Opinion
Civ. No. 02-4215 (DRD).
November 29, 2004
Pascal J. Dubois, Bridgeton, New Jersey, Pro Se Plaintiff.
John R. Parker, Esq., JOHN R. PARKER, LLC, Flemington, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendant Joyce Pirre.
Mark A. Bailey, Esq., LYNCH · MARTIN, North Brunswick, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendants Michael T. Abode and Middlesex County Adult Correction Center.
OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff, Pascal J. Dubois, moves for summary judgment on claims that he was deprived of his constitutionally protected right to access the courts while he was a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff asserts a systematic deprivation of this right by defendants Joyce Pirre ("Pirre"), Michael T. Abode ("Abode"), and Middlesex County Adult Correction Center ("MCACC"). Defendants cross-move for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is denied and Defendants' motions are granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff, a pro se detainee at MCACC, awaiting trial on criminal charges in Middlesex County, filed a Complaint with this court on March 10, 2003 alleging a number of incidents of interfering with his outgoing mail occurring between April 25, 2000 and July 30, 2002 (Complaint at 6A, 6F). Plaintiff's allegations, to the extent that they are not based in pure speculation, will be accepted as true. Abode was the warden of MCACC, and Pirre was a social worker employed at MCACC.
Plaintiff believed that his outgoing legal mail was being delivered (Complaint at 6C). When pieces of Plaintiff's outgoing mail were returned to him on several occasions, Plaintiff concluded that his legal correspondence was not being mailed. Having mailed his legal correspondence via certified mail, Plaintiff expected the return of the certified receipts. On some
Pieces of Plaintiff's outgoing mail were returned to him with notes indicating the reason for their return on the envelopes (Plaintiff's Exhibit H; Plaintiff's Brief at 4).
occasions, Plaintiff's mail had been opened prior to being returned to him. On May 10, 2002, Plaintiff was called into Abode's office and told by Abode that his outgoing mail would not be sent. Specifically, Plaintiff contends, Abode stated, "I will not mail your shit . . ." (Complaint at 6C). Plaintiff's attention was directed to some of his outgoing mail contained in a large box in Abode's office (Complaint at 6A). Among the mail contained in the box was an Interlocutory Appeal addressed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which was due on May 1, 2002. Plaintiff's appeal was not received by the Court of Appeals until May 17, 2002 (Complaint at 6C). Plaintiff contends that Abode withheld 421 pieces of his mail (Complaint at 5).
Plaintiff kept track of 421 pieces of outgoing mail via their tracking numbers and certified receipts. Such outgoing legal mail was allegedly addressed to the courts and authorities and contained, inter alia, Plaintiff's strategies for his defense (Plaintiff's Brief at 3).
In a July 26, 2002 incident, Plaintiff was in the law library at the MCACC. Pirre approached Plaintiff and handed him an opened manila envelope. Plaintiff recognized the manila envelope as one that he had sealed and marked "Legal and Confidential". The manila envelope contained several pieces of outgoing legal correspondence (Complaint at 6F).
The legal correspondence contained within the larger manila envelope was intended for, inter alia, courts, authorities, judges, and investigators. Several of the pieces of correspondence contained within the larger manila envelope had been opened after Plaintiff mailed the larger envelope and before the envelope was returned to him (Plaintiff's Brief at 10).
The Complaint states that Plaintiff's case is about outgoing legal mail which was held, censored, opened and inspected. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Abode denied him access to the courts by censoring, holding, reading, opening and copying Plaintiff's outgoing legal mail and that Pirre inspected, searched, opened and censored Plaintiff's mail, in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Pirre is accused of interfering with the preparation of Plaintiff's trial and defense and denying Plaintiff access to the courts. Plaintiff contends MCACC proximately caused his injuries by the acts of its employees Pirre and Abode within the scope of their employment.
II. Discussion
Summary Judgment Standards
A motion for summary judgment will be granted if after drawing all inferences in favor of
the moving party, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Portline Transportes Maritime Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 536 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1994).
A genuine issue may exist if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the party opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the moving party bears the burden of pointing out to the district court an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the opposition bears the burden of "set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In deciding this motion, the facts and inferences drawn from them will be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pollock v. American Tel. Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986). The court will take the nonmoving party's allegations of fact as true. Goodman v. Mead Johnson Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976). The court will also resolve all doubts and make all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Apalucci v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 145 F.3d 630, 631 (3d Cir. 1998).
