Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale

4 Citing cases

  1. Marshall v. Johnson

    392 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1981)

    The parties do not dispute the ambiguity of the language nor the propriety of introducing parol or extrinsic evidence in ascertaining the intended boundary between their parcels of land. See Routh v. Williams, 141 Fla. 334, 193 So. 71 (1940); Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 227 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); Burgess v. Pine Island Corp., 215 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). In reversing the trial court the district court undertook an analysis of the parol evidence presented at trial.

  2. Board of Trustees v. Lost Tree Village

    805 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that the existence of an ambiguity is a question of law and the ambiguity must then be resolved as a question of fact

    See Whitfield v. Webb, 131 So. 786, 788 (Fla. 1931); Burgess v. Pine Island Corp., 215 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); see also City of Hollywood v. Zinkil, 283 So.2d 581, 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Where there is a latent ambiguity in a deed or contract, parol and other extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show the true intent of the parties. See id.; Landis v. Mears, 329 So.2d 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Ace Elec. Supply Co. v. Terra Nova Elec., Inc., 288 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 227 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). From our review of the record, it appears that the trial judge never examined the extrinsic evidence with the intention of determining if a latent ambiguity existed.

  3. Yates v. Bass Ranch, Inc.

    379 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 8 times

    In applying the rule, our Supreme Court, in Clark v. Cochran, 79 Fla. 794, 85 So. 250 (1920), stressed the fact that the documents there in issue "came from a place where they would naturally be found if genuine . . . and there is no evidence of fraud or suspicious circumstances." In Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 227 So.2d 709, (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) we held proper the admission into evidence as an ancient document of a map which appeared to be regular on its face, bore a date resembling the rest of the document, and appeared to have been over thirty years of age, noting that the map came from proper custody. We have not found a Florida case holding that the ancient documents rule sufficient to authenticate a document and thus to warrant its admissibility also acts as an exception to the hearsay rule, as it does in a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered the question.

  4. City of Hollywood v. Zinkil

    283 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 11 times

    Extrinsic evidence such as parol evidence is permissible to explain ambiguities in a written instrument, particularly where such ambiguity is "latent" as distinguished from "patent". Routh v. Williams, 1940, 141 Fla. 334, 193 So. 71; Carson v. Palmer, 1939, 139 Fla. 570, 190 So. 720; Connelly v. Smith, Fla.App. 1957, 97 So.2d 865; Paradise Beach Homes, Inc. v. South Atlantic Lbr. Co., Fla.App. 1960, 118 So.2d 825; Wise v. Quina, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 590; Burgess v. Pine Island Corporation, Fla.App. 1968, 215 So.2d 755; Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.App. 1969, 227 So.2d 709. The ambiguity in the 1927 deed was a latent ambiguity; therefore, the trial court erred in excluding the deed as well as the extrinsic evidence relating thereto.