Opinion
2d Civil No. B161718.
10-7-2003
DONNA R. DOYLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JEREMY WIGGINS et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Donna R. Doyle, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Schumann, Rallo & Rosenberg and Kim Schumann for Defendants and Respondents.
Donna R. Doyle sued respondents, Jeremy and Kira Wiggins, for personal injuries she allegedly suffered in an automobile accident. Doyle did not comply with the Wiggins discovery requests and the trial courts orders directing compliance. The court ordered her to pay sanctions to respondents. Later, the court dismissed her case because she did not follow the courts specific directions on opposing respondents request for terminating sanctions.
Doyle appeals from the order of dismissal. Because Doyle does not provide factual or legal authority showing that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this case, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 29, 2001, Doyle filed this action alleging she suffered personal injuries in an automobile collision with Kira Wiggins. On January 10, 2002, respondents propounded interrogatories and a request for production of documents. Doyle did not provide adequate responses to these requests. Respondents sent a meet and confer letter to her on March 5, 2002, requesting further responses to specific interrogatories and production of documents on or before March 10, 2002. The letter notified Doyle that if she did not comply, respondents would file a motion to compel seeking monetary sanctions.
Doyle did not comply with respondents requests, and on March 26, 2002, respondents moved to compel further responses, obtain documents, and receive an award of monetary sanctions. On April 18, 2002, the court granted the unopposed motion and imposed sanctions of $660.50 against Doyle, payable within 30 days. The court ordered Doyle to serve responses no later than May 10, 2002. The trial court vacated and reset the readiness conference and trial dates. The court ordered Doyles deposition to take place on May 1 at 10:00 a.m.
On May 17, 2002, Doyle moved to set aside the order of sanctions imposed on April 18, 2002. On May 30, 2002, Doyle paid $25 of the sanctions ordered. On May 31, 2002, the court declined to waive the rest of the sanctions previously imposed, provided plaintiff with a copy of the "Rules of Court," and advised plaintiff that she must follow the rules if there is any matter she wished the court to address on June 5, 2002. June 5 was the date set for respondents ex parte hearing for an order shortening time to hear the motion for terminating sanctions.
On June 5, the court granted respondents application for an order shortening time to hear their motions for terminating sanctions. The court ordered that "[a]ny opposition to the motion shall be served and filed no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 12, 2002. Any reply shall be served and filed no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 17, 2002. Plaintiff shall provide Defendant with a fax number for receipt of documents." The notice of ruling, provided by respondents, emphasized in bold print the courts order to provide defense counsel with a fax number.
Doyle did not fax her opposition as ordered by the court, but mailed opposition to the motion for terminating sanctions on June 12, 2002. On June 14, 2002, respondents filed a notice stating that Doyle failed to provide proper, timely opposition. Although respondents received Doyles mailed opposition papers on June 14, 2002, her papers did not discuss the request for orders shortening time and terminating sanctions, did not provide a memorandum of points and authorities, and did not include proof of service. Doyles papers stated that she failed to pay the monetary sanctions previously imposed because she is on SSI, social security, and is bankrupt. She admitted she did not attend her deposition on May 1, 2002, as previously ordered by the trial court, claiming she was too ill. She stated that she appeared at a later date. Although a copy of the face of a check in the amount of $670 for sanctions dated June 19, 2002, appears in the record, there is no evidence that the check was actually sent or that respondents received it.
On June 20, 2002, the court granted the motion for terminating sanctions finding "there have been numerous continuances granted to Plaintiff to afford her time to prepare for trial, and there have been multiple violations of local rules by Plaintiff. Whether those violations were in good faith or unintentional is irrelevant. The Court finds the Plaintiff has been given many second chances. Todays hearing was to determine whether or not Defendants request to dismiss the case for failure by Plaintiff to comply with the sanction order should be granted. The Court gave very specific instructions to Plaintiff on how to oppose the motion and she failed to follow the Courts directions." The court dismissed the case with prejudice, and denied Doyles request for reconsideration in which she again argued she had been too ill to comply with the courts orders. This appeal ensued.
Discussion
"`. . . In choosing among its various options for imposing a discovery sanction, a trial court exercises discretion, subject to reversal only for manifest abuse exceeding the bounds of reason. . . ." (Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1244.) In exercising their discretion to impose discovery sanctions, trial courts consider the totality of the circumstances which include the conduct of the party, the willfulness of the dereliction, the degree of detriment to the propounding party, and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain discovery. (Id ., at p. 1246.) When a party repeatedly fails to comply with discovery orders, the court may impose a terminating sanction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subd. (b)(4)(C).)
"Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: . . . [¶] (2) Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures. . . . [& para;] (4) Failing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery. [¶] (5) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery. [¶] (6) Making an evasive response to discovery. [¶] (7) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery. [¶] (8) Making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery. . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subd. (a).)
Doyle contends she tried her best to comply with the courts orders but her physical and mental limitations made it difficult or impossible for her to do so. Unfortunately, Doyle did not satisfy the trial court that she had such debilitating infirmities that she could not timely and properly comply with discovery requests. We extended the submission date after oral argument to permit Doyle to submit further documentary evidence to support her position. We have read and considered the documents Doyle has submitted after oral argument, and we cannot say that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason in dismissing her case.
The order terminating the action is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J. and YEGAN, J.