Opinion
22-ALJ-22-0070-AP
06-10-2022
Julia O. Downs, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and College of Charleston, Respondents.
FINAL ORDER
S. PHILLIP LENSKI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or court) pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed on February 22, 2022, by Julia O. Downs (Appellant). The Appellant seeks judicial review of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (Department or Respondent) Appellate Panel's (Panel) decision modifying the Appeal Tribunal's (Tribunal) decision and finding the Appellant ineligible for benefits for the thirty-two claim weeks beginning April 5, 2020, through November 14, 2020, and overpaid $21,832.00 in benefits, upon finding she was paid benefits to which she was not entitled due to unreported earnings, and must repay the Department that amount. However, the Appellate Panel cancelled the monetary penalty and administrative penalty assessed for fraud.
After careful consideration of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, the court finds that substantial evidence in the record supports the Panel's determination. Accordingly, the Panel's decision is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
The Appellant filed for regular unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on March 21, 2020 and pandemic unemployment assistance (PUA) benefits on May 26, 2020. The Department found the Appellant eligible to receive benefits and paid her a total of $21,832.00 for thirty-two (32) claim weeks between April 5, 2020 and November 14, 2020. Subsequently, the Department found the Appellant was not eligible for benefits during those thirty-two claim weeks because she was working full-time during those weeks. The Department mailed an overpayment determination to the Appellant on December 29, 2020, finding the Appellant committed fraud when filing her weekly claim for benefits during those thirty-two weeks. The Appellant appealed the overpayment determination to the Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal held a hearing on October 18, 2021. After the hearing the Appeal Tribunal issued a decision affirming the overpayment determination. The Appellant then appealed to the Appellate Panel. The Appellate Panel modified the Appeal Tribunal's decision by affirming the determination that the Appellant received benefits to which she was not entitled but removing the fraud finding and penalty. On February 22, 2022, the Appellant appealed to this court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Department is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (finding that the Employment Security Commission, a predecessor of the Department, was an agency within the meaning of the APA). Accordingly, the APA's appellate standard governs appeals from decisions of the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380 & 1-23-600(D). This court's review in appellate cases is limited to the record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(4).
Additionally, the court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact but may modify or reverse the decision of the agency when substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5). Substantial rights of the appellant are prejudiced when, among other things, the agency's decision, including the agency's findings, inferences, and conclusions, are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Id. However, the party challenging an agency action on appeal has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917 (citation omitted).
In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)); 73 A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 497 (2015). A reviewing court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact for which there is room for a difference of intelligent opinion. See Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1995) (citation omitted); Grant, 319 S.C. at 353, 461 S.E.2d at 391 (citation omitted). As such, "[a] reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency 'unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark, 276 S.C. At 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307).
DISCUSSION
The Appellant filed a claim for Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits on March 21, 2020 after her place of part-time employment, Stono Market LLC, closed. The Department found the Appellant eligible for benefits based on her representations to the Department and paid her benefits for thirty-two (32) claim weeks. The Department conducted a wage audit for the Appellant with the Respondent Employer, College of Charleston, and discovered the Appellant was employed full-time with the College of Charleston (Employer or College) during every week she filed a claim for UI benefits. The Department notified the Appellant of the UI claim audit and the Appellant admitted to having two (2) jobs, a part-time job with Stono Market LLC and a full-time job with the College of Charleston. The Appellant claimed that she failed to report the wages from the College because she thought her employer reported her earnings for her.
Subsection 41-35-10 of the South Carolina Code provides that benefits are payable to an individual who is unemployed and eligible for benefits. Subsection 41-27-370(1) of the South Carolina Code clarifies that an individual is unemployed in a week during which she performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to her. The Appellant admits that she was a full-time employee of the College during the thirty-two (32) weeks she received benefits and that her reported wages from the College for those weeks are accurate. The Appellant argues that despite the Department's system warning her during every weekly certification that she was required to report all earnings received during that week, she did not know that she was required to report her wages from her full-time job with the College.
Subsection 41-41-40(A)(1) of the South Carolina Code provides that a person who has received UI benefits while not eligible to receive those benefits, is liable to the repay the Department the amount received by her. Therefore, because the Appellant received benefits to which she was not entitled to, she must repay the Department. Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Department is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.