Opinion
Civil Action 1:22-cv-04326-SDG-JKL
08-18-2023
MICHAEL DUCKWORTH, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN K. LARKINS III United States Magistrate Judge
This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff Michael Duckworth alleges that his former employer, Defendant Georgia Department of Human Services, fired him because of his gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (“Title VII”). The case is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. [Doc. 9.] For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged enough factual content to support a plausible inference that Defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his gender. As a result, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following summary of facts is based on Plaintiff's allegations in the amended complaint, which for present purposes, the Court assumes to be true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In February 2019, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Social Services Specialist 2 in its Division of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”). [Doc. 7 ¶¶ 14-15.] He was initially assigned to work in the Clayton County Foster Care Unit, where he was the only male employee. [Id. ¶ 16.] In August 2019, he was reassigned to the Child Protective Services unit, where he was again the sole male employee. [Id. ¶¶ 17, 24.]
According to Plaintiff, Defendant's “Training Coordinator” delayed his “required training” until November 2019. [Doc. 7 ¶¶ 18, 22.] The Training Coordinator informed Plaintiff it was “because of the associated cost.” [Id. ¶ 19.] Plaintiff, however, knew of “several female employees in the same position as
It is unclear what the training entailed or whether the training was only for his reassignment to the Child Protective Services unit, or more generally for his employment with DFCS. Because Plaintiff states that the training was for his “new Child Protective Services assignment,” the Court takes him to mean that his training was for the reassignment in August 2019, meaning that his training was delayed for roughly three months. [See Doc. 7 ¶ 22.]
Plaintiff . . . [who] did not have their training delayed by the Training Coordinator.” [Id. ¶ 20.] Plaintiff offers no details whatsoever regarding the Coordinator's cost concerns, does not identify an individual female employee as a comparator (much less one similarly situated to him in any way), and does not offer other allegations to suggest that “associated costs” was not the actual reason his training was delayed. Regardless, because of the delayed training, Plaintiff complains that he was assigned cases for which he was not fully trained. [Id. ¶ 21.]
Also in November 2019, Plaintiff began reporting to Nadia Holmes, a Social Service Specialist Supervisor. [Doc. 7 ¶ 23.] In December 2019, Plaintiff asked Holmes for permission to take leave on December 26 and 27. [Id. ¶ 26.] Plaintiff does not explain the circumstances of his request-for example when it was made, what his reason for the request was, or any allegation regarding what staffing levels were required at that time. And while Holmes initially approved the request [id. ¶¶ 26-27]; she later backtracked and instructed Plaintiff to report to work on each of those days[id. ¶ 28]. Plaintiff alleges that he knows of no similarly-situated female employees who were denied previously-approved leave. [Id. ¶ 30.] Plaintiff does not explain how or why he would have any knowledge about other employees' leave requests, and does not otherwise explain what significance his lack of knowledge demonstrates.
Plaintiff alleges that he asked Holmes, Precious Andrews (the CPS Social Services Administrator) and Deneka Manning (the Assistant Director) why his request had been denied; however, he does not allege how they responded or, indeed, if they responded at all. [Doc. 7 ¶ 29.]
In January 2020, Holmes gave Plaintiff a “poor” work performance evaluation based on his purported failure to complete timely assignments. [Doc. 7 ¶¶ 31, 32.] According to Plaintiff, however, Holmes was actually to blame because she delayed the approval of his cases “to give the appearance” that he was not timely submitting his cases. [Id. ¶¶ 32-34.] Plaintiff asked Andrews and Manning about transferring to another department. [Id. ¶ 35.] His transfer request was denied. [Id. ¶ 36.] Plaintiff expressed to Holmes, Andrews, and Manning that he believed the denial of his leave requests and his transfer “appeared to be discriminatory and retaliatory.” [Id. ¶ 37.] According to Plaintiff, he was “aware of similarly situated female employees who received favorable treatment concerning department transfers.” [Id. ¶ 38.] More specifically, he alleges that someone named “Shedra” was approved for a department transfer even though she had “several disciplinary actions on her record.” [Id. ¶ 39.] Plaintiff does not provide any allegations about the procedure or requirements for transferring departments, does not explain the basis upon which his transfer request was denied, does not identify the supervisor(s) who approved Shedra's transfer, and does not offer anything other than the mere fact of Shedra's transfer to support his allegations of discrimination and retaliation.
