All that need be averred or shown to sustain a cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment is a deprivation of one's liberty without legal process. Dubreuil v. Pinnick (1978), 178 Ind. App. 526, 383 N.E.2d 420, 422, trans. denied. The arrest in such actions must be based upon a void, erroneous or irregular process.Stine v. Shuttle (1962), 134 Ind. App. 67, 73, 186 N.E.2d 168, 171.
Under Indiana law, "false imprisonment, is based upon deprivation of one's liberty without legal process that may arise when arrest or detention is without warrant or a warrant that charges no offense ... and all that must be averred or shown is the deprivation of one's liberty without legal process." Dubreuil v. Pinnick , 178 Ind.App. 526, 383 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1978) (brackets omitted). The Court finds that introducing a claim of false imprisonment at this stage would unduly prejudice upon the Defendants.
An improper motive or malice is not an element of false imprisonment. Dubreuil v. Pinnick, 178 Ind.App. 526, 530, 383 N.E.2d 420, 423 (1978). Here, the jury was instructed that, to recover damages for false imprisonment, which imprisonment may be by false arrest, the plaintiffs were required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Trooper Abbott was a law enforcement officer, he restrained the plaintiffs' freedom of movement or liberty without their consent, not acting pursuant to a warrant, and plaintiffs were damaged as a result.
See Lazarus Dep't Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 526 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (evidence that wrongfully-detained shopper was incarcerated just before the holidays, subjected to embarrassment and humiliation in criminal processing including being strip searched, worried about future prosecution, and suffered physical manifestations of trauma associated with arrest supported award of over $300,000), reh'g denied, trans. denied; see also Dubreuil v. Pinnick, 178 Ind.App. 526, 533, 383 N.E.2d 420, 424 (1979) (stating that in action for false imprisonment, "plaintiff may recover for wounded pride and humiliation."). Though there are no allegations of false imprisonment here, we find the analogy an apt one. Mother failed to dismiss the protective order against Father even though she knew she had to do so.
In addition, we will not set aside a judgment as excessive unless the amount is so large that it cannot be explained upon any reasonable hypothesis other than prejudice, passion, partiality, corruption, or that some improper element was considered. Dubreuil v. Pinnick (1978), 178 Ind. App. 526, 383 N.E.2d 420, 424-25. Mr. Mumma, the second landscaper hired by Nering, testified that the advance payments were sufficient to compensate Stockstill for his completed work.
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, this court will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 420, 421. Rather, we will view only the evidence most favorable to the verdict, together with all logical inferences flowing therefrom. Id.
This court will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 420."
In addition, it is only where the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law.Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 420, 421. (Citations omitted). Although the trial judge may have desired further clarification, this does not inherently mean that the evidence was insufficient.
Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc. v. McCarrell (1975) [ 163 Ind. App. 613], 325 N.E.2d 844.'"Dubreuil v. Pinnick (1978), Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 420, at 421. It is Cargill's position that the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence presented at trial was that the hogs awarded to Cargill were not the same ones described in the Bank's security agreements.
Because the purpose of assessing damages is to endeavor to compensate the specific individual harmed by the negligence of another, the law does not undertake to impose a hard and fast rule to be used blindly in determining the damage award in every tort action. Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 420; Kavanagh v. Butorac, (1966) 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824, reh. den. (1967) 221 N.E.2d 824. In Kavanagh v. Butorac, supra, at 221 N.E.2d 828 this Court stated: