Opinion
24A-MH-833
10-09-2024
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: D.S., Appellant-Respondent v. Community Health Network, Inc., Appellee-Petitioner
Attorney for Appellant Megan Shipley Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Jenny R. Buchheit Sean T. Dewey Ice Miller LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable David J. Certo, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2403-MH-13666
Attorney for Appellant Megan Shipley Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Jenny R. Buchheit Sean T. Dewey Ice Miller LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Weissmann, Judge
[¶1] D.S. appeals his temporary involuntary civil commitment to a hospital for treatment of his mental illness. Although he has been released, he claims the appeal is not moot because he will suffer collateral consequences from the commitment. Alternatively, D.S. contends we should address the appeal under the mootness exception for questions of great public importance. Concluding the appeal is moot and the exception does not apply, we dismiss.
Facts
[¶2] D.S., 56, lived with his girlfriend, J.T., in Fishers, Indiana, for several days weekly and otherwise worked as a health care provider and lived in Chicago. Shortly before D.S.'s commitment, J.T. noticed changes in D.S.'s behavior that alarmed her friends and relatives. For instance, D.S. presented information about "a hundred fifty-million-dollar lawsuit, a RICO case, and Rudy Guiliani" to an Illinois municipal board. Tr. Vol. II, p. 6. D.S. also started recording videos, some of which were hostile and directed at a suburban Chicago police chief. Other videos suggested D.S. would become lieutenant governor of Indiana and that he was working with homeland security.
[¶3] While J.T. was at work, D.S. sent her "concerning videos" in which he appeared agitated and upset at a parking garage. Id. at 10. D.S. told J.T. that he had spoken to Fishers police, and J.T. agreed to meet D.S. at the Fishers Police Department. From there, J.T. drove D.S. to Community Health Network's Behavioral Health Pavilion CRISIS center. Before entering the facility, D.S. "put on like twenty different lanyards." Id. at 11. He later became disruptive when the facility's workers tried to check his vital signs.
[¶4] Community Health Network, Inc. (Hospital) petitioned to detain D.S. on an emergency basis because D.S. had a "psychiatric disorder" and was "gravely disabled." App. Vol. II, p. 13. The treating physician noted that D.S. was "endorsing manic and psychotic symptoms," "lacks insight and judgment," and was refusing medications. Id. at 14. The trial court found probable cause to grant the emergency detention request.
[¶5] Hospital petitioned for a commitment hearing, providing a physician's statement that D.S. was suffering from bipolar disorder, was gravely disabled, and needed a temporary commitment. During D.S.'s hospitalization, he experienced "elevated mood, euphoria, rapid and pressured speech, decreased[d] need for sleep, multiple delusions and agitation[, and] racing thoughts." Tr. Vol. II, p. 19. He also had difficulty focusing or engaging in "a linear conversation." Id. at 20. D.S. accused Hospital of intentionally depriving him of sleep and torturing him. On pieces of paper he possessed in the hospital, D.S. claimed to have written "the mental health act of America" in three hours. Id. at 21-22.
[¶6] Although D.S.'s blood pressure was high and put him at risk for stroke and other complications, D.S. refused to take medication to treat his condition. He also refused to take medications aimed at stabilizing his mental illness symptoms. D.S. advised other patients that they should refuse their medications because they did not need them, and he wanted to call their families to tell them the same thing.
[¶7] After a hearing on the commitment petition, the trial court found that D.S. was mentally ill with bipolar disorder, that he was gravely disabled, and that he needed custody, care, and treatment at Hospital for a period expected not to exceed 90 days. The court ordered D.S. to take all medications as prescribed and attend all clinical sessions as scheduled. The court also granted Hospital "an Order to Treat unless [D.S.] does not substantially benefit from the medications." App. Vol. II, p. 10. D.S. appealed, but the temporary commitment order expired before his appeal was fully briefed.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] D.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his temporary involuntary commitment. Although his temporary commitment expired before this appeal ripened, D.S. argues that his appeal is not moot due to collateral consequences that he will suffer from an unreviewed commitment. He alternatively argues that his appeal concerns a matter of great public importance and therefore falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine. We reject both claims.
I. This Appeal is Moot
[¶9] "A case is moot when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the parties no effective relief." E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022). A moot appeal is subject to dismissal because the opinion is merely advisory if effective relief cannot be granted. C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 219 N.E.3d 142, 146-147 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023).
