The time within which the notice must be given in order to comply with the statute begins to run on the day the breach of the city's duty occurred. Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133 ( 174 S.E. 365); Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 ( 39 S.E.2d 576); Davis v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 280 ( 147 S.E.2d 868); Crawford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173 (8); Lilly v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 83; Gould v. Palmer Read, 96 Ga. 798 ( 22 S.E. 583). 3.

ORDER Davis v. United StatesFidelity Guaranty Co., 119 Ga. App. 374 167 S.E.2d 214 Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987 991 39 S.E. 495 497 See Nashville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 120 Ga. 453 47 S.E. 959 Georgia Ry. Electric Co. v.Carrol, 143 Ga. 93 84 S.E. 434 Roper v. Jones, 42 Ga. App. 686 157 S.E. 367 Dalyrmple v. BrunswickCoca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga. App. 754 181 S.E. 597 Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 39 S.E.2d 576 Western Atlantic R. R. v. Fowler, 77 Ga. App. 206 47 S.E.2d 874 Malcolm v. Cotton, 128 Ga. App. 699 197 S.E.2d 760 Dalyrmple, supra 51 Ga. App. at 754 181 S.E. 597 598 The mere factthat one who has received an injury to his personsuffers as a result thereof a monetary loss such asexpenditures for doctor's bills, loss of earningcapacity, etc., does not make the injury any less aninjury to the person. The resulting monetary damagesare damages resulting from an injury to the person,and not from an injury to a property right.Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 87 Ga. 79 81 13 S.E. 250 Frazier v. Ga. R. R. Banking Co., 101 Ga. 70 28 S.E. 684 Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987 991 39 S.E. 495 Raleigh v. Gaston R. Co.v. Western Atlantic R. Co., 6 Ga. App. 616 65 S.E. 586 Patellis v. King, 48 Ga. App. 389 172 S.E. 921 Davis v. Patrick, 128 Ga. App. 677 197 S.E.2d 743 Robinson v. Bomar, 122 Ga. App. 564 177 S.E.2d 815 DavisBomar,BomarCentral of Ga. Ry. v. Harbin, 132 Ga. App. 65 207 S.E

We do not understand the Georgia law to be that by merely suing for the last of a series of consequences (at a time when the right of action for the first consequence is barred) a plaintiff can thereby extend the statute of limitations. In fact, the case of Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290(2), 39 S.E.2d 576, cited by plaintiff, appears to conclude this contention against her. In that case plaintiff sued for injuries to her teeth, based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant restaurant in serving food with a rock or other similar substance therein. It appeared that certain minor injuries were received at the time she originally bit down on the rock. It appeared to be generally conceded that these injuries were barred, but the petition also sought to recover for additional injuries, apparently suffered within the statute of limitations, which resulted from her efforts to correct the consequences of the first injury. Thus, at page 294 at page 578 of 39 S.E.2d of the opinion, the court said:

Plaintiffs' counsel's recital in his letter to the Clerk that they could be filed not later than August 25 was erroneous as a matter of law because, as just stated, they had to be filed not later than midnight of August 24. Gibson v. Kelley, 1953, 88 Ga. App. 817, 78 S.E.2d 76; Dowling v. Lester, 1946, 74 Ga. App. 290(1), 39 S.E.2d 576; Brown v. Emerson Brick Co., 1914, 15 Ga. App. 332, 333(2), 83 S.E. 160; Peterson v. Georgia Railroad Banking Co., 1895, 97 Ga. 798, 25 S.E. 370; and Irwin v. State, 1903, 117 Ga. 722, 728, 45 S.E. 59. The fact that the 24th fell on Sunday did not allow an extra day.

" For consideration in answering the above questions, the Court of Appeals cites the following: "Crawford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173 (8); Lilly v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 83; Gould v. Palmer Read, 96 Ga. 798 ( 22 S.E. 583); Schofield v. Woolley, 98 Ga. 548 ( 25 S.E. 769); McClaren v. Williams, 132 Ga. 352 (4) ( 64 S.E. 65); Davis v. Boyett, 120 Ga. 649 (2) ( 48 S.E. 185); Maxwell v. Walsh, 117 Ga. 467 ( 43 S.E. 704); Freeman v. Craver, 56 Ga. 161; Irvin v. Bentley, 18 Ga. App. 662 (3) ( 90 S.E. 359); Barrett v. Jackson, 44 Ga. App. 611 ( 162 S.E. 308); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133 ( 174 S.E. 365); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 758 ( 176 S.E. 829); Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721 ( 124 S.E. 553); Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga. App. 825 ( 163 S.E. 268); Tabor v. Clifton, 63 Ga. App. 768 ( 12 S.E.2d 137); Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 (2) ( 39 S.E.2d 576); Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628 ( 86 S.E.2d 649): Parker v. Vaughn, 124 Ga. App. 300 ( 183 S.E.2d 605); Crawford v. McDonald, 125 Ga. App. 289 ( 187 S.E.2d 542); Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388. 394 (173 S.E. 680); Chitty v. Horne-Wilson, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 716 ( 89 S.E.2d 816); Chitty v. Horne-Wilson, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 721 ( 89 S.E.2d 820); Wellston Co. v. Sam M. Hodges, Jr. Co., 114 Ga. App. 424 ( 151 S.E.2d 481); Hunt v. Star Photo Finishing Co., 115 Ga. App. 1, 5 ( 153 S.E.2d 602); Whiten v. Orr Construction Co., 109 Ga. App. 267 ( 136 S.E.2d 136); Morgan Construction Co., v. Kitchings, 110 Ga. App. 599 ( 139 S.E.2d 