In any event, Plaintiff “began to experience difficulty getting management's approval for work related tasks, such as timely approval of timesheets.” [Doc. 7 ¶ 40.] On January 20, 2020, Holmes placed Plaintiff on a 60-day performance improvement plan (“PIP”) and, thereafter, he was “removed from his work cubicle.” [Id. ¶ 42.] According to Plaintiff, he is not aware of any similarly-situated female employee who was similarly removed from a cubicle. [Id. ¶ 43.] Plaintiff does not explain the basis for his PIP, whether his cubicle loss was tied to the PIP, or what knowledge he had regarding measures taken in connection with an employee being placed on a PIP.
On March 18, 2020, Plaintiff “submitted a letter” to someone (he does not say to whom), “outlining targeting by Ms. Holmes following the December 2019 time off incident and Plaintiff's assertions that females were not treated similarly.” [Doc. 7 ¶ 44.] Plaintiff does not explain if he raised allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex or gender, or if he merely asserted that he was treated worse than his fellow employees, all of whom were women.
Nearly two months later, on May 14, 2020, Manning emailed Plaintiff and instructed him to bring his work phone and laptop in for evaluation. [Doc. 7 ¶ 45.] When he arrived, she confiscated the devices; and on May 15, his employment was terminated. [Id. ¶¶ 46-47.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not give him a reason for his termination. [Id. ¶¶ 48-49.]
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff brings a single claim for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. [Doc. 7 ¶¶ 53-63.] In relevant part, he alleges that his termination from employment constituted an adverse employment action and that “[t]he disparate treatment of Plaintiff versus his female comparators is evidence of a discriminatory animus.” [Id. ¶¶ 57-58.] Notably, despite being fired less than two months after allegedly writing a letter to someone outlining his “assertions that females were not treated similarly,” Plaintiff brings no claim for retaliation.
On April 21, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. [Doc. 9.] On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff responded to the motion [Doc. 19], and on August 2, 2023, Defendant filed a reply [Doc. 20]. The motion is now ripe for consideration.
II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint need not provide “detailed factual allegations,” but it must provide factual allegations sufficient to set forth the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Providing only “labels and conclusions” is insufficient, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. The Court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not [shown]-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, if assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the amended complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue that precludes relief or if it is based on a meritless legal theory, dismissal is warranted. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989); see also Brown v. Crawford Cnty., Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1010 (11th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed because (1) except for the termination of his employment, none of the other actions qualified as adverse employment actions actionable under a Title VII disparate treatment theory; and (2) he has not pled facts sufficient to establish for pleading purposes that similarly-situated employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably and has not otherwise plausibly alleged that unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the decision to fire him. [Doc. 9.]
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on the employee's gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff asserting a Title VII disparate treatment claim must establish that he was a qualified member of a protected class and was subject to an adverse employment action in contrast to similarly situated employees outside the protected class (or otherwise establish a causal connection between his protected class and the adverse employment action). E.g., Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). At the pleading stage, however, a plaintiff need not allege specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination; rather, he must set forth facts sufficient to plausibly suggest intentional race discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 514 (2002). “This is because McDonnell Douglas's burden-shifting framework is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
That said, it is still appropriate to evaluate, on a motion to dismiss, whether a complaint's allegations allow for more than a possibility that a causal connection exists between a plaintiff's protected characteristic and an adverse employment action, and thus whether the facts alleged plausibly support a “reasonable inference” of discrimination in relation to an adverse action. Henderson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 436 Fed.Appx. 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Baker v. Hafez Corp., No. 13-00641-KD-N, 2014 WL 1760976, at *9 (S.D. Ala. May 2, 2014) (a plaintiff must allege sufficient “factual content, explaining how the disparate treatment occurred, to give rise to an inference of discrimination and, therefore, nudge the discrimination claim across the line from conceivable to plausible); Veale v. Fla. Dep't of Health, No. 2:13-CV-77-FTM-38UAM, 2013 WL 5703577, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2013) (collecting cases in which trial courts “have dismissed discrimination claims when the allegations relating to similarly situated employees are insufficiently pled”). Importantly, bare assertions or legal conclusions are insufficient to meet this burden, and “[d]istrict courts frequently dismiss discrimination claims when the allegations of disparate treatment are nothing more than legal conclusions unsupported by any facts.” Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., No. 8:09-CV-634-T-33TBM, 2011 WL 2631869, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 5, 2011) (collecting cases), aff'd, 482 Fed.Appx. 394 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Glover v. Donahoe, 626 Fed.Appx. 926, 931 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding that race discrimination claims should be dismissed where complaint omitted facts tending to show that termination was motivated by plaintiff's race); Hopkins v. Saint Lucie Cnty. Sch. Bd., 399 Fed.Appx. 563, 566 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a plaintiff's discrimination claim should be dismissed because the complaint merely included conclusory allegations of discrimination and failed to allege specific facts allowing the court to infer that the defendant treated those outside of his protected class more favorably); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims as conclusory and unsupported where plaintiff failed to allege specific factual support for the conclusory allegation that “plaintiffs were . . . denied promotions . . . and treated differently than similarly situated white employees solely because of [ ] race”).
