E.2d 115). That being so, the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant a directed verdict as to the second count of appellee's complaint. A new trial is, therefore, necessary.

  4. Kurtz v. Williams

    222 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)

    r the purpose of argument, that questions of fact exist in this case as to whether the defendant father owned the automobile driven by his son at the time of the collision complained of, the record is clear that the son, who had only a learner's permit, did not have permission to drive it without his father or mother present in the automobile; that they were not present on this occasion and were not even at home; that the son had never before driven any of the father's automobiles without permission and without a parent present; that this particular automobile was not made available for this son's use; and that the son took the keys to the automobile from the pants of his brother, who was asleep, and drove it away without the knowledge or consent of his father, mother, or brother. Consequently no liability could attach to the father under the family purpose doctrine, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to him. Cf. Brown v. Porto, 106 Ga. App. 226 ( 126 S.E.2d 639); Duckworth v. Oliver, 112 Ga. App. 371 ( 145 S.E.2d 115); Durden v. Maddox, 73 Ga. App. 491 ( 37 S.E.2d 219). Judgment affirmed. Bell, C. J., and Marshall, J., concur.

  5. Sledge v. Law

    149 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 8 times
    In Sledge v. Law, 113 Ga. App. 746, 149 S.E.2d 758 (1966), the plaintiff, injured in an automobile collision, based his action on the "family car" doctrine.

    None of the Georgia cases cited is controlling on the issue in this case whether the father supplied the automobile for the use of the son, as here there are some additional facts relevant to this issue. The question in this case is different from that decided in Duckworth v. Oliver, 112 Ga. App. 371 ( 145 S.E.2d 115), cited by the defendant. In the Duckworth case, when the collision that brought about the suit occurred, the father's automobile was being driven by an adult son who did not customarily use father's automobile, but had one of his own.