Summary
In Drummond v. Inhabitants of the Town of Manchester, 161 Me. 376, 212 A.2d 701 (1965) this Court dismissed an appeal brought in 1965 from denial of a junkyard permit on the grounds that it "came too late" since the 1964 permit, if issued, would have already expired.
Summary of this case from Lynch v. Town of KitteryOpinion
Opinion, August 31, 1965.
Constitutional Law. Appeal and Error. Automobile Junkyards.
It would be inappropriate for Supreme Judicial Court on appeal to give purely advisory opinion with respect to dead issue.
Where application of landowner in 1964 for permit to establish and maintain automobile junkyard or graveyard was denied, and landowner then brought suit for declaration of his rights under pertinent statutes, and in 1965 justice of Superior Court ordered summary judgment for landowner, Supreme Judicial Court would dismiss town's appeal in 1965 on ground that case was moot because judgment below came too late and was required to be set aside, in view of fact that statute provides that permit, if granted, shall be valid only until first day of year following.
ON APPEAL.
This is an appeal from an order of summary judgment for the landowner declaring that a permit should have been granted subject to and conditioned on reasonable rules and regulations. The court held that the appeal was required to be dismissed on the grounds that the case was moot because the judgment below came too late in view of a statutory change. Appeal dismissed.
Sanford L. Fogg, for Appellant.
Seward B. Brewster, for Appellee.
Barnett I. Shur, amicus curiae.
SITTING: WILLIAMSON, C.J., WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, MARDEN, RUDMAN, JJ.
In 1964 plaintiff applied to the Municipal Officers of defendant town for a permit to establish and maintain upon his own property an automobile junkyard or graveyard so-called. After notice and hearing the permit was denied. Plaintiff then brought a complaint in the nature of a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of his rights under and an interpretation of the pertinent statutes. (Now 30 M.R.S.A. § 2451 to 2458, inc.; formerly R.S., 1954, Chap. 100, Secs. 137 to 144, inc., as amended). As of February 8, 1965 the justice below ordered summary judgment for the plaintiff on his complaint declaring that the 1964 permit should have been granted subject to and conditioned upon reasonable rules and regulations affecting operation imposed by defendant. An appeal was taken thereto.
Sec. 2452 provides in part that a permit, if granted, "shall be valid only until the first day of the year following." It follows that the permit for 1964, in issue here, would not be affected by our decision. Conditions change from year to year under which such permits are granted or denied by municipal officers. Changes are also wrought by legislative amendment. We note with interest the enactment of P.L., 1965, Chap. 285 which amends the above-cited statutes and adds a new section 2451-B which contains a definition of "automobile graveyard" not found in the original sections. It would be inappropriate for this court to give a purely advisory opinion with respect to a dead issue. The judgment below came too late and must be set aside. The case is moot.
Appeal dismissed.