Drew v. K-Mart Corp.

52 Citing cases

  1. Burton v. City of Stamford

    115 Conn. App. 47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 45 times
    Declining to find that trial court abused its discretion by permitting late amendment of complaint when key factual issues remained same despite new theory of liability that would have required changes to jury instructions

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 255, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006); Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352, 364-65, 659 A.2d 172 (1995); Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 242, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). With that standard in mind, we turn to the defendant's claim.

  2. Mezes v. Mead

    709 A.2d 597 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 15 times

    (Citations omitted.) Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 247, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). "The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the admonition given was a sufficient antidote for improper argument."

  3. State v. McKnight

    706 A.2d 1003 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 7 times

    "It is the province of the trial court to determine whether a prior statement is in fact inconsistent with statements advanced at trial." Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 249, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). "In determining whether an inconsistency exists, the testimony of a witness as a whole, or the whole impression or effect of what has been said, must be examined."

  4. State v. Moales

    678 A.2d 500 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 4 times

    "It is axiomatic that for a statement to be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement it must be inconsistent with the testimony of the party at trial." Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 249, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). The trial court allowed Fox to testify about Rivera's statement that he did not know the defendant.

  5. Brewer v. Wilcox Trucking, Inc.

    1998 Ct. Sup. 7825 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)

    In the Sixth Count the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. In order to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous.Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337; Drew v. K-Mart Corp. , 37 Conn. App. 239, 251, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). The issue of whether the defendant's conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior is a question of law to be decided by the court.

  6. Luedee v. Strouse Adler Co.

    1998 Ct. Sup. 1024 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)   Cited 3 times
    Granting a motion to strike an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on allegations that plaintiff's colleagues and managers entirely ignored her at work and made her position "insignificant and irrelevant"

    The plaintiff also argues that whether the conduct alleged is extreme and outrageous constitutes a question of fact properly determined by the jury. In order to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous.Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337; Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 251, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). The issue of whether the defendant's conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior is a question of law to be decided by the court.

  7. KLIMAS v. ADVO SYSTEMS INC.

    1996 Ct. Sup. 4109 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)

    Count IV The elements for the intentional infliction of emotional distress were recently expressed in Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). "In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. . . . Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind. . . . Thus, [i]t is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort. . . ."

  8. Silberberg v. Lynberg

    186 F. Supp. 2d 157 (D. Conn. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    Granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's statements, alone, did not indicate that he suffered "severe" mental distress

    Ancona, 746 A.2d at 192. See, e.g., Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 655 A.2d 806, 814 (Conn.App. 1995) (testimony that plaintiff suffered "great humiliation" was insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress); Reed v. Signode Corp., 652 F. Supp. 129, 137 (D.Conn. 1986) (plaintiff's testimony that events were "distressing" insufficient to support claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Almonte, 959 F. Supp. at 575 (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where plaintiff alleged sleeplessness, depression, and anxiety, but did not offer any evidence that he suffered these symptoms "to an extraordinary degree"); Esposito v. Conn. College, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 47 (Conn.Super. 2000) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where "plaintiff's submissions fail[ed] to indicate any symptoms or conditions suffered by plaintiff"); MacDonald v. Howard, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 373 (Conn.Super. 2000) (noting that "merely al

  9. Josey v. Filene's, Inc.

    187 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Conn. 2002)   Cited 18 times
    Finding no state action where private security guard was not, among other things, authorized to make arrests

    While the court is certain that the experience of being handcuffed in front of other shoppers and being detained in the mall was not a pleasant experience, the court cannot find that these actions rise to the level of extreme or outrageous behavior. See e.g., Drew v. K-Mart Corp, 37 Conn. App. 239, 655 A.2d 806 (Conn.App. 1995) (the court upheld a ruling by the lower court dismissing a claim where the plaintiff had become involved in an altercation in the parking lot with security guards over her son's alleged theft of a item and the incident was witnessed by the daughter of a co-worker). In addition, the court cannot conclude that the distress Josey suffered was severe.

  10. Maloney v. PCRE, LLC

    68 Conn. App. 727 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 75 times
    In Moloney v. PCRE, LLC, 68 Conn. App. 727, 755, 793 A.2d 1118 (2002), the trial court likewise declined to award prejudgment interest on the ground that it had found "no evidence of bad faith or wilfulness" on the part of the defendants. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

    The trial court may permit an amendment to pleadings at any time. Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn. App. 239, 242, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). Although our courts have been liberal in permitting amendments, that liberality is restrained by certain considerations.