Action by Belle Crosby against the City of Chester for injuries sustained as result of the alleged negligence of defendant in the maintenance of its streets. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Mr. Charles W. McTeer, for appellant, cites: As to negligenceof municipality: 43 C.J., 998; 129 S.C. 257; 123 S.E., 839; 20 R.C.L., 9. As to contributory negligence: 111 S.C. 420; 98 S.E., 195; 82 S.C. 565; 64 S.E., 760; 166 S.C. 376; 166 S.E., 861. As to negligence: 88 S.C. 553; 71 S.C. 49; 193 S.C. 220; 8 S.E.2d 366; 193 S.C. 429; 8 S.E.2d 744; 181 S.C. 412; 187 S.E., 742; 131 S.E., 790. Proximate cause: 157 S.C. 359; 154 S.E., 645; 186 S.C. 525; 197 S.E., 31; 190 S.C. 181; 2 S.E.2d 686; 190 S.C. 309; 2 S.E.2d 790. Asto proof of negligence: 182 S.C. 441; 189 S.E., 652; 180 S.C. 436; 186 S.E., 383; 181 S.C. 244; 186 S.E., 911; 192 S.C. 527; 7 S.E.2d 749; 169 S.C. 403; 169 S.E., 84; 107 S.C. 124; 92 S.E., 191. Inabinet v. StateHy. Dept., Westbrook Adv. Sheet, Jan. 18, 1941; 113 S.C. 489; 101 S.E., 834; 94 S.C. 375; 78 S.E., 23; 178 S.C. 323; 181 S.E., 8; 10 S.E.2d 799; 11 S.E.2d 438. Messrs. Hemphill Hemphill, for respondent, cite: Asto statutory construction: 187 S.C. 322; 197 S.E., 823; 84 S.C. 122; 65 S.E., 1030, 1031; 19 Ann. Cas., 978; 94 S.C. 375; 78 S.E., 23, 24; 159 S.C. 425; 157 S.E., 447, 448; 139 S.C. 295; 137 S.E., 743; 107 S.C. 124; 92 S.E., 191; 164 S.C. 507; 162 S.E., 747; 176 S.C. 518; 180 S.E., 670. As to proximate cause: 128 S.C. 257, 123 S.E., 839. As to negligence: 169 S.C. 403; 169 S.E., 84. Asto comparison of cases: 139 S.C. 295; 137 S.E., 743; 113 S.C. 489; 101 S.E., 834. As to contributory negligence: 178 S.C. 323; 183 S.E., 8; 186 S.C. 402; 197 S.E., 97; 1
Messrs. Robert R. Carpenter and Forrest C. Wilkerson, of Roddey, Sumwalt Carpenter, Rock Hill, for Appellant, cite: As to the Appellant's not being able to reasonably foreseethat injury might result from any reasonable conduct bypeople in the vicinity of its electric line, nor could it haveanticipated or avoided such injury in the exercise of ordinarycare: 57 Am. Jur.2d, Negligence, Section 54; 20 R.C.L. 13, Section 9; 129 S.C. 247, 123 S.E. 839, 842; 26 Am.Jur.2d Electricity, Gas and Steam, Section 120; 298 Mich. 443, 299 N.W. 139; 122 Ga. App. 107, 176 S.E.2d 493; 6 A.L.R.2d 754. As to the alleged negligenceof Lynches River Electric Cooperative not being the directand proximate cause of the Respondent's injury: Am. Jur. 2d, Electricity, Gas, and Steam, Section 49; 279 Pa. 188, 123 A. 769, footnote number 11 to 26 Am. Jur.2d, electricity, Gas, and Steam, Section 49; 202 S.C. 73, 24 S.E.2d 121, 125; 193 S.C. 309, 8 S.E.2d 321; 190 S.C. 309 2 S.E.2d 790; 45 C.J. pp. 931, 932. As to the evidenceof Respondents contributory negligence dictating adirected verdict for the Defendant: 26 Am. Jur.2d Electricity, Gas, Steam Section 94; 186 S.C. 525, 197 S.E. 37; 190 S.C. 181 S.E.2d 686, 688. Messrs. D. Glenn Yarborough and Berry Mobely, of Lancaster, for Respondent, cite: As to the Lynches River ElectricCooperative reasonably foreseeing that injury might resultin the vicinity of its electric line and it could have anticipatedor avoided such injury in the exercise of ordinarycare: 159 S.C. 266, 156 S.E. 87; 91 S.W. 703. As to thenegligence of Lynches River Cooperative being the directand proximate cause of the Respondent's injury: 208 F. Supp. 873; 156 S.E. 874; 244 S.C. 454, 137 S.E.2d 594; 159 S.C. 266, 156 S.E. 874; 156 S.C. 158, 153 S.E. 119; 157 S.C. 174, 154 S.E. 118. As to any evidence ofRespondent's contributory negligence not dictating directedverdict for the Defendant: 248 F. Supp. 782; 196 F. Supp. 721; 192 S.C. 248, 6
E.P. Riley, Esq., of Greenville, for Appellant, cites: Asto requirement that permissive statutes be reasonably appliedand strictly construed: 213 S.C. 68, 48 S.E.2d 585; 238 S.C. 584, 121 S.E.2d 213; 29 S.C. 140, 7 S.E. 56; 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552; 231 S.C. 516 99 S.E.2d 181. William D. Richardson, Esq., of Greenville, for Respondent, cites: As to there being ample proof of negligence onpart of Appellant: 135 S.E.2d 838, 244 S.C. 186; 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552; 169 S.C. 403, 169 S.E. 84; 190 S.C. 309, 2 S.E.2d 790; 231 S.C. 516, 99 S.E.2d 181; 188 S.C. 408, 199 S.E. 525. May 28, 1970.
Messrs. R.R. Whitlock, of Lake City, and William H.Blackwell, of Florence, for Appellant, cite: As to Trial Judgeerring in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a nonsuitor directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failedto prove actionable negligence on the part of the defendant: 213 S.C. 68, 48 S.E.2d 585; 167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120; 180 S.C. 536, 186 S.E. 535; 168 S.C. 467, 167 S.E. 682; 225 S.C. 553, 83 S.E.2d 199; 190 S.C. 309, 2 S.E.2d 790; 218 N.C. 266, 10 S.E.2d 799; 233 N.C. 272, 63 S.E.2d 544; 149 Va. 523, 140 S.E. 641; 141 Mass. 242, 5 N.E. 249. As to the Trial Judge erring infailing to hold, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was barredby her own contributory negligence: 149 Va. 523, 140 S.E. 641; 187 S.C. 414, 198 S.E. 45. As to right of municipalityto limit use of parkway lying between sidewalkand street: 149 Va. 523, 140 S.E. 641; 63 C.J.S. 107, Sec. 794b (2); 167 So. 276, 232 Ala. 129; 25 Am. Jur. 702, Sec. 407. Messrs. Arrowsmith Palles, of Florence, for Respondent, cite: As to right of Plaintiff to recover against municipality: 197 S.C. 66, 14 S.E.2d 552. As to ordinancelimiting use of parkway between sidewalk and street neverhaving been enforced, and parkway was part of street: 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228; 104 S.E. 337, 115 S.C. 29; 178 S.C. 323, 183 S.E. 8.
Messrs. Carlisle, Brown Carlisle and Johnson Johnson, for appellant, cite: As to construction of enabling statute: 180 S.C. 536; 186 S.C. 535; 174 S.C. 208; 177 S.E., 158; 168 S.C. 126; 167 S.E., 1; 167 S.C. 231; 166 S.E., 120; 155 S.C. 77; 151 S.E., 887; 43 S.C. 398; 21 S.E., 315; 49 A.S.R., 823; 190 S.C. 309; 2 S.E.2d 790; 176 S.C. 518; 180 S.E., 670; 159 S.C. 405; 157 S.E., 136; 182 S.C. 384; 189 S.E., 657. As to complaintmeeting statutory requirements: 188 S.C. 14; 198 S.E., 425; 184 S.C. 316; 192 S.E., 565; 163 S.C. 13; 161 S.E., 195; 21 R.C.L., 441; 154 S.C. 105; 151 S.E., 230; 134 S.C. 398; 132 S.E., 678; 127 S.C. 251; 119 S.E., 869; 66 S.C. 12; 44 S.E., 93. Construction of survivalstatute: 168 S.C. 351; 167 S.E., 555; 170 S.C. 432; 170 S.E., 475; 148 S.C. 4; 185 S.E., 539. LordCampbell's Act: 150 S.C. 302; 148 S.E., 57; 29 S.C. 161; 7 S.E., 58. Rules of statutory construction: 185 S.C. 313; 194 S.E., 139; 113 S.C. 99; 101 S.E., 285; 99 S.C. 218; 82 S.E., 1048; 90 S.C. 412; 73 S.E., 769; 3 S.C. 423; 21 S.C. Eq., 174.
As to plaintiffs' second cause of action, the court notes initially that, even if it could be found that the vehicle dispatcher at the Fort Jackson motor pool was negligent, such negligence cannot be said to be the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries and losses. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Driggers v. City of Florence, 190 S.C. 309, 2 S.E.2d 790, 791 (1939), stated: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.” Driggers v. City of Florence, 190 S.C. 309, 313, 2 S.E.2d 790, 791 (1939) (emphasis added). Evidence of an independent negligent act of a third party is directed to the question of proximate cause.
