Opinion
24A-AD-1002
08-19-2024
D.S., Appellant-Respondent v. J. A. Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Katherine A. Rich Alexus L. Conboy The Northside Law Firm Westfield, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Shana D. Paula Eimerman Law PC Noblesville, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable David K. Najjar, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-2301-AD-56
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Katherine A. Rich
Alexus L. Conboy
The Northside Law Firm
Westfield, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Shana D. Paula
Eimerman Law PC
Noblesville, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] D.S. ("Father") appeals following the denial of his motion styled as a motion to correct error, which challenged an order summarily dispensing with his consent to the adoption of his minor child ("Child") by J.A. Father attempts to challenge the lack of a hearing and the trial court's decision that Father's consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied under Indiana Code Sections 31-19-9-8 and 31-1-9-12. We conclude that the order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, and thus we dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] No hearing has been conducted in this matter prior to the initiation of this purported appeal; thus, the limited facts are gleaned from the court filings and Chronological Case Summary. On January 17, 2023, in Hamilton Superior Court, J.A. filed a petition to adopt Child. J.A. averred that: Child was born in July of 2020; J.A. had continuous physical custody of Child since July 15, 2020; Child was the subject of a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") proceedings in Marion County; J.A. anticipated that the consent of N.K. ("Mother") might not be required; and the name of Child's father was unknown to J.A. at that time.
We anticipate that a hearing will be conducted in the future, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-19-10-5(a), which provides: "Whenever a motion to contest an adoption is filed, the court shall, before entering a decree under IC 31-19-11, set the matter for a hearing to contest the adoption."
[¶3] One year later, in February of 2024, Father, Mother, and the Marion County Department of Child Services ("DCS") were each provided with a Notice of Adoption. DCS moved to intervene in the adoption proceedings. On February 15, Mother and Father filed separate motions to contest the adoption. In his verified motion, Father asserted that he had been granted unsupervised visitation with Child while he resided in work release in Hendricks County; he additionally claimed that DCS opposed the adoption of Child. In her verified motion, Mother asserted that Father had "opened a paternity case" and expressed her desire that Father be awarded custody of Child. (App. Vol. II, pg. 22.)
It is not clear from the record when J.A. became aware of Father's identity.
[¶4] On March 13, J.A. filed a "Notice of Putative Father Registry Affidavit." (Id. at 3.) On April 1, Father filed his "Verified Motion for Transfer of Venue and Consolidation." (Id. at 30.) Therein, Father averred that he, Mother, Child, and J.A. all lived in Marion County and that there was a pending CHINS case in Marion County.
[¶5] J.A. filed an "Objection to Respondent's Verified Motion for Transfer of Venue and Consolidation and Motion to Find Respondent Biological Father's Consent is Irrevocably Implied." (Id. at 33.) J.A. asserted that the Hamilton Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction over Child, Father had failed to notify the paternity court of the pending adoption proceedings, and Father had not registered with the Indiana State Department of Health Putative Father Registry. J.A. petitioned the trial court as follows:
J.A. referenced Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-14(a), which provides: "If a petition for adoption and a paternity action are pending at the same time for a child sought to be adopted, the court in which the petition for adoption has been filed has exclusive jurisdiction over the child, and the paternity proceeding must be consolidated with the adoption proceeding."
Respondent biological father's failure to timely register with the Putative Father Registry bars him from establishing paternity at this late stage and his consent to the adoption remains irrevocably implied.
Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court deny Respondent[] biological father's request to transfer venue and consolidate proceedings and additionally requests that the Court find that Respondent biological father's consent to this adoption is irrevocably implied.(Id. at 35.) On April 10, the trial court entered an order denying Father's motion to transfer and consolidate and finding that Father's consent to adoption was irrevocably implied. Father filed a motion styled as a motion to correct error, to which J.A. responded. On April 18, the trial court summarily denied Father's motion. This purported appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] The Indiana Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction in appeals from final judgments. Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A). Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H) defines a final judgment as a judgment that "disposes of all claims as to all parties[,]" App. R. 2(H)(1), or "the trial court in writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) ... there is no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment," App. R. 2(H)(2). Whether an order is a final judgment governs this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003).
[¶7] We may sua sponte consider whether we have subject matter jurisdiction. Matter of Adoption of S.L., 210 N.E.3d 1280, 1282 (Ind. 2023). A final judgment is one which does not require a future decision by that same court. Id. The final judgment rule prevents delays resulting "from limitless intermediate appeals." Id.
[¶8] Here, the order dispensing with Father's consent to adoption did not end the case; it was thus interlocutory. And Father's motion to correct error was, in effect, a motion to reconsider. See Snyder v. Snyder, 62 N.E.3d 455, 458 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (recognizing that motions to correct error are proper only after the entry of a final judgment and any such motion filed prior to the entry of final judgment must be viewed as a motion to reconsider). Accordingly, the trial court's ruling upon Father's self-styled motion to correct error is also not a final judgment.
[¶9] However, a trial court may convert an otherwise interlocutory order into an appealable final judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 54(B), which provides in part:
A judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties is final when the court in writing expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay, and in writing expressly directs entry of judgment, and an appeal may be taken upon this or other issues resolved by the judgment; but in other cases a judgment, decision or order as to less than all the claims and parties is not final.
Here, the trial court did not in writing expressly determine the non-existence of a just reason for delay and in writing expressly direct the entry of judgment.
[¶10] Finally, some interlocutory appeals may proceed under Indiana Appellate Rule 14. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(A), specified interlocutory orders may be appealed as a matter of right. But none of those grounds are applicable to the purported appeal before us. Under Appellate Rule 14(B), an interlocutory order may be appealed "if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal." No such certification and acceptance occurred in this case.
Conclusion
[¶11] The order from which Father attempts to appeal is not a final judgment. Nor is the order an appealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we dismiss the purported appeal.
[¶12] Dismissed.
Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.