Opinion
J-S02038-14 No. 2037 EDA 2013
03-27-2014
D.P., Appellant v. J.P., Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order June 27, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No.: 1999-09137
BEFORE: GANTMAN, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, D.P., appeals pro se from the child support order entered by the trial court on June 27, 2013. We quash.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this case as follows:
[The parties] were married on September 18, 1993 and separated on November 18, 2004. They are the parents of two children [J.P., Jr., born June 21, 1995, and J.P., born June 25, 1998]. The parties were divorced through a decree dated October 16, 2006 and resolved the economic issues in their divorce by arbitration. With regard to support, the arbitrator at that time concluded that [Appellee's] net monthly income was $25,500, [Appellant's] net monthly earning capacity was $2,000 and [Appellee] would pay $4,500 per month in child support. The arbitrator's findings relevant to support were incorporated(Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/13, at 1-2) (footnotes and record citations omitted). Appellant filed this timely appeal from the support order on July 16, 2013.
into an order through the Montgomery County Domestic Relations Office on September 12, 2006.
On April 4, 2012, [Appellee] filed a [p]etition to [m]odify [s]upport on the basis the support guidelines had changed, as well as the parties' incomes. On July 13, 2012, the parties appeared before Support Master Arthur Klein. On September 11, 2012, [Appellant] filed a petition to [m]odify [s]upport in which she sought a retroactive increase in child support from 2006 through 2009 on the basis that [Appellee] failed to report increases in his income.
The parties appeared before the [trial court] on January 16, 2013 for a hearing on both support and custody. At this hearing, the [c]ourt determined that there would be no retroactive increase in child support. At the conclusion of the hearing, the [trial court] entered an interim order, without prejudice, for [Appellee] to pay $3,500 per month in child support. Additionally, the [c]ourt ordered [Appellee] to produce his W-2 for 2012 by February 15, 2013 as well as documentation regarding his 2013 bonuses. The parties and their counsel again appeared before the [trial court] on June 25, 2013. After a conference with both attorneys, the [court] took the case under advisement and issued a support order on June 27, 2013. On July 2, 2013, [Appellant] filed a [m]otion for [r]econsideration, which was denied by the [trial court] through an order dated July 9, 2013.
Pursuant to the trial court's order, Appellant timely filed a Rule 1925(b) statement of errors on July 19, 2013. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 31, 2013. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On October 17, 2013, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss this appeal and a supporting brief arguing that Appellant's failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure warrant dismissal of the appeal. ( See Appellee's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal, 10/17/13, at 1). Appellant filed a response, and on November 21, 2013, this Court entered a per curiam order denying Appellee's motion without prejudice to raise the issue before the merits panel. ( See Order, 11/21/13).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[1.] EARNING CAPACITY- Whether the [trial] court erred by ignoring tax returns, social security printout that showed earning capacity where [Appellee] has had a history of hiding earnings from child support[?](Appellant's Brief, at 5).
[2.] ADDITIONAL INCOME Whether the [trial] court can dismiss the fact that [Appellee], in addition to his salary and bonus, also has investment income[?]
[3.] RETRO SUPPORT- Whether the [trial] court erred by ignoring the Pennsylvania Domestic Relations rule reporting income increases by saying that [Appellee] didn't need to do so from 2006-2010 because he was a "Meltzer [] case" and also ignored that in 2010 when tax returns show he made almost $1 million in salary and bonus and yet didn't report it. The 2006 arbitration he stated he made $479,000. Please note that this 2006 [sic] was also a lie since the social security printout shows he made over $200,000 more.
[4.] Whether the [trial] court erred by ignoring Krebs v. Krebs, 944 A.2d 768—(Pa: Superior Court 2008) [sic] in not issuing retro support to [Appellant] from 2006-2012[?]
[5.] INCREASE FOR SUPPORT- Whether the [trial] court can ignore [Appellant's] medical and unemployment in child support[?] Whether the [trial] court erred by not following the child support guidelines for deviations[?]
[6.] FEES- not granting fees for counsel/other expenses. Not granting arrears[?]
[7.] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS For preventing due process, having ex-parte communication and violate constitutional rights[?]
Melzer v. Witsberger, 480 A.2d 991 (Pa. 1984).
We have numbered Appellant's questions because she neglected to do so. ( See id. ).
Prior to analyzing the issues in Appellant's pro se brief, we must determine whether she properly preserved her issues for our review. Rule 1925(b)(4) provides, in pertinent part:
(ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge. The judge shall not require the citation to authorities; however, appellant may choose to include pertinent authorities in the Statement.Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (iv), (vii).
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(iv) The Statement should not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-frivolous issues are set forth in an appropriately concise manner, the number of errors raised will not alone be grounds for finding waiver.
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(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.
Rule 1925 is a crucial component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal. This Court has further explained that a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent to no Concise Statement at all.Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Kanter, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006) (citations omitted); see also id. at 401 (waiving prolix Rule 1925(b) statement where court determined that "outrageous" number of issues was deliberate attempt to circumvent purpose of Rule 1925). "[T]he Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently 'concise' and 'coherent' such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest the existence of bad faith." Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1048 (Pa. 2008).
Our law makes it clear that Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is not satisfied by simply filing any statement. . . . Specifically, this Court has held that when appellants raise an "outrageous" number of issues in their 1925(b) statement, the appellants have "deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now seek to raise."Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007), affirmed, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted).
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Appellants [engage] in misconduct when they "attempt[] to overwhelm the trial court by filing [a] Rule 1925(b) Statement that contain[s] a multitude of issues that [Appellants] d[o] not intend to raise and/or c[an] not raise before this Court."
[Our Supreme Court has] encourage[d] the lower courts to recognize that on rare occasions a party may, in good faith, believe that a large number of issues are worthy of pursuing on appeal.aEiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 938 A.2d 417, 427 (Pa. 2007) (plurality opinion).
a [However], as a practical matter, the courts will never be able to completely rule out the possibility that . . . a disgruntled appellant might raise issues on appeal to punish a trial judge who ruled against that party. Thus, the good faith inquiry . . . is not one that requires a finding of fact, per se. Rather, [it] simply requires that lower courts undertake consideration of whether the circumstance of the lawsuit at issue suggest there is a lack of good faith involved. Only then should a litigant suffer the loss of appellate review due to the volume of issues raised.
This Court has emphasized that an appellant's pro se status does not excuse her from complying with the requirements of Rule 1925(b). See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005).
While this [C]ourt is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that [an] appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because she lacks legal training. As our [S]upreme [C]ourt has explained, any layperson choosing to represent [herself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that [her] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [her] undoing.Branch Banking & Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).
Here, Appellant filed a four-page Rule 1925(b) statement of errors that is far from concise: it raises twenty issues, some of which are overly vague, redundant, and allege misconduct on the part of the trial court and Appellee. ( See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/19/13, at unnumbered pages 1-4). Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement raises at least thirteen issues beyond the seven raised in the "Statement of Issues," section of her brief. ( See Appellant's Brief, at 5; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/19/13, at unnumbered pages 1-4). Although the trial court attempted to address Appellant's issues to the extent that it was able to discern them, it stated that her Rule 1925(b) statement is vague, and that waiver of many of her issues is appropriate. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/13, at 2-6). We agree, and determine that it would be inappropriate for this Court to undertake a review of so many issues where Appellant has displayed a blatant disregard for our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Jiricko, supra at 210; Tucker, supra at 346. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has failed to preserve any issues for appellate review. See Kanter, supra at 401.
Specifically, Appellant asserts that Appellee has a history of misrepresenting his income to avoid child support payments, and that the trial court exhibited bias in Appellee's favor and engaged in ex parte communications with him. ( See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/19/13, at unnumbered pages 1-4).
Moreover, even if Appellant had complied with Rule 1925(b), we would quash this appeal for the failure of her brief to conform materially to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Commonwealth v. Lyons, supra at 252.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119 sets forth the required content of the argument section of briefs and provides, in relevant part:
(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
(b) Citations of authorities. Citations of authorities must set forth the principle for which they are cited. . . .
(c) Reference to record. If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears[.]
Here, Appellant's brief falls well below the standards delineated in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, although Appellant raises seven issues in her statement of questions involved, she divides her argument into only three sections in which she combines and blends her discussion of the issues. ( See Appellant's Brief, at 5, 16-28). The argument section of Appellant's brief consists primarily of a series of accusations against Appellee for his history of "perjury" and "lies" regarding his income to avoid paying fair child support, and against the trial court for "look[ing] the other way." ( Id. at 16-17, 21, 24; see id. at 16-28). Appellant does not explain how her cited legal authority applies to the facts of this case, nor does she provide this Court with any citation to the record. ( See id. at 16-28); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c).
Thus, even if we liberally construe the materials Appellant filed, the lack of legal argument and other substantial defects in her brief preclude us from conducting meaningful review. See Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Pa. Super. 1993) (concluding that quashal is appropriate where appellant did not properly raise and develop issues raised in his brief); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (authorizing quashal where defects in appellate brief are substantial). We therefore quash this appeal.
Appeal quashed. Judgment Entered. __________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary