A judgment is defined by Wyoming Code, Sec. 89-2201, R.S. It is final when it terminates the litigation. Klever v. Seawall, 65 Fed. Rep. 373; City v. Deacon (Cal.) 34 P.2d 183; Dresser v. Dresser (Okla.) 22 pac. 2d 1012; Meyer v. District Court (Mont.) 57 P.2d 778.
The aggregate value of the defendant's estate at the time of the trial was slightly in excess of $1,000,000, while at that time the value of any property owned by the plaintiff was practically nothing. It satisfactorily appears from the record that the separation of the parties was the result of defendant's improper treatment of plaintiff, extending over a long period of time, and that the plaintiff was without any serious fault, and the trial court so found. Numerous facts and circumstances are to be considered by this court in passing upon the reasonableness of an alimony award. Those considerations have been mentioned in numerous prior decisions, including our opinions in Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, and Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okla. 12, 213 P. 884. It is not necessary that all such considerations be here restated.
In disposing of the wife's claim that fraud had been practiced upon her, the court said: "The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, and her conduct after her remarriage, justify the conclusion that defendant understood that her rights in the property and her right to alimony payments terminated upon her remarriage; that she was not mislead in executing the contract, and that no fraud was practiced upon her in connection therewith. We have carefully examined the entire record, as well as the cases relied upon by defendant to sustain her contention, such as McRoberts v. McRoberts, 177 Okla. 156, 57 P.2d 1175, and Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, and are impelled to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court was not clearly against the weight of the evidence nor contrary to law."
" The trial court did not find the judgment was void because it was not for a definite sum as in Dresser v. Dresser 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012 (1933). This is not a direct appeal from an unconscionable award as in Moseley v. Moseley, 171 Okla. 150, 42 P.2d 237 (1935).
Although we have said, in Reed v. Reed, Okla., 456 P.2d 529, 533, * * * "there is no rule available by which to measure or determine the amount of alimony or property to be awarded a party in a divorce case as each case depends on its own facts and circumstances; * * *", we have, in a number of decisions, emphasized certain matters that must be considered. In Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, in making this determination, we considered what property of each party was separate property and what property a joint accumulation; whose efforts resulted in the accumulation; the duration of the marriage; whether the marriage was one of affection or convenience; whether the wife was somewhat at fault; respective financial worth of the parties and their conduct as to frugality. In Harden v. Harden, 182 Okla. 364, 77 P.2d 721, we said, after referring to the matters specified in Dresser, supra, "It is not necessary that all such considerations be here restated.
However, we know of no authority which supports defendant's argument that, although an equal division of property is decreed this was not required in order to effect an equitable division, and necessarily shows an abuse of the trial court's discretion in making such an award. We have held many times that no rule requires allowance of any fractional part in fixing equitable division. Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012; Burtrum v. Burtrum, 184 Okla. 61, 84 P.2d 598. We have held in many cases that in determining what is a just and reasonable property settlement of jointly acquired property, the trial court should take into consideration the efforts of the respective parties during their married life in acquiring the property.
In addition thereto, defendant was awarded certain capital stock of the Empire Drug Co., and the United Drug Company, value about $800, also all mineral and royalty lease interests owned by the parties not specifically awarded plaintiff, and one half of the money, $20,000, collected on the fire insurance policy covering the original Bristow Drug Store. The Court ordered that each of the parties pay his or her own attorney fees. The defendant, in support of his assignments of error, cites the case of Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012 and quotes at length in his brief from many out-of-state decisions referred to in that opinion. He also submits a list of Oklahoma divorce cases showing the property values involved in each action and the percentage of the husband's estate allowed as alimony by the trial court and by the Supreme Court. No fixed percentage or rule is available by which to measure or determine the amount of alimony or property to be awarded a party.
This court has the power to hear and determine the question. See particularly Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012. It would seem equally as true that the apparent error in the decree relative to the alimony and property settlement may be corrected upon appeal. For this reason we shall cause to be rendered the judgment which should have been rendered. That alternative portion of the trial court's decree purporting to operate as a transfer of title to real property in another state is vacated and set aside.
In this state, if the parties agree upon a division of property and the court finds that such agreement is fair and reasonable, the same may be approved. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 167 Okla. 598, 32 P.2d 305. But such agreement may be set aside if found unfair or unreasonable. Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012. The court is vested with discretion in the approval or disapproval of such settlements. Limb v. Limb, 195 Okla. 249, 156 P.2d 1013. The court can approve, disapprove or modify the contract of the parties but it cannot be said that the approval of the contract withdraws the issues of property rights from the consideration of the court, as defendant contends.
The contract provides that plaintiff shall have no claim against defendant's business so long as the weekly payments are maintained. The court specifically found that the weekly payments were in lieu of alimony. While a contract of property settlement is not necessarily binding on the court, Dresser v. Dresser, 164 Okla. 94, 22 P.2d 1012, this one was specifically approved. We hold that the weekly payments are due plaintiff under the contract, that they terminate upon plaintiff's death or remarriage, and that they are not alimony.