The Court first takes up the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations that he suffered an adverse employment action. As noted, Defendant contends that the only adverse employment action that Plaintiff suffered was his separation from employment, and that the other incidents he alleges-including not being trained, being given an unfavorable performance evaluation, being denied a transfer, being placed on a PIP, and so on-are insufficient to qualify as adverse employment actions. [Doc. 9 at 6-7.] In response, Plaintiff concedes that the sole adverse employment action that forms the basis of his Title VII disparate treatment claim is his termination from employment. [Doc. 19 at 7.] He explains that he included allegations about the other events simply in an attempt to support his contention that Defendant fired him based upon his gender. [Id.] Because Plaintiff's discharge is indisputably an adverse employment action, his discrimination claim is not subject to dismissal on this basis.
Nevertheless, Defendant's second argument-that Plaintiff's gender discrimination claim fails because he has not alleged that any viable comparators exist-has merit. Defendant argues that Plaintiff merely “generally refers to comparators outside his protected class, which lacks the specificity necessary to state a claim for relief.” [Doc. 9 at 9.] Defendant further maintains that the only putative comparator Plaintiff does identify, “Shedra,” is not a viable comparator because there is no indication that she and Plaintiff held the same position; had similar qualifications, experience, or training; had the same supervisor; or sought transfers in close temporal proximity to each other. [Id. at 9.] Defendant also highlights that Plaintiff fails to allege that there were any open positions available when Plaintiff sought a transfer; that Shedra's disciplinary history was relevant to her ability to transfer (or relevant in comparison to Plaintiff); or that Plaintiff was even qualified to transfer to another position. [Id. at 9-10.]
Plaintiff essentially concedes that he has been unable to plead specific facts to establish a viable comparator. [Doc. 19 at 9 (“Defendant assumes that Plaintiff has access to copies of everyones' resumes and employee files with whom he performed work; he does not. Without discovery, Plaintiff will never have this information.”).] Indeed, he nevertheless claims that this is not fatal to his case because he does not have to allege a comparator to state a disparate treatment claim other than alleging that there are comparators. [Id. (“There exists no threshold of knowledge that a Plaintiff must plead specifically about comparable individuals beyond the prima facie elements of a plausible claim for Title VII gender discrimination.”).] He also explains that the lack of allegations about a comparator owes to the fact that Plaintiff has not been able to conduct discovery, which would allow him to plead specific facts about identifiable comparators. [Id.] Even so, he contends that at this point his complaint should survive dismissal because he “provides an extensive list of differences in treatment he has personally observed between himself and similarly situated employees, and also pleads that no reason was provided for his termination.” [Id. at 10.]
Along these lines, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant declined to fully participate in informal discovery prior to his filing this action.
Upon review of the allegations in the amended complaint, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that plausibly suggest, rather than allow for the mere possibility, that his discharge was related to his sex or gender. Boiling Plaintiff's factual allegations down to their actual content, Plaintiff's allegations amount to the following: that during the entirety of his 15-month employment with Defendant, he was the only male employee in his cohort; that, from time to time, other unidentified employees-who all happened to be female and included someone named Shedra-were treated more favorably in small ways; and that he was fired without an explanation. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, more is needed to support a plausible inference of discrimination. “Generally speaking, a similarly situated comparator is an employee who engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff; was subject to the same employment policy, guidelines, or rule; had the same supervisor; and who shared the plaintiff's employment or disciplinary history.” Ward v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist., 856 Fed.Appx. 225, 228 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)) (cleaned up). The amended complaint is devoid of any such information, leaving “precisely the sort of labeland-conclusion, formulaic recitation of the element of a cause of action that the Twombly Court found inadequate.” Henley v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 267 F.Supp.3d 1341, 1356 (N.D.Ga. 2017) (cleaned up) (citing Ashmore v. F.A.A., No. 11-cv-60272, 2011 WL 3915752, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2011)).