The above standards remain unchanged when a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 494 (3d Cir. 1995), citing Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F. 2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992), and when a court is faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1987). If a review of cross-motions for summary judgment reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be entered in favor of the party deserving judgment under the law and the undisputed facts. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo Jr., 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998).
Defendant Pirre moves for summary judgment on three grounds: first, that Plaintiff failed to show actual injury resulting from Pirre's alleged conduct and second, that Pirre's conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and third, that Pirre enjoys qualified immunity for her conduct.
MCACC and Abode jointly move for summary judgment. MCACC moves for summary judgment on the basis that as a local government agency, it cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injury inflicted solely by its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Abode moves for summary judgment on multiple grounds. Abode contends Plaintiff was not denied access to the courts and that Plaintiff's claim regarding his outgoing mail is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Abode also contends he is entitled to qualified immunity and that Plaintiff is barred from seeking summary judgment regarding his incoming mail because Plaintiff failed to raise the issue in his Complaint.
MCACC
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against MCACC which is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot survive. The United States Supreme Court has held that a local government may not be sued in a Section 1983 claim where the alleged injury was inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that a "county (or its agencies) may not be sued under a respondeat superior theory. Therefore, a prima facie case against a county must involve an allegation of a policy or custom [of the county] that directed or caused the constitutional deprivation." Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 2004).
The MCACC is a county agency. Abode and Pirre were employees at MCACC at the time of the alleged incidents. There is no evidence that there was any policy or custom directed or caused by MCACC resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. MCACC cannot be held liable in Plaintiff's Section 1983 action for the alleged actions of Abode or Pirre. MCACC's cross-motion for summary judgment must be granted.
Abode
Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to summary judgment, in part because Abode withheld his incoming mail. The Court of Appeals has held that "a Plaintiff may not move for summary judgment on claims not raised in the complaint," Liberty Lincoln-Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 134 F.3d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1998), because a claim not raised in the complaint will not be deemed as properly before the court. State of New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 1996); O'Hearn v. Simpson Techs. Corp., 2004 WL 870686, 1 (E.D.Pa. 2004). In fact, raising matters not contained in the complaint is prohibited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Singer v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv., 2000 WL 14874, 2 (E.D.Pa. 2000).
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment regarding the issue of his incoming legal mail. He alleges that he never received incoming mail (in the form of legal documents) he tried to secure for his trial scheduled to take place in February 2003 (Plaintiff's Brief at 17). Plaintiff also alleges that he never received incoming mail that had been sent to him from the Superior Court of New Jersey in 2002. Id. Among the documents were copies of arrest warrants and judgments against his wife. Plaintiff claims he was unable to use the documents to cross-examine his wife because his incoming mail was withheld. Id. at 15, 16.
Because Plaintiff did not raise the issue of being denied his incoming mail in his Complaint, he may not raise the issue now. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this issue will be denied and Abode's cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue will be granted.
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that he was denied access to the courts because of interference with his outgoing legal mail.
Access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that "delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003), (quoting Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F.Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Jones v. Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1986)). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996), the Supreme Court noted that there are many constitutionally acceptable ways to ensure meaningful access to the courts. Applying the Supreme Court's holding in Lewis, the Court of Appeals stated that, "to pursue a claim of denial of access to the courts an inmate must allege actual injury, such as the loss or rejection of a legal claim." Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997), citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 349. Plaintiff asserts in general terms that the interference with his outgoing mail resulted in his conviction on the state criminal charges against him. This raises issues involving federal-state comity and the relationship of § 1983 claims and habeas corpus relief which will not be addressed here.
Abode contends that Plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising the issue of denial of access to the courts by interference with his outgoing mail.
The Court of Appeals has held that, "application of the claim preclusive aspect of the res judicata doctrine requires a showing . . . that there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action." United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). "Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, "[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose."" Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 129-130, citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). The final "judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever." Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 130, citing Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597.