March 25, 1975.Felix L. Finley, Jr., Esq., of Pickens, for Appellant, cites: As to a lack of any evidence of actionable negligence on thepart of Defendant: 243 S.C. 425, 436, 134 S.E.2d 410; 205 S.C. 441, 32 S.E.2d 368; 163 S.C. 506, 161 S.E. 777. As to the Plaintiff's bringing about his own injuryand damage or negligently contributing thereto: 73 S.C. 254, 54 S.E. 367; 224 S.C. 477, 80 S.E. 51; 212 S.C. 224, 57 S.E.2d 306; 186 S.C. 463, 196 S.E. 188; 188 S.C. 408, 199 S.E. 525; 185 S.C. 462, 194 S.E. 868; 20 R.C.L., par. 6, p. 344; 84 S.C. 202, 206, 65 S.E. 1051; 222 N.C. 234, 22 S.E.2d 434; 241 Ala. 109; 1 So.2d 1; 133 A.L.R. 1020; 243 S.C. 132 S.E.2d 385; 192 S.C. 406, 7 S.E.2d 4; 195 S.C. 486, 12 S.E.2d 27; 142 S.C. 492, 523, 141 S.E. 90; 29 S.C. 140, 7 S.E. 56; 39 S.C. 27, 17 S.E. 507. As to the Court's erring inrefusing to direct a verdict for Defendant: 255 S.C. 192, 177 S.E.2d 785; 190 S.C. 309, 2 S.E.2d 790; 129 S.C. 258, 123 S.E. 839; 39 Am. Jur.2d Highways, etc., par. 410; Anno. 62 A.L.R. p. 500. As to Plaintiff's Assumingthe risk of injury and damage: 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.E.2d 46; 183 S.C. 247, 190 S.E. 709; 233 S.C. 20, 25, 103 S.E.2d 395. Messrs. Abrams, Bowen, Hagins Robertson, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Messrs. Joseph R. Young, of Young, Clement Rivers, of Charleston, John A Boykin, Jr., and William D. Goddard, of Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant-Respondent, cite: As to a lack of any direct or circumstantial evidence of actionablenegligence attributable to Southern Bell: 19 S.C. 20; 248 S.C. 10, 138 S.E.2d 732; 180 S.C. 436, 186 S.E. 383; 190 S.C. 309, 790, 791; 15 S.C. 443, 450; 232 S.C. 139, 101, S.E.2d 262, 265; 238 S.C. 336, 106 S.E.2d 381; 286 F.2d 816, 819-820; 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174, 176; 180 S.C. 130, 185 S.E. 184, 187; 184 Va. 94, 34 S.E.2d 374; 141 S.C. 355, 139 S.E. 778, 779; 160 S.C. 541, 159 S.E. 390. Allen R. Dupree, Esq., of North Charleston, for Respondent-Appellant, cites: As to the evidence presented beingsufficient to constitute a prima facie case of actionable negligenceagainst the Appellant: 58 S.C. 39, 36 S.E. 109; 247 S.C. 18, 145 S.E.2d 423; 219 S.C. 360, 65 S.E.2d 468; 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153; 104 S.E.2d 357; 57 S.E. 760; 78 S.E. 956; 28 S.E.2d 545; 186 S.E. 911; 64 S.E. 1010; 90 S.C. 25, 72 S.E. 558; 169 S.E.2d 396; 48 S.E. 284; 156 S.E. 874; 233 S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381; 249 S.C. 456, 154 S.E.2d 833; 92 S.C. 188, 75 S.E. 1024; 89 S.E. 641.
to the driver by the wife of the owner: 230 S.C. 207, 95 S.E.2d 168; 124 S.C. 1, 117 S.E. 186; 127 S.C. 349, 121 S.E. 267; 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169; 62 Ga. App. 229, S.E.2d 531. Joseph L. Nettles, Esq., for Respondents, GeraldineThompson and Bobby Thompson, cites: As to Nancy Carder'sDriving: 3 So.2d 905; 17 S.E.2d 849; 243 S.C. 439, 134 S.E.2d 410; 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410; 235 S.C. 268, 111 S.E.2d 521; 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580, 95 A.L.R.2d 1333; 248 S.C. 10, 16, 148 S.E.2d 10. Heyward E. McDonald, Esq., of Rogers, McDonald,McKenzie Fuller, of Columbia, for Respondent, NancyCarder, cites: As to a lack of evidence and testimony, viewedin the light most favorable to Appellant, to require the TrialJudge to overrule the motion for nonsuit as to the issue ofheedlessness and recklessness on the part of the host driver: 256 S.C. 458, 128 S.E.2d 886; 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338; 8 A.M. Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Section 511; 150 S.E.2d 95; 202 S.C. 73, 24 S.E.2d 121; 190 S.C. 309, 2 S.E.2d 790; 248 S.C. 389, 150 S.E.2d 473; 249 S.C. 168, 153 S.E.2d 312; 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776; 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 1172; 220 N.W. 203; 150 A. 795; 42 C.J., page 890, Sec. 592; 224 Mass. 420, 113 N.E. 119; 272 Pa. 419, 116 A. 594. As to the Trial Judge'sproperly excluding out-of-court admission and testimonyabout the incident when the car failed inspection because oftwo slick tires: 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410; 233 S.C. 233, 104 S.E.2d 357. December 7, 1972.