At most, Plaintiff's vague allegations that unidentified coworkers-again all of whom were women-were treated better than him raises a possibility of genderbased animus, but falls short of plausibly alleging gender discrimination. See Henley, 267 F.Supp.3d at 1356 (finding that the plaintiff's failure to allege facts supporting his conclusory allegation that putative comparators were treated more favorably “undermines the plausibility of his discrimination claim, and leaves only a ‘possibility' of racially-discriminatory animus”); see also Bartholomew v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, No. 219CV695FTM38MRM, 2020 WL 321372, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2020) (citing cases for the proposition that “courts often dismiss complaints for failing to allege enough factual support on the comparators”).
Plaintiff is correct that showing a comparator is not the only way for a plaintiff to prove that an employment decision was motivated by discriminatory animus. For example, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment-never mind a motion to dismiss-by presenting a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker” even in the absence of a comparator. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, if a plaintiff can survive summary judgment without showing a comparator, it stands to reason that a plaintiff is not required to identify a comparator at the pleading stage either, since the pertinent inquiry at this stage of the proceedings is simply whether the “plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that there was a causal link between a plaintiff's protected characteristic and an adverse employment action or other facts otherwise supporting a ‘reasonable inference' of discrimination in relation to an adverse action.” Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:16-CV-1030-CAP-JKL, 2018 WL 10510815, at *5 (N.D.Ga. Nov. 6, 2018) (citing Henderson, 436 Fed.Appx. at 937).
Based upon this, Plaintiff contends that he can show a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence because he “provides an extensive list of differences in treatment he has personally observed between himself and similarly situated employees, and also pleads that no reason was provided for his termination.” [Doc. 19 at 10 (emphasis added).] Unfortunately for Plaintiff, however, this argument adds nothing new because it assumes-and, indeed, requires-that he has adequately pleaded that there are viable similarly-situated individuals, which he has not done. And while it may be suspicious for an employer to not give a reason for firing an employee, it is too great of an inferential leap to conclude that this is an indication that discriminatory animus motivated the decision.
The convincing mosaic analysis is typically utilized in circumstances when a plaintiff lacks comparator evidence precisely because there are no other similarly situated individuals, allowing the plaintiff to bypass the presentation of a standard prima facie case. See Smith v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 588 Fed.Appx. 965, 976 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Lockheed-Martin, 644 F.3d at 1328). And while the convincing mosaic approach condones the consideration of “systematically better treatment of those outside the protected class,” Plaintiff has not offered more than conclusory assertions of systematically better treatment in his amended complaint.
Plaintiff argues that he does not possess discovery from Defendant to flesh out his contentions that comparators exist. [Doc. 19 at 9-10.] But in so arguing, Plaintiff gets the cart before the horse. In order to proceed to the discovery phase of civil litigation, he “still needs to plead a facially plausible claim of [gender].
More generally, Plaintiff's attempt to piece together a convincing mosaic out of a handful of workplace slights is unsuccessful because (1) he does not identify any specific comparators or establish that they are comparators in order to raise a plausible inference of discrimination in relation to those slights, and (2) he fails to ever tie the possible (but not plausible) discriminatory animus of any person involved in those incidents to the motivations of the person(s) who made the decision to terminate his employment. Take, for example, the “Training Coordinator” who delayed Plaintiff's training based upon purported cost concerns. The allegations in the amended complaint-which consist of ipse dixit assertions that female employees received timely training-are far too threadbare to support an inference that that person was motivated by discriminatory animus to delay Plaintiff's training. Davis, 516 F.3d at 974. And even more fundamentally, the amended complaint does not allege that the Training Coordinator had anything to do with the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Thus, the Training discrimination,” which he has not done here. Bartholomew, 2020 WL 321372, at *6.
Coordinator's reasons for delaying training are not probative of the reasoning behind the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. In a similar way, without any particular facts to support that there were identifiable, similarly situated comparators that were treated more favorably, Plaintiff simply does not allege a sufficient basis to plausibly suggest that Holmes was motivated by gender bias when she canceled his approved leave, placed him on a PIP, gave him an unfavorable review, or allegedly sabotaged his work product. Accordingly, the convincing mosaic theory for establishing an inference of discrimination does not provide a vehicle for Plaintiff to establish a plausible inference of intentional discrimination. And as a result, his claim for gender discrimination fails.
And even if there were, there are no allegations that Holmes was even involved in the decision to terminate his employment following the PIP.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion to dismiss [Doc. 9] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 18th day of August, 2023.