Thus, Floyd's challenge is procedurally barred. See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995). Even if the challenge were not procedurally barred, Floyd's argument would be without merit.

Accordingly, these claims are procedurally defaulted. See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims not raised in first habeas petition are procedurally barred from being raised in a subsequent habeas petition). As noted earlier, claims two and (a) through (d) were asserted by Sims in his state habeas petition, see R. Vol. 27, Tab 1, pp. 73-83, and were rejected by the Florida Supreme Court. 622 So.2d at 981 ("We find no other valid basis for a claim of ineffectiveness here.").

As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Jennings v. State, 782 So.2d 853 (Fla. 2001): With respect to the HAC [heinous, atrocious, or cruel] instruction, this Court has found that a constitutionally vague HAC instruction may be found harmless where the facts of the murder support finding the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) (explaining that error concerning constitutionally vague HAC instruction was subject to harmless error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)); Johnston v. Singletary, 640 So.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Fla. 1994) (explaining that the “jury would have found Johnston's brutal stabbing and strangulation of the eighty-four-year-old victim, who undoubtedly suffered great terror and pain before she died, heinous, atrocious, or cruel, even with the limiting instruction”); but see Hitchcock v. State, 614 So.2d 483, 484 (Fla. 1993) (vacating sentence based on unconstitutional HAC instructional error without conducting a harmless error analysis, on facts similar to those in the instant case). Here, the constitutionally vague pre-Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), HAC instruction constitutes harmless error.

“In Florida, a state habeas petition is the proper procedural vehicle for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, for example, but not for raising claims that should have been brought on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.” SeeRutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla.2000) ; see alsoDoyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1995) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims not raised in first habeas petition are procedurally barred from being raised in a subsequent habeas petition). Therefore, to find that Mr. Overton's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was procedurally barred is not an adequate state ground.

Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989). We rejected a similar argument in Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Doyle's claim was procedurally barred because Doyle had failed to pursue the issue on appeal). As in Doyle, Taylor did not raise this claim on direct appeal and we now reject this habeas claim for the same reason.

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims not raised in first habeas petition were procedurally barred from being raised in a subsequent habeas petition. Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995). In the present case, Petitioner has neither alleged nor shown either cause or prejudice that would excuse the default.

I also note that Doyle challenged his sentence of death under Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), several times. SeeDoyle v. Singletary , 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) ; Doyle v. State , 526 So.2d 909, 911 (Fla. 1988).

Parker v. Dugger, 550 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989). We rejected a similar argument in Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Doyle's claim was procedurally barred because Doyle had failed to pursue the issue on appeal). As in Doyle, Taylor did not raise this claim on direct appeal and we now reject this habeas claim for the same reason.

Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989). We rejected a similar argument in Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Doyle's claim was procedurally barred because Doyle had failed to pursue the issue on appeal). As in Doyle, Taylor did not raise this claim on direct appeal and we now reject this habeas claim for the same reason.

With respect to the HAC instruction, this Court has found that a constitutionally vague HAC instruction may be found harmless where the facts of the murder support finding the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Doyle v. State, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1995) (explaining that error concerning constitutionally vague HAC instruction was subject to harmless error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)); Johnston v. Singletary, 640 So.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Fla. 1994) (explaining that the "jury would have found Johnston's brutal stabbing and strangulation of the eighty-four-year-old victim, who undoubtedly suffered great terror and pain before she died, heinous, atrocious, or cruel, even with the limiting instruction"); but see Hitchcock v. State, 614 So.2d 483, 484 (Fla. 1993) (vacating sentence based on unconstitutional HAC instructional error without conducting a harmless error analysis, on facts similar to those in the instant case). Here, the constitutionally vague pre- Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992), HAC instruction constitutes harmless error.