¶ 15. In Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 765–66 (¶¶ 8–9) (Miss.1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court determined a discussion of fault was proper in an Armstrong analysis, even if the divorce was based on irreconcilable differences. “[L]imited testimony regarding all the Armstrong factors can be introduced even in an uncontested divorce.

¶ 6. Melinda contends that the chancellor did not err, because of his reliance upon the Driste opinion, which states "[t]he fact that both spouses agree to a divorce does not eliminate the consideration of the fault factor in determining alimony." Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 766 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App. 1999). Melinda argues that by stating in the opinion when addressing fault, "fault (the separation of the husband without explanation)," the chancellor was merely stating the law by listing the factors and such a comment does not imply any punitive intent in the chancellor's decision.

Id. In Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 768 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App. 1998), the chancellor awarded the wife of an eight year marriage, with no children, rehabilitative alimony of $750 per month for eighteen months, lump sum alimony of $20,000, nearly $5,000 in attorney fees, one-third of the tax refund, and almost an even division of the remaining property. This Court reversed and remanded the chancellor's award and held the overall alimony award was inadequate.

See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 936 (Miss. 1994); Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 766 (Miss. 1998). ¶ 9.

Nothing in that case indicates such a factor may only be considered in a fault-based divorce." Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 765 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). ¶ 10. Junita left the marital domicile and procured living quarters for herself and her daughter.

Tammy relies on Driste v. Driste to support her assertion; however, Driste is inapplicable to the facts before us, as Driste considered an award of permanent periodic alimony. Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 766 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). Nonetheless, “[i]t is true that the chancellor is entitled to weigh ‘[m]arital misconduct’ as a ‘viable factor’ in his analysis of the Ferguson factors, but ‘only when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.’ ” Phillips v. Phillips, 45 So.3d 684, 697 (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So.2d 901, 904–905 (Miss.

Tammy relies on Driste v. Driste to support her assertion; however, Driste is inapplicable to the facts before us, as Driste considered an award of permanent periodic alimony. Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 766 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). Nonetheless, “[i]t is true that the chancellor is entitled to weigh ‘[m]arital misconduct’ as a ‘viable factor’ in his analysis of the Ferguson factors, but ‘only when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.’ ” Phillips v. Phillips, 45 So.3d 684, 697 (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So.2d 901, 904–905 (Miss.

Tammy relies on Driste v. Driste to support her assertion; however, Driste is inapplicable to the facts before us, as Driste considered an award of permanent periodic alimony. Driste v. Driste, 738 So. 2d 763, 766 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). Nonetheless, "[i]t is true that the chancellor is entitled to weigh '[m]arital misconduct' as a 'viable factor' in his analysis of the Ferguson factors, but 'only when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.'"

Although not explicitly stated, marital fault is considered in the context of the Ferguson factors. Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 768 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

Although not explicitly stated, marital fault is considered in the context of the Ferguson factors. Driste v. Driste , 738 So. 2d 763, 768 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). ¶29.