Another judge of this court addressed Plaintiff's allegations that Abode interfered with his outgoing legal mail approximately five months ago on June 28, 2004. Dubois v. Abode, et al., Civil Action No. 02-3397 (D.N.J. 2004). In this case, Plaintiff again raises the issue of denial of access to the courts by means of interfering with his outgoing legal mail. In the June 28, 2004 opinion, the court specifically addressed Plaintiff's allegations that Abode withheld his outgoing legal mail and failed to provide him with large envelopes. Id. at 17-18. In her opinion, the court found that Plaintiff's claim failed because Plaintiff's subjective belief that Abode interfered with his outgoing mail was "insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial," Id. at 19, because Plaintiff "ha[d] not established actual injury . . . plaintiff clearly suffered no harm from Abode's alleged conduct," Id., and because unavailability of large envelopes "does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation". Id. The court found that "no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Abode denied Plaintiff his constitutional right of access to the courts," Id., and granted Abode's motion for summary judgment.
The very issue that Plaintiff raises in the instant case, namely, that he was denied access to the courts by reason of Abode's interference with his outgoing mail has already been decided against him in an earlier case. The doctrine of res judicata precludes him from retrying that issue in this case. Incidentally, were he permitted to raise the issue of denial of access to the courts by reason of Abode's interference with his incoming mail, that issue would also be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because he could have and should have raised it in his earlier law suit and did not do so. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Abode will be denied and Abode's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Pirre
Two of the three grounds on which Pirre moves for summary judgment are first, the failure of Plaintiff to establish a constitutional violation and second, qualified immunity. "To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, (1) the facts, `[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the inquiry, [must] show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right,' and (2) `[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Forbes v. Township of Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
To determine whether Plaintiff has established a violation of a constitutional right, in the context of a summary judgment motion, the court must first determine the facts upon which Plaintiff bases his claim and whether any of these facts which are mentioned in the claim are disputed. In this case, Plaintiff's violation of access to the courts claim is based upon his allegations that he made numerous submissions of legal materials to the prison officials for mailing and that there was interference with their delivery.
In his brief Plaintiff describes Pirre's role as follows, "On July 26, 2002, defendant Joyce Pirre, a Social Worker in the M.C.A.C.C., escorted by correctional officer R. Paraham, came to see Plaintiff Dubois in the law library while he was working on his pleadings and preparing for his upcoming trial. Defendant Pirre walked straight to Plaintiff Dubois and handed him a large open manila envelope in front of a dozen witnesses . . . addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, Plaintiff's best friends and only support in the U.S.A., who were helping him from outside by mailing his legal materials . . ." (Plaintiff's Brief at 10).
According to Plaintiff, the large manila envelope contained two certified letters to Defendant Abode and twenty or thirty items of legal correspondence addressed to federal and state courts, state authorities, judges, investigators, his standby attorney, forensic experts, etc. Pirre handed Plaintiff the opened envelope with its enclosures "and told him that they, meaning the jail's officials and Defendant Abode, were not going to mail it." Id. at 11.
It is the opening and return to him of the envelope on July 26, 2002 that is the factual basis of Plaintiff's constitutional claim against Pirre. During discovery Plaintiff could not identify any particular envelope that was in the larger manila envelope. He could not identify any harm caused to him or a result of any delay in his attempted mailings of July 26, 2002. All of his mail was eventually sent. There is no evidence that Pirre had any role in the processing of Plaintiff's mail while he was an inmate at MCACC. On deposition Plaintiff could not say that Pirre opened the large envelope, or that she opened any envelope contained in the larger envelope or that she read any of his mail (Plaintiff's Dep. at 29, 30). As for a conspiracy between Abode and Pirre, all Plaintiff could say was:
"A. She just got mixed up and probably set up by the Ex-Warden. I don't know. I'm just assuming that. He set her up. Probably; probably not. Probably she was part of the conspiracy; probably not. I don't know" (Plaintiff's Dep. at 30).
These facts are undisputed, and the episode that occurred on July 26, 2002 does not rise to the level of a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights to access the courts. This being the case there is no need to address the second prong of Pirre's qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against her will be denied and Pirre's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
III. Conclusion
The court has determined that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact that could lead a rational trier of fact to find for Plaintiff in this case. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgement will be denied, Defendant Abode's and MCACC's cross-motions for summary judgment will be granted and Defendant Pirre's cross-motion for summary judgment will be granted.