In general, this Court must accept a trial court's findings of fact on a motion in limine unless they are clearly erroneous. Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 33 (4), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019). However, because Pauldo's interview was both audio- and video-recorded, "the recording is part of the record on appeal, and the parties point to no evidence beyond the recorded interview to support their arguments regarding the admissibility" of the statement, "we review de novo the trial court's determinations of both fact and law."
This standard requires a suspect to "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 35, 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). As a result, "ambiguous or equivocal" statements that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood "only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel" are not enough, Taylor , 304 Ga. at 48, 816 S.E.2d 17 (emphasis in original), and "even a comment that a suspect would like counsel to be present in the future is not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel," Dozier , 306 Ga. at 35, 829 S.E.2d 131 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Young confines his argument to the issue of whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and never argues that he actually invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, which would have required him to "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 35, 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). A defendant may waive his rights under Miranda , "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."
"[O]ur case law contains no general mandate requiring trial courts, when responding to a jury's request for a recharge on a particular issue, to also recharge on all principles asserted in connection with that issue." Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 32-33 (3), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Rather, when the jury does not request additional instructions, "the need, breadth, and formation of additional jury instructions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 35 (4) (b), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019). And we view Edwards's comments in context.
Lucas v. State, 273 Ga. 88, 90 (2) (538 S.E.2d 44) (2000) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 34 (4) (a) (829 S.E.2d 131) (2019) (holding that the test is whether "a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney").
Id. at 23 (3). See also Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 32-33 (3) (829 S.E.2d 131) (2019) ("[O]ur case law contains no general mandate requiring trial courts, when responding to a jury's request for a recharge on a particular issue, to also recharge on all principles asserted in connection with that issue."); Sampson v. State, 279 Ga. 8, 10 (5) (608 S.E.2d 621) (2005) (where the jury requested the legal definitions of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and conspiracy, "it was within the trial court's discretion to limit the scope of the recharge to issues pertinent to the jury's request"); Salahuddin v. State, 277 Ga. 561, 564-565 (4) (592 S.E.2d 410) (2004) ("[W]here the jury requests further instructions upon a particular phase of the case, the court in its discretion may recharge them in full, or only upon the point or points requested." (punctuation and emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion, and
But neither that statement nor Locklear's subsequent silence was "an invocation of his right to remain silent, let alone an ‘unequivocal and unambiguous’ one." Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 34 (4) (a), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019). A reasonable law enforcement officer instead would have understood Locklear's statement to mean only that he did not want to discuss in greater detail what happened in relation to Long's truck, not that he did not want to speak to police at all.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that these statements were not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel. See Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 35 (4) (b), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019) ("[T]he mere mention of the word ‘attorney’ or ‘lawyer’ without more, does not automatically invoke the right to counsel." (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Ellis does not challenge the admission of his statement on the ground that it was involuntary under the constitutional due process standard, and so we do not address that issue. See Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019). "To use a defendant's custodial statements in its case-in-chief, the State must show that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived them."