In answering this question we must bear in mind that the universal rule to be applied is that the pole star in considering the will of a deceased, is the intention of the testator which is to be found and implemented if it can be done without violence to statutory law or recognized judicial authority. As was held in Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W.2d 146, a will may consist of several testamentary papers construed together and writings propounded for probate constitute the will of the deceased where they show unequivocally that the writer intended them as a posthumous disposition of his estate. In re Smith's Estate, 31 Cal.2d 563, 191 P.2d 413, 416, it was held;
" Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W.2d 146, 149, cites McCutchen v. Ochmig, supra, and holds that animus testandi is shown if the writing offered for probate discloses an intention on the part of the writer that it should control and direct the disposition of his property after death and "the words of the writings propounded for probate `unequivocally show that the writer intended it as a posthumous disposition of his estate'". The statute, Code, Section 8090, only requires that to be a will the paper offered for probate shall purport to be a disposition of the writer's property after his death, however informal the expressions used, and without regard to whether the language employed by the writer is sufficient for the purpose intended, that being a matter of construction by the proper court after the testamentary character of the instrument has been established.
This, however, is again a matter of construction which is not involved in a probate proceeding. Grant that a will may consist of several separate paper writings and that only such part or parts of one or more writings as are material in a dispositive sense may be extracted, not out of context but simply apart from the irrelevant matter, from an entire document, for example, several letters as in Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W.2d 146; or that the same document may contain both testamentary and nontestamentary provisions each relating to different properties; yet in all such instances the writing in order to be entitled to probate as a holograph must be wholly in the handwriting of the testator. It is obvious that the two documents in question provide an entirely different disposition of the same property. If we should extract the last sentence of the second one and add it to the first, we would thwart the intention expressed in each document.
"It is sufficient if the words of the writing propounded for probate `unequivocally show that the writer intended it as a posthumous disposition of his estate, both real and personal . . .' McCutchen v. Ochmig, 1 Baxt., 390, 397." Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 432, 68 S.W.2d 146, 149. The testimony of Mrs. Graves is evidence that Mrs. Allen intended it to operate as her will. Her testimony is competent for this purpose.