Gregory v. Helvering, 1935, 293 U.S. 465, 470, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596; United States v. Phellis, 1921, 257 U.S. 156, 168, 42 S.Ct. 63, 66 L.Ed. 180; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ashland Oil Refining Co., 6 Cir., 1938, 99 F.2d 588, 591, certiorari denied, 1939, 306 U.S. 661, 59 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed. 1057. Thus in analyzing multiple-step transactions, "transitory phases of an arrangement frequently are disregarded under these sections of the revenue acts where they add nothing of substance to the completed affair." Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., supra, 315 U.S. at pages 184-185, 62 S.Ct. at page 544; Liddon v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 1956, 230 F.2d 304, 309, certiorari denied, 1956, 352 U.S. 824, 77 S.Ct. 34, 1 L.Ed.2d 48. Although the case involved another tax area, the following language from DuPont v. Deputy, D.C.Del. 1938, 23 F. Supp. 33, is apt (23 F. Supp. at page 37): "* * * for the purpose of determining tax liability the courts look through the form of the transaction to the substance.
With the assent of Polaroid and the government I permitted Greist to intervene. Du Pont v. Deputy, D.C. D.Del., 23 F. Supp. 33. The order allowing the intervention provided that the only issue to be determined was the party considered to be the manufacturer, and not the amount or base of the tax.
The principle that substance and not form should be the test in this class of cases is well founded and it is the principle that has determined my rulings in the instant case. S.A. MacQueen Co. v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 67 F.2d 857; Du Pont v. Deputy, D.C., 23 F.Supp. 33; Helvering v. Gregory, 2 Cir., 69 F.2d 809; Slayton v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 931. One of the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs is Commissioner v. Behan, 2 Cir., 90 F.2d 609.