It is at once obvious that although Dahlia Clay is not a party to the instant action, her estate very much is. It is a well recognized rule that admissions by a predecessor in interest are admissible in an action against a successor in interest when there is privity between the two. See Matusick v. Large, 85 Nev. 202, 452 P.2d 457 (1969); Katnig v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 195 (Okla. 1963); Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wn. App. 519, 475 P.2d 908 (1970); McCormick on Evidence § 268 (2d ed. 1972). See also Silver Syndicate, supra.
At least three Washington cases have held that "any use of the questioned land, however temporary, consistent with its general nature, would appear to be sufficient to preclude application of the statute." Wilson v. Howard, 5 Wn. App. 169, 172, 486 P.2d 1172 (1971) (finding that occasional recreational use of the land, which was wild beachfront property, was consistent with its general nature and sufficient to remove it from the category of "vacant and unoccupied."); see also McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wn.2d 24, 253 P.2d 415 (1953) (finding that temporary use of timber lands by "cedar makers," employed by the party claiming title and working but not living on the land, was deemed to be sufficient to categorize the land as neither vacant nor unoccupied); see also Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wn. App. 519, 522-23, 475 P.2d 908 (1970) (finding that the plaintiff's claim of reacquisition of title by payment of taxes pursuant to the vacant lands statute was precluded due to the defendant's extensive improvements in connection with a fish hatchery on the land). The threshold issue is whether the land was truly vacant and unoccupied to the extent necessary for WWCSDA to use RCW 7.28.080.
[12] Our review of the record indicates that counsel objected to the testimony on relevancy grounds and that no hearsay objection was made. We doubt that a hearsay objection could properly have been sustained, see Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wn. App. 519, 475 P.2d 908 (1970); ER 801(d)(2), but hold only that no hearsay objection was preserved for appeal. State v. Severns, supra. The judgment is affirmed.
In a legal sense, the enclosure "unfurled the flag of hostile ownership." Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wn. App. 519, 524, 475 P.2d 908 (1970).
Hall's testimony was admissible as an admission of a party opponent because it was made by an authorized agent of defendant corporation inconsistent with that party's position at trial. Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wn. App. 519, 475 P.2d 908 (1970); Avgerinion v. First Guaranty Bank, 142 Wn. 73, 252 P. 535 (1927). Although the above described testimony by no means stands alone in the record, it does, by itself, constitute substantial evidence of the terms of the employment agreement sued upon.
Its existence, under the circumstances, would not convey notice of a claim by the plaintiff. Beck v. Loveland, 37 Wn.2d 249, 222 P.2d 1066 (1950); Drumheller v. Nasburg, 3 Wn. App. 519, 475 P.2d 908 (1970). A fence existing as a convenience rather than as an assertion of ownership does not establish notice of a claim.