Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2133-G
July 18, 2001
MEMORANDUM ORDER
The court has before it the motion of defendants Morenci Candles, Inc. ("Morenci"), Monty B. Young, and Salena C. Young (collectively, "the Youngs") to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Also before the court are the motions of defendants Dream Walker Candle Company ("Dream Walker"), Pat Ramirez ("Ramirez"), and Steven Eli "(Eli") to transfer venue and for a more definite statement. For the following reasons, all three motions are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Dreamers Candles, Ltd., a Texas limited partnership ("Dreamers"), is owned by Paul and Mary Ann Darr ("the Darrs"). Plaintiff's Complaint ("Complaint") at 4. Based in Strawn, Texas in Palo Pinto County, Dreamers manufactures and sells "unique, scented, premium-quality candles throughout the United States." Id. Dreamers contends that on or about March 13, 1997, Eli entered into an agreement with the Darrs to operate the Dreamers' booth at the monthly "First Monday Trade Days" trade show in Canton, Texas. Id. According to Dreamers, under this agreement Eli was to sell, on consignment, only Dreamers' products. Id. Dreamers alleges that Eli broke this agreement by selling other brands of candles, including his own "Dream Walker" brand. Id. Dreamers also contends that Eli, along with Ramirez, made "tortious, malicious, intentional, false, and derogatory comments" about the origin of Dreamers' products and Dreamers' business status. Id. at 7.
Dreamers also contends that Eli, Ramirez, and Dream Walker conspired with defendant Oralia Lopez ("Lopez"), a former Dreamers' employee, and Morenci, a company based in Gordon, Texas and owned by the Youngs, to provide a substitute source of candles identical to Dreamers' candles. Complaint at 3, 8. Dreamers avers that Lopez stole cases of candles from Dreamers and provided its trade secrets to Morenci. Id. at 8. Dreamers maintains that these trade secrets have allowed Morenci to copy Dreamers' candles. Id. According to Dreamers, Morenci currently supplies Eli and Dream Walker with candles that are "the same, or misleadingly close to the same, colors, textures, sizes, scents, and names" as Dreamers' candles. Id. at 18.
Dreamers asserts that it has a federally registered trademark on the Principal Register as well as federal and/or common law trade dress and trademark protections for many of its candles. Id. at 10.
In summary, Dreamers has asserted causes of action against all defendants for (1) federal trademark infringement; (2) dilution of a famous mark; (3) unfair competition under the Lanham Act; (4) injury of business reputation or trade name or mark; (5) theft of trade secrets; (6) Texas common law unfair competition; and (7) common law conspiracy. Complaint at 11-22. Dreamers also alleges additional causes of action against Eli, Ramirez, and Dream Walker for (1) fraud and (2) libel, slander, and/or business disparagement. Id. at 19-22. A final cause of action for breach of contract is brought against Eli only. Id. at 20-21.
Dreamers filed this suit in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas on September 29, 2000, id. at 1, seeking injunctive relief, actual and exemplary damages, interest, court costs, and attorney's fees. Id. at 23-24.
II. ANALYSIS
The court will discuss each of these motions in turn.
A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 1. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." However, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1357 at 598 (1969), for the proposition that "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983)). In determining whether dismissal should be granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).
2. The Present Motion
The present motion, brought by Morenci and the Youngs (collectively, the "Morenci Defendants"), asserts that "[d]espite the numerous causes of action asserted by [Dreamers] against the Morenci Defendants, [Dreamers] fails to allege facts supporting each of the necessary elements of the causes of action upon which it seeks relief" and, therefore, has failed to state any claim against the Morenci Defendants upon which relief can be granted. Morenci Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Brief in Support ("Motion to Dismiss") at 2.
However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the plaintiff to plead the specific factual elements of its claim. See, e.g., Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; see also Colonial Penn Insurance Company v. Market Planners Insurance Agency, 1 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1993). Rather, the Rules require only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . ." FED. R. CIV. P.8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to set up a liberal system of "notice pleading." See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Of course, even under this liberal standard, the pleadings must present more than mere legal conclusions. Askanase v. Fatjo, 148 F.R.D. 570, 573 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (citing Walker v. South Central Bell Telephone Company, 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990)). "Even the liberal notice pleading allowed by the federal rules requires a pleading to include the operative facts upon which the pleader bases [its] claim." Id.
a. Count 1 (Trademark Infringement)
To prevail on its trademark and/or trade dress claim (count 1), Dreamers must prove "(1) that [its] mark or trade dress, as the case may be, qualifies for protection and (2) that . . . use of [its] mark or trade dress creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds of potential consumers." Pebble Beach Company v. Tour 18 I Limited, 155 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir. 1998). "A trademark or service mark is 'any word, name, symbol, or device or combination thereof used by a person 'to identify and distinguish his or her goods, . . . including a unique product. . . .'" Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127). "Trade dress' refers to the total image and overall appearance of a product." Id. (quoting Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 251 and n. 3 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998)). Trademarks and trade dress qualify for protection if "they are inherently distinctive or have achieved secondary meaning in the public's mind — i.e., if the trade dress or mark 'has come through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.'" Id. (quoting Sunbeam, 123 F.3d at 253). On the other hand, a trade mark or dress is not protectable if "the design 'is one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection.'" Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992)).The Morenci Defendants aver that Dreamers "has not pled facts that satisfy even the minimum initial requirement of the test; namely, that the Morenci Defendants are using [Dreamers'] trademark and/or trade dress." Motion to Dismiss at 5. The court disagrees. Dreamers claims that its "unique, scented, premium-quality candles" have achieved a secondary meaning and are identified with a specific source — namely Dreamers. Complaint at 4, 10-11. Dreamers has also alleged that Lopez stole its trade secrets, passed them onto Morenci, and that Morenci consequently has adopted "substantially, and suspiciously, similar trade dress and marks" as Dreamers. Complaint at 8, 10. As stated above, these facts must be accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Dreamers. Under these standards, Dreamers has provided sufficient facts to put the Morenci Defendants on notice of its trademark or trade dress claim.
b. Count 2 (Dilution of a Famous Mark)
In determining whether a mark is famous, a court may consider factors such as (a) the distinctiveness of the mark; (b) the duration and extent of use of the mark; (c) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity; (d) the geographical extent of the trading area; (e) the channels of trade; (f) the degree of recognition of the mark; (g) the nature and extent of use of similar marks by others; and (h) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1981, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). For the owner of a famous mark to be entitled to an injunction, a third party must commercially use the mark after it has become famous. Id.
The Morenci Defendants do not challenge Dreamers' allegations that its mark is famous under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). See Motion to Dismiss at 5. Rather, they contend that Dreamers' allegations do not "come close to establishing that the Morenci Defendants, used, let alone diluted, tarnished, and/or blurred its 'famous mark.'" Id. at 6. Dreamers' complaint states that "the Defendants, and those acting in agency and/or conspiracy with them, have stolen Dreamers' trade secrets and adopted substantially, and suspiciously, similar trade dress and marks in, among others, the candles, the colors, the scents, the names, and the packaging." Complaint at 10. Dreamers contends that these actions "have caused and will continue to cause both blurring and tarnishment of [Dreamers'] famous mark." Id. at 13. Although not a model of clarity, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim against the Morenci Defendants for dilution of a famous mark.
c. Counts 3 and 4 (Lanham Act and Injury to Business Reputation or Trade Name)
The Morenci Defendants argue that Dreamers' claims of (1) unfair competition under the Lanham Act (Count 3); and (2) injury to business reputation or trade name or mark (Count 4) track verbatim the language of the statute, thereby presenting a legal conclusion without alleging any supporting facts. Motion to Dismiss at 6-7. But as Dreamers correctly points out, it need not replead, for each count, previously stated factual allegations that are incorporated by reference. Plaintiff's Response to Morenci Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim ("Response to Motion to Dismiss") at 7. Dreamers has alleged sufficient predicate facts in support of its Lanham Act and injury to business reputation or trade name or mark claims to satisfy the notice pleading standard.
d. Count 5 (Theft of Trade Secrets)
Under Texas law, trade secret misappropriation requires "(a) the existence of a trade secret; (b) a breach of a confidential relationship or improper discovery of the trade secret; (c) use of the trade secret; and (d) damages." Taco Cabana International, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1123 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). In their motion to dismiss, the Morenci Defendants aver that "[Dreamers] has not alleged that the Morenci Defendants acquired these trade secrets through a breach of a confidential relationship or through improper means." Motion to Dismiss at 8. However, the Morenci Defendants have failed to show that Dreamers cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief.In Taco Cabana, the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury verdict of misappropriation of trade secrets on facts nearly indistinguishable from the facts here alleged. 932 F.2d at 1117, 1128. There, the owners of the Two Pesos restaurant chain obtained and used the architectural and kitchen equipment layout and design plans belonging to competing restaurant chain Taco Cabana. Id. at 1117. The Two Pesos owners were given the plans by a lighting designer who had himself borrowed the plans from another contractor and copied them without authorization. Id. at 1125.
"A complete catalogue of improper means is not possible. In general they are means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct." Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971)). Dreamers has alleged that Lopez stole its trade secrets and provided those trade secrets to Morenci. Complaint at 8. Dreamers contends that "Defendants have made candles using the same, or misleadingly close to the same, colors, textures, sizes, scents, and names of Dreamers candles, together with copied containers." Id. at 18. Finally, Dreamers alleges that the information necessary to make such candles "would not have been available to Defendants except through misappropriation and/or breach of loyalty or other improper and violative access to Dreamers' trade secret, confidential, and proprietary information." Id. These averments are sufficient to state a claim against the Morenci Defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets.
e. Count 6 (Texas Common Law Unfair Competition)
Dreamers contends that the Morenci Defendants, as well as the other defendants, have palmed off their own products as Dreamers' candles in an attempt to trade off of the Dreamers name. Complaint at 19. Additionally, Dreamers alleges that these defendants have engaged in reverse palming off by selling Dreamers' candles as if they were their own products. Id. Through these methods, Dreamers avers, the Morenci Defendants are trying to steal Dreamers' business for themselves. Id. Referencing their arguments regarding counts one through five, the Morenci Defendants claim "the factual allegations do not support a finding that the Morenci Defendants used any of these methods." Motion to Dismiss at 8-9. For the reasons discussed above, Dreamers has stated a claim for unfair competition.
f. Count 10 (Civil Conspiracy Under Texas Common Law)
To prevail on a cause of action for civil conspiracy, Dreamers must show that (1) two or more persons, (2) with an object to be accomplished, (3) had a meeting of minds on the object or course of action (4) resulting in one or more overt acts, and (5) damages. Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 685 (N.D. Tex. 1998). To satisfy the elements of civil conspiracy, especially meeting of the minds, Dreamers must prove the defendants had a specific intent to participate in the purpose of the conspiracy. Chevalier v. Animal Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (N.D. Tex. 1993). The Morenci Defendants contend that Dreamers has not alleged that the Morenci Defendants intended to harm Dreamers or were aware that they were receiving stolen trade secrets. Motion to Dismiss at 9. Although Dreamers has not alleged that the Morenci Defendants intended to engage in any harmful conduct against Dreamers, direct evidence is not required to prove a civil conspiracy. Chevalier, 995 F. Supp. at 1230. Indeed, civil conspiracy is ordinarily established by circumstantial evidence. Id. Dreamers has alleged that "Defendants have acted in concert or conspiracy in committing the wrongful acts pled above." Complaint at 22. These allegations, while sparse, are sufficient to state a claim for civil conspiracy against the Morenci Defendants.
For all the aforementioned reasons, Dreamers has provided, pursuant to Rule 8(a), a short and plain statement of each claim showing that it is entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Morenci Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.
B. Transfer of Venue 1. Legal Standard
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of Section 1404(a) "is to prevent the waste 'of time, energy and money' and 'to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense . . .'" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Continental Grain Company v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960)). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating that a change of venue is warranted. Gundle Lining Construction Corporation v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 844 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1994). Generally, a plaintiff is afforded some deference in choosing a forum. Lindloff v. Schenectady International, 950 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Tex. 1996). However, the plaintiff's choice of forum is afforded reduced significance where the plaintiff does not live in the chosen forum and where most of the operative facts occurred outside the chosen forum. Id.
In deciding whether to grant transfer, the court should consider: (1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of material witnesses, (3) the availability of process to compel the presence of unwilling witnesses, (4) the cost of obtaining the presence of witnesses, (5) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (6) calendar congestion, (7) where the events in issue took place, and (8) the interests of justice in general. Gundle, 844 F. Supp. at 1165. Transfer should be granted only if, after examining these eight factors, "the balance of convenience and justice weighs heavily in favor of the transfer" and it would make it " substantially more convenient for the parties to litigate the case." State Street Capital Corp. v. Dente, 855 F. Supp. 192, 197 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
2. The Present Motion
The present motion, brought by Dream Walker, Ramirez, and Eli (collectively the "Dream Walker Defendants"), seeks a transfer of venue to the Tyler Division of the Eastern District of Texas. The Dream Walker Defendants argue that this suit properly belongs in the Eastern District of Texas because (among other reasons) many of the witnesses reside in the Eastern District, most of the events alleged by Dreamers occurred in the Eastern District, and the convenience of the parties favors transfer. Defendants Dream Walker, Ramirez, and Eli's Motion to Transfer Venue and Supporting Memorandum ("Motion to Transfer") at 6-10.
a. Factors (2). (3), and (4)
As noted by the Dream Walker Defendants, Motion to Transfer at 6, the convenience of the witnesses is often regarded as the most important factor to be considered in ruling on a motion to transfer venue. See State Street Capital Corp., 855 F. Supp. at 197. "Moreover, it is the convenience of non-party witnesses, rather than that of party witnesses, that is the more important factor and is accorded greater weight in a transfer of venue analysis." Id. at 198. The Dream Walker Defendants list six non-party witnesses who live in the Eastern District of Texas. Motion to Transfer at 6-8. Two of these six witnesses reside in Longview, Texas and one lives in Tyler. Id. at 7-8. The other three non-party witnesses listed by the Dream Walker Defendants live in Canton, Texas. Id. at 6-7. The trip from Canton to Dallas is twenty miles longer than the trip from Canton to Tyler. Plaintiff's Response to Dream Walker's Motion to Transfer ("Response to Motion to Transfer") at 4. Thus, transfer to Tyler would be cheaper and more convenient for the six non-party witnesses identified by the Dream Walker Defendants.Turning next to the other parties' witnesses, the court notes that Dreamers has failed to identify by name any of its own fact witnesses who would be inconvenienced if this case were to be transferred to the Eastern District. Response to Motion to Transfer at 4. However, the court must also consider the Morenci Defendants and Lopez in its analysis. The Morenci Defendants, although served with the Dream Walker Defendants' Motion to Transfer, have not responded. However, it appears that Lopez was never served with the motion. While the Morenci Defendants have waived their right to be heard on the motion by virtue of their failure to respond, Lopez has not. Lopez lives in Mansfield, Texas, in the Northern District, and is alleged by Dreamers to have provided trade secrets to the Morenci Defendants of Gordon, Texas, also in the Northern District. Complaint at 2-3. Because Lopez has not had the opportunity to respond to the motion and because it appears likely that Lopez's fact witnesses may be located in the Northern District, the court is reluctant to conclude that Tyler would be a more convenient forum for the majority of the non-party witnesses in this case.
Lopez filed an answer to the complaint on October 18, 2000 wherein she provided her current mailing address.
Gordon, Texas is approximately 100 miles from Dallas and 198 miles from Tyler. Mansfield, Texas is approximately 33 miles from Dallas and 124 miles from Tyler.
b. Factor 5
The Dream Walker Defendants assert that their sources of proof, consisting of documents and records, are housed at Dream Walkers' principal office in Palestine, Texas. Motion to Transfer at 12. However, the Dream Walker Defendants have failed to account for possible sources of proof of the other defendants. It is likely that the Morenci Defendants and Lopez will rely upon sources of proof located in the Northern District where each of them live and work. As discussed above, Lopez has not had the opportunity to respond to the instant motion. Accordingly, the Dream Walker Defendants have failed to show that it is substantially more convenient for all the parties to litigate this case in the Eastern District.
Palestine, Texas is located in the Eastern District and is approximately 54 miles from Tyler and 111 miles from Dallas.
c. Factor (7)
The Dream Walker Defendants assert that none of the acts complained of by Dreamers in their complaint occurred in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and that all of the facts alleged took place in either the Eastern District or the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District. Motion to Transfer at 8-9. The Dream Walker Defendants also assert that the only connection this case has to the Dallas Division of the Northern District is that Eli lives in Dallas. Id. at 9. The Dream Walker Defendants argue that since none of the key facts took place in the Dallas Division and since Dreamers is not a resident of Dallas, Dreamers' choice of forum is entitled only to minimal consideration. Id. at 8. A plaintiff's choice of forum is always given some deference and should be considered, along with the other relevant factors, in determining whether transfer under Section 1404(a) should be granted. See Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corporation, 90 F. Supp.2d 757, 774 (E.D.Tex. 2000). While it appears that none of the operative facts of this case occurred in the Dallas Division, it does appear that this case has a factual connection to the Northern District by virtue of the claims against the Morenci Defendants and Lopez. Because the plaintiffs forum choice is entitled to some deference and since there is a factual basis for venue in the Northern District, this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of transfer to the Eastern District.
d. Factor (1)
The Dream Walker Defendants argue that the Eastern District is a more convenient forum for the parties because Dream Walker and Ramirez reside in the Eastern District. Motion to Transfer at 10. They also contend that Dreamers frequently conducts business in the Eastern District and, therefore, cannot claim to be inconvenienced by litigating in the Eastern District. Id. Once again, however, the Dream Walker Defendants' argument fails to account for Morenci and Lopez. Considering that these defendants must travel an additional 90 — 100 miles to reach Tyler, transfer to the Eastern District clearly would not be more convenient for all the parties in this suit.
e. Summary of Factors
The Dream Walker Defendants have not shown that the balance of convenience and justice weighs heavily in favor of the transfer and that it would be substantially more convenient for the parties to litigate this case in Tyler. Accordingly, the Dream Walker Defendants' motion to transfer to the Eastern District is denied.C. Motion for a More Definite Statement
Lastly, the Dream Walker defendants argue that Dreamers' complaint is too vague, ambiguous, and devoid of specifics to place the Dream Walker Defendants on notice as to what acts are complained of by Dreamers. Dream Walker, Ramirez, and Eli's Motion for More Definite Statement and Supporting Memorandum ("Motion for More Definite Statement") at 1-2. When a party moves under Rule 12(e) for a more definite statement, the court is afforded discretion to determine whether the complaint is such that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959). The moving party must "point out the defects complained of and the details desired." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). This motion, however, may not be used as a substitute for discovery. Mitchell, 269 F.2d at 132. A pleading is sufficient if it is clear enough to serve the purpose of notice pleading contemplated by the rules. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (holding that all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests). Therefore, a motion for a more definite statement is generally disfavored by the courts. J J Manufacturing, Inc. v. Logan, 24 F. Supp.2d 692, 703 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) states that "[i]n all averments of fraud . . ., the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity." Rule 9(b) does not require hyper-technical or needlessly repetitive pleading, however. Steiner v. Southmark Corporation, 734 F. Supp. 269, 273 (N.D. Tex.), reconsideration denied, 739 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Tex. 1990). "Rule 9(b) is read in connection with FED. R. CIV. P. 8 which requires only a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Landry v. Air Line Pilots Association International AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990). The particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the pleadings apprise the defendants of the time, place, and nature of the fraudulent behavior and their involvement in it. Steiner, 734 F. Supp. at 273. Here, Dreamers adequately identified the nature of each alleged misrepresentation, the approximate date of each alleged misrepresentation, and the manner in which these misstatements were misleading. Complaint at 5-8.
For the other causes of action, the Dream Walker defendants argue throughout their motion that Dreamers' overly generalized allegations are too vague and devoid of enough specifics to allow them to respond. Motion for More Definite Statement at 4-11. But courts frequently hold that motions for a more definite statement are designed to only provide a remedy for a pleading that is unintelligible rather than one that merely lacks detail. Nebout v. City of Hitchcock, 71 F. Supp.2d 702, 706 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The Dreamers' complaint is clearly intelligible and gives fair notice to the Dream Walker Defendants of the acts complained of by Dreamers. Accordingly, the motion for a more definite statement is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Dreamers has provided, pursuant to Rule 8(a), a short and plain statement of each claim showing that it is entitled to relief. The Morenci Defendants have not shown beyond doubt that Dreamers could prove no set of facts in support of those claims that would entitle Dreamers to relief. Accordingly, the Morenci Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED.
Because the Dream Walker Defendants have not shown that the balance of convenience and justice weighs heavily in favor of transfer and that it would be substantially more convenient for the parties to litigate this case in the Eastern District of Texas, the Dream Walker Defendants' motion to transfer is DENIED.
Finally, Dreamers' complaint is understandable and gives fair notice of its claims to the defendants. Thus, the Dream Walker Defendants' motion for a more definite statement is also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.