The statute authorizing condemnation will be construed in the light of its general scope and tenor and the nature of the public use for which the condemnation is authorized. Driscoll v. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 52 A. 618, 620; Carroll v. City of Newark, 108 N.J.L. 323, 158 A. 458, 460, 461, 79 A.L.R. 509. Driscoll v. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 52 A. 618, 620.
Any language in a statute which makes its meaning clear is sufficient to give the right to take land in fee. Downing v. State, 214 Ala. 199, 107 So. 80; Driscoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 52 A. 618; Carroll v. Newark, 108 N.J. Law 323, 158 A. 458, 79 A.L.R. 509; Barnes v. Peck, 283 Mass. 618, 187 N.E. 176. The statement in Code, Title 19, § 24, to the effect that the order of condemnation shall vest in the applicant the easement proposed to be acquired, is inapt, and does not limit the provisions of § 1, same title, authorizing a municipal corporation to take lands or to acquire an interest or an easement therein, for any uses for which private property may be taken.
This, we think, is in accordance with the great weight of the authorities. The following cases will prove of interest: City of Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N.C. 732 ( 130 S.E. 861); Driscoll v. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 92 ( 52 A. 618); Meldrum v. District of South Vancouver, 22 B. C. 574; Herald v. Board of Education, 65 W. Va. 765 ( 65 S.E. 102, 31 L.R.A. [N. S.] 588). Turning now to our own cases, it should be first noted that in People v. Gardner, 136 Mich. 693, and Pantlind v. City of Grand Rapids, 210 Mich. 18 (15 A.L.R. 280), this court sustained ordinances regulating the collection and disposal of garbage upon the ground that they were a valid exercise of the police power.
The city procured an unconditioned and unrestricted title to the land in fee. Having afterwards lawfully dedicated it, with other lands, to the purposes of a public park, it held it in trust for such public use; Driscoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92,101; the power to lay out, alter or discontinue such parks, in the manner described in the charter, being vested in the court of common council. Whether the city through its common council, or otherwise, could thereafter, without legislative authority, devote such land to another use inconsistent with the first, we have no occasion to inquire. The use to which it was in fact devoted was not inconsistent with its use by the public as a public park.
No precise words are necessary in a statute to authorize the condemnation of a fee. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes, then a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in City of Newton v. Perry, 163 Mass. 319, 39 N.E. 1032. `There are no sacramental words which must be used in a statutory power to take and hold lands in order to give a right to take the lands in fee.' See, also, Driscoll v. City of New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 52 A. 618. "The statute, from its title throughout, anticipates the exercise of complete control over the lands by the city.
757 (Conn. 1999) (challenge to tax exemption); Driscoll v. City of New Haven, 52 A. 618, 622 (Conn. 1902) (taxpayer suit to enjoin municipal grant of land to private company); Kentucky Union R.R. Co. v. Bourbon County, 2. S.W. 687, 690 (Ky. 1887) (taxpayer suit to enjoin subscription of bonds for railroad purposes); Brumley v. Baxter, 36 S.E.2d 281, 286 (N.C. 1945) (taxpayer suit to enjoin municipal grant of real property for use by military veterans); see also Gross v. Auditor of Accounts, 109 Vt. 156, 159, 194 A. 465, 467 (1937) (Article 7 challenge to payment to sheriff's widow as "emolument" without consideration of public service). These cases generally turned on whether the challenged action promoted a public purpose or was made without some consideration of public service.
Thus, authority may be granted to take the fee or an easement. Driscoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 99, 52 A. 618. The legislature may likewise authorize the taking of an interest which is either permanent or temporary. Waterbury v. Platt Bros. Co., 75 Conn. 387, 392, 53 A. 958." In Collins the plaintiff sought to obtain a right of way fifty feet in width to cross the defendant's land of which the inner thirty feet were sought for a permanent easement within which to lay the gas pipe while the outer ten feet on each side temporarily were needed solely for [he purpose of providing ample space for the movement of heavy equipment used in the installation of the pipe.
2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), p. 453, sec. 7.223. See also Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Manasse (1942), 380 Ill. 27, 42 N.E.2d 543; Driscoll v. New Haven (1902), 75 Conn. 92, 52 A. 618; Matter of Rochester (1893), 137 N.Y. 243 33 N.E. 320. Sec. 182.35(1), Stats., permits the corporation to condemn only such lands as are "necessary."
Thus, authority may be granted to take the fee or an easement. Driscoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 99, 52 A. 618. The legislature may likewise authorize the taking of an interest which is either permanent or temporary.
Where land is given to a municipality for such a use as that of maintaining a park, where it is dedicated for such a use, and even where the municipality itself acquires it and uses it for that purpose, the municipality is often referred to in the decisions as holding the land in trust or as a trustee for the public, and in our own decisions we have used this language. See, e.g., Derby v. Alling, 40 Conn. 410, 438; Driscoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92, 101, 52 A. 618; Hartford v. Maslen, supra. It is of course not necessary for the creation of a trust that any particular language be used if the intent of the creator is to establish it; but we have repeatedly held that where property is conveyed to a charitable corporation, simply with the requirement that it be used for one of its authorized purposes, this is not in itself sufficient to establish a trust.