[¶10] D.S. contends his appeal is not moot because he will suffer harmful collateral consequences absent appellate review of his temporary commitment. An appeal may be heard when significant negative collateral consequences will result if the judgment stands. Id. at 147. "Indiana's appellate courts have applied the 'collateral consequences' doctrine to hold that appeals are not moot where meaningful relief may still be had by our review of those appeals on their merits." Id.
[¶11] D.S. argues that his temporary commitment has the collateral consequence of rendering his future commitment easier. Citing Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), D.S. contends that "a history of involuntary commitment is evidence that supports a finding of grave disability" in a new commitment proceeding. Appellant's Br., p. 9. But Golub involved a regular commitment and no mootness issue. 814 N.E.2d at 1037.
Regardless, D.S.'s reliance on Indiana precedent for this alleged collateral consequence may be unavailing. D.S. testified that upon his release, he would return to Chicago, where he had been living and working prior to living part-time in Fishers. D.S. cites no Illinois authority suggesting that his temporary involuntary commitment in Indiana would enhance his chances of a similar involuntary hospitalization in Illinois.
[¶12] In any case, this Court has rejected a claim of collateral consequences similar to D.S.'s. In J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 222 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), we ruled that the collateral consequences doctrine should apply "only when the appellant demonstrates a particularized collateral consequence flowing from the temporary commitment order." Id. at 1024. Like D.S., the patient in J.F. argued that the temporary commitment order carried negative collateral consequences by rendering her future involuntary commitment proceeding easier to obtain. Finding the patient's appeal moot, the J.F. Court concluded the patient "has not sufficiently shown a particularized harmful consequence would befall her if this Court declined to reach the merits of her appeal." Id.
[¶13] In so ruling, J.F. distinguished another of this Court's decisions. Id. at 1024 n.3. In M.T. v. Cmty. Health Network, 219 N.E.3d 151, 153 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), a patient argued that his temporary involuntary commitment "would add to the history of hospitalizations on his medical record and make future involuntary commitment proceedings against him more likely to be successful." But in J.F., this Court noted that the patient in M.T. had developed a "properly presented record[]" supporting the collateral consequences findings. 222 N.E.3d at 1024 n.3. This record included evidence showing the patient's history of hospitalizations and the treating physician's reliance on that history in diagnosing the patient and developing a treatment plan for him. M.T., 219 N.E.3d at 155. No comparable record was presented by the patient in J.T.
[¶14] As in J.F., D.S. has not developed a "properly presented record[]" supporting application of the collateral consequences doctrine. 222 N.E.3d at 1024, n.3. The record contains no evidence of D.S.'s medical history, including any prior hospitalizations. We therefore conclude that D.S., like the patient in J.F., has not sufficiently shown a particularized harmful consequence would befall him if this Court does not reach the merits of his appeal.
II. The Public-Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine Does Not Apply
[¶15] The public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine allows a moot appeal to be reviewed on the merits "when the issue involves a question of great public importance which is likely to recur." E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466 (quoting Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991)). "[A]ppellate courts are not required to issue an opinion in every moot temporary commitment appeal, but they may readily do so to address novel issues or close calls, or to build the instructive body of law to help trial courts make these urgent and difficult decisions." Id. We have broad discretion in making this determination. J.F., 222 N.E.3d at 1023.
[¶16] D.S. claims the public-interest exception applies here, given that his appeal questions when a hospital may obtain a temporary involuntary commitment based on a mentally ill person's refusal of treatment for physical ailments. But D.S. cites four Indiana appellate decisions which already have ruled on this issue. This precedent also shows that the issue is fact sensitive, leading to outcomes that are largely case-specific. See, e.g., In re Commitment of A.W.D., 861 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (affirming trial court's ruling that patient committed for five years remained gravely disabled due to his inability to manage his daily medications for physical ailments); P.B. v. Evansville State Hosp., 90 N.E.3d 1199, 1201 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (reversing commitment based on inadequate evidence that patient was gravely disabled when evidence showed her physician feared her physical health would decline upon her release but record contained no evidence that patient's mental health had ever impacted her physical health). As D.S. has failed to show that this case involves a question of great public importance, we decline to invoke the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
[¶17] We dismiss this appeal as moot.
Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.