Haida cites to First National Bank of Chicago v. Maynard, 75 Conn.App. 355, 815 A.2d 1244 (foreclosure action), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 914, 821 A.2d 768 (2003), and Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 198 (2d Cir.2007) (discussing applicability of abuse of discretion standard to court's granting of injunctive relief). Both Asia Pacific and Vera Financial incorrectly rely on Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 93 A.2d 925 (1952), for the proposition that an appellate court reviews a trial court's interlocutory judgment of interpleader for an abuse of discretion. Although Driscoll involved an interpleader action, this court did not apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's interlocutory judgment of interpleader in that case, but rather, this court applied the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's award of counsel fees to the parties' respective personal representatives. Id., at 351–52, 93 A.2d 925.
After the account was established, Giacomo gave the bankbook to his mother and she kept it in a trunk in their home. The plaintiff claims a true survivorship account was not established and it was an attempt to create a testamentary disposition, and cites Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, and Flynn v. Hinsley, 142 Conn. 257. These cases were decided before the statute which is now § 36-3 of the General Statutes. The statute in effect at the time the account was established (June 6, 1960) provided that where a deposit was made "in the names of two persons and in form to be paid to either or the survivor of them . . . may be paid to either during the lifetime of both or to the survivor after the death of one of them, and such payment and the receipt or acquittance of the one to whom such payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge for all payments so made. The making of a deposit . . . in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding respecting the ownership of, or the enforcement of the obligation created or represented by, such deposit . . . , of the intention of both of the named owners thereof to vest title to such deposit . . . , including all additions and increments ther
.... [T]he issue of intent is a question of fact....”); Heffernan v. New Britain Bank & Trust Co., 175 Conn. 8, 12, 392 A.2d 481 (1978) (“[t]he question of [a joint holder's] intention [to transfer possession and enjoyment of a joint account to the other joint holder immediately, or rather, after death] is one of fact, to be determined by reference to the particular facts of each case”); Flynn v. Hinsley, 142 Conn. 257, 262, 113 A.2d 351 (1955) (“[t]he question whether in delivering a bankbook it was the intention of the claimed donor immediately to transfer title to the bank account [to one named as a joint holder] is one of fact for the determination of the trier”); Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 667, 88 A.2d 391 (1952) (“[a] question of intent [as to the making of a present gift by transferring an account into joint ownership] is a question of fact” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The issue of ownership upon the death of a joint account holder similarly is a factual one. Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 349, 93 A.2d 925 (1952); Clayman v. Prochaska, 2 Conn.App. 430, 435, 479 A.2d 1214 (1984). It is subject, however, to the rebuttable presumption of ownership in the survivor(s) created by operation of § 36a–290 (b). See, e.g., Garrigus v. Viarengo, 112 Conn.App. 655, 668–71, 963 A.2d 1065 (2009) (statutory presumption rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that defendant joint holder fraudulently induced decedent to create joint accounts by falsely representing that funds would be distributed to other survivors according to decedent's wishes); Clayman v. Prochaska, supra, at 435, 479 A.2d 1214 (statutory presumption not rebutted when evidence showed that decedent intended that defendant joint holder, decedent's former wife, would receive funds in joint account upon death of decedent).
The trial court has a wide discretion in making its awards, subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion. Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 351-52, 93 A.2d 925 (1952); Podzunas v. Prudential Ins. Co., 125 Conn. 581, 583, 7 A.2d 657 (1939). The plaintiffs claim that the award of $2450 in attorney's fees was excessive and that the trial court was influenced to the prejudice of the plaintiffs by evidence of the $900,000 financial worth of Frank Loda.
Each of these analyses of savings bank trust accounts proved in some sense unsatisfactory. As this court recognized in Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 350, 93 A.2d 925 (1952), savings accounts that purport to transfer ownership of deposits are so hybrid in concept that they call out for a sui generis treatment by statute. The earliest Connecticut statute to address this need provided procedures for the creation of savings account trusts and absolved banks from any liability for payment of funds on deposit at the depositor's death to the named beneficiary.
In the finding, which was necessarily curtailed by the absence of an appendix, there are no facts to support a valid gift inter vivos. Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 502, 152 A.2d 512; Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 350, 93 A.2d 925; Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 667, 88 A.2d 391. Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey and vermont.
Burbank v. Stevens, 104 Conn. 17, 23, 131 A. 742; Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Slater, 114 Conn. 603, 613, 159 A. 578. The intent of the donor is the determinative factor. What his intent was raises an issue of fact. Flynn v. Hinsley, 142 Conn. 257, 262, 113 A.2d 351; Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 349, 93 A.2d 925; Costello v. Costello, 136 Conn. 611, 616, 73 A.2d 333. In concluding that the decedent, Charles Parandes, in- tended to make a present gift inter vivos to the defendant, the trial court, upon the facts, reached a reasonable and logical conclusion and correctly followed recognized principles of applicable law.
While the best method of carrying out such a purpose would be to change the account to make it stand in the name of the donee as sole owner, this was not the only way in which such a gift could be validly made. A valid inter-vivos gift of personal property such as a bank account requires two things: a delivery of the possession of the property to the donee and a present intention that the title to it should pass immediately to him. It is not necessary that there should be a manual delivery of the passbook or that delivery should be made to the donee in person, nor is there any particular form or mode in which the transfer must be made or by which the intention of the donor must be expressed. Guinan's Appeal, 70 Conn. 342, 348, 39 A. 482; Main's Appeal, 73 Conn. 638, 640, 48 A. 965; Stamford Savings Bank v. Everett, 132 Conn. 92, 94, 42 A.2d 662; Kriedel v. Krampitz, 137 Conn. 532, 534, 79 A.2d 181; Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 667, 88 A.2d 391; Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 349, 93 A.2d 925. One of the court's conclusions was that the "accounts are valid and enforceable trusts."
ssession of the three bankbooks to Mrs. Hinsley and of the two bankbooks to Thomas Cagney with the intention that title to the books and to the bank accounts they represented should pass immediately to Mrs. Hinsley and Thomas Cagney, respectively, and rendered judgment declaring that Mrs. Hinsley has title to and ownership of the three savings bank accounts and Thomas Cagney has title to and ownership of the two bank accounts. From this judgment the defendant Timothy L. Cagney has appealed, assigning error in the foregoing conclusions and also in the claimed failure of the court to adopt some of his claims of law bearing on the question of the quantum of evidence requisite to prove gifts such as those claimed by the other defendants. The principles of law controlling the decision of a case in which it is claimed that a decedent has made a gift of a bank account payable to either himself or another or the survivor are enunciated in Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 88 A.2d 391, and Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 93 A.2d 925. To constitute a valid gift inter vivos, it is essential that there be (1) a delivery of possession, usually to be accomplished by delivery of the bankbook evidencing the account, with (2) an intention on the part of the donor that title, as distinguished from the right of enjoyment, shall pass to the donee immediately rather than upon the death of the donor.
"(b) The establishment of a deposit account or share account which is a joint account under subsection (a) of this section is, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, or other clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, prima facie evidence of the intention of all of the named owners thereof to vest title to such account, including all subsequent deposits and additions made thereto, in such survivor or survivors, in any action or proceeding between any two or more of the depositors, respecting the ownership of such account or its proceeds...." The issue of ownership upon the death of a joint account holder is a factual one. Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society , 139 Conn. 346, 349, 93 A.2d 925 (1952). Appellate review of findings of fact is limited to the clearly erroneous standard.