Condon v. Pomroy-Grace, 73 Conn. 607, 614, 48 A. 756, 53 L.R.A. 696; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66 145 A. 25. A conclusion reached upon comparison and examination of conflicting professional opinion, by reliance upon one rather than another, can rarely be found erroneous in law in the absence of bad faith. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., supra, 96 Conn. 295, at page 300, 114 A. 109."

This is a conclusion of fact and as such must be sustained unless the commissioner applied an illegal standard in reaching it, or drew a conclusion which the subordinate facts did not justify, or found a fact material to this conclusion without evidence or against the evidence. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109; Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 153, 93 A. 245. The finding as corrected makes it clear that the question of causality was resolved in the defendant's favor upon a sharp conflict in medical opinion. It is axiomatic that a finding based upon the opinion of experts, where there is a conflict, must stand.

Miller v. Riverside Storage Cartage Co., 189 Mich. 360; Kostamo v. H. G. Christman Co., 214 Mich. 652. Notwithstanding the income of the father, plaintiffs were dependent on the contributions of the deceased at the time of the accident. Grant v. Kotwall, 133 Md. 573 ( 105 A. 758); Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295 ( 114 A. 109); Henry Pratt Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 367 ( 127 N.E. 754); London Guarantee Accident Co. v. Hoage, 64 App. D.C. 105 ( 75 Fed. [2d] 236); Frear v. Ells, 200 App. Div. 239 ( 193 N.Y. Supp. 324). There are some cases that uphold defendant's contention that if the father was earning sufficient to support himself and his wife, the latter was not dependent upon the contributions of the son. Fosket v. A. J. Buschmann Co., 193 App. Div. 342 ( 183 N.Y. Supp. 919); Frey v. McLoughlin Bros., Inc., 187 App. Div. 824 ( 175 N.Y. Supp. 973); Kelley v. Hoefler Ice Cream Co., 196 App. Div. 800 ( 188 N.Y. Supp. 584). The weight of authority, however, is to the contrary.

See 58 Am.Jur. 685, Workmen's Compensation, 162; 9 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text (Perm. Ed.) 1901-03. Since the commissioner found that Wheat had made no contribution whatsoever to the support of the plaintiffs after January 27, 1961, he could reasonably and logically conclude that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the first two enumerated requisites for a finding that they were Wheat's dependents in fact at the time of his death on August 16, 1963. As we repeated in O'Dea v. Chicago Bridge Iron Works, supra, 40, quoting from Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 302, 114 A. 109: "A dependent is one who has relied upon the decedent for support and who has a reasonable expectation that such support will continue." "Indeed, expectation of the continuance of contribution is of the very essence of dependency.

See Cackowski v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc., 133 Conn. 631, 636, 53 A.2d 649; Scranton v. L. G. DeFelice Son, Inc., 137 Conn. 580, 583, 79 A.2d 600. And the court was not compelled to credit the defendant's expert testimony. Van Detti v. Parsons Bros., Inc., 146 Conn. 282, 286, 150 A.2d 200. There is nothing to the contrary in Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109, Burdick v. United States Finishing Co., 130 Conn. 455, 458, 35 A.2d 405, and Greenberg v. Electric Boat Co., 142 Conn. 404, 407, 114 A.2d 850, the three cases cited and relied upon by the defendant. The court was entitled to accept Mrs. King's testimony, instead of that of the defendant's expert, as to the damage caused her home by the blast, and to find that reasonable compensation therefor would be $175.

The defendant claims that Fennell's testimony should not have been allowed because it was not shown that he was qualified to testify as an expert as to the timber value of these trees, since it appeared that as a tree surgeon his knowledge related to shade tree rather than timber values, and further that by reason of his lack of knowledge of the latter values the grounds upon which his opinion was based were so unreasonable as to render it inadmissible. See Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109. The qualification of an expert is in the discretion of the trial court.

" Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714, 134 A. 259. "An opinion of an expert may be unreasonable because the grounds upon which it rests are so unreasonable as to make it an error of law for a court to base its decision upon the opinion." Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109; Kulak v. Landers, Frary Clark, 120 Conn. 606, 608, 181 A. 720; Burdick v. United States Finishing Co., 130 Conn. 455, 458, 35 A.2d 405; see Di Biase v. Garnsey, 106 Conn. 86, 89, 136 A. 871. Inasmuch as such testimony as that objected to in this instance would not justify a trier in coming to any conclusion as to the speed of the car, it was not proper evidence for a jury's consideration. Myers v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, 153 Kan. 287, 302, 110 P.2d 810; Kanne v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 Ill. App. 524, 530, 34 N.E.2d 732; Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Vaughan, 71 F.2d 394, 395; see Estabrook v. Main, 110 Conn. 271, 272, 147 A. 822; Stitham v. LeWare, 134 Conn. 681, 682, 60 A.2d 658. The court was, therefore, in error in allowing the question objected to. Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 222, 189 A. 331; 32 C.J.S. 220, 522; 20 Am.Jur. 667, 795.

We cannot say that the commissioner's decision was unreasonable or was an abuse of his discretion; Wysocki v. Bradley Hubbard Co., 113 Conn. 170, 177, 154 A. 431; and it was confirmed by the trial court. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 300, 114 A. 109.

" Where this is to be resolved on such conflicting testimony as is presented in this case the rule applicable is clear. "A conclusion reached upon comparison and examination of conflicting professional opinion, by reliance upon one rather than another, can rarely be found erroneous in law in the absence of bad faith." Kulak v. Landers, Frary Clark, 120 Conn. 606, 608, 181 A. 720; Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 300, 114 A. 109. No element of bad faith is involved upon this record. The jury's finding upon the issue cannot be disturbed.

The plaintiff relied on a doctor who testified, in response to a hypothetical question, that the cause of the cerebral hemorrhage was the accident and that the physical infirmities of the insured in no way contributed thereto. The defendant recognizes the difficulty of upsetting a finding of the trial court based on conflicting expert opinion but claims that, read as a whole, the testimony of the doctor called by the plaintiff is not sufficient in law to support his diagnosis, citing Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109. It is to be noted, however, that "A conclusion reached upon comparison and examination of conflicting professional opinion, by reliance upon one rather than another, can rarely be found erroneous in law in the absence of bad faith." Kulak v. Landers, Frary Clark, 120 Conn. 606, 608, 181 A. 720. No bad faith is apparent in this record.