In its January 5, 2021 memorandum of decision, the court, Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee, acknowledged the precedent of our Supreme Court holding that a motor vehicle is not underinsured where the liability limits in the tortfeasor’s policy are equal to or greater than the underinsured benefits in the claimant’s policy. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins, Co., 252 Conn. 79, 87–91, 743 A.2d 156 (1999); Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 299, 801, 673 A.2d 474 (1996); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, 213 Conn. 625, 632– 33, 569 A.2d 1105 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d 977 (1991). The court nevertheless concluded that a 2014 amendment to § 38a-336 (b) legislatively overruled that Supreme Court precedent.

As our Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he public policy established by the uninsured motorist statute is to ensure that an insured recovers damages he or she would have been able to recover if the uninsured motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance." Sandor v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. , 241 Conn. 792, 800, 699 A.2d 96 (1997) ; see also Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co. , 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999) ("the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to protect the named insured and other additional insureds from suffering an inadequately compensated injury caused by an accident with an inadequately insured automobile" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of "the broad, remedial purpose of the uninsured motorist statute ... [our Supreme Court has] stated that an insurer may [not] circumvent th[at] public policy ...."

The Connecticut Supreme Court has referred to the treatise Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage, written by Jon Berk and Michael Jainchill, as an authoritative commentary on Connecticut's uninsured motorist law. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, n. 3, 743 A.2d 156 (1999). "The fundamental purpose of uninsured . . . motorist coverage is to provide protection to innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists."

Streitweiser v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 219 Conn. 371, 377, 593 A.2d 498 (1991). See also Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Insurance Co., 252 Conn. 79, 88 n. 5, 743 A.2d 156 (1999). In Middlesex Insurance Co. v. Quinn, supra, 225 Conn. 259-60, the defendant was injured while driving a car he owned.

. . ." Perodeau, 792 A.2d at 756-57 (quoting Doyle v. Metro. Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 743 A.2d 156, 158 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That language is construed according to the commonly approved usage of the words, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 1-1(a), for which it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition.

¶ 10. As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained in Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Insurance Co., 743 A.2d 156, 161 (Conn. 1999), the function of split-limit UIM coverage is to provide broader coverage in situations involving multiple "claimants," but such coverage cannot "convert an otherwise nonunderinsured vehicle into an underinsured vehicle." In Doyle, the tortfeasor had a $100,000 single-limit liability policy, and the insured claimant had a policy with split-limit UIM coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.

Our review of the trial court's decision therefore is plenary. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999). When construing a statute, "[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999).We begin our analysis with a review of the relevant statutory provisions.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999). With these principles in mind, we turn to the petitioner's claim that he is entitled to presentence credit for the period of time during which he was incarcerated in Massachusetts prior to his extradition to this state.

Because the issue that we must decide — whether the rate tables promulgated by the workers' compensation commission pursuant to § 31-310 (b) apply to all injured employees or only to those employees who contribute to FICA — presents a question of statutory construction, our review is plenary. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999). When construing a statute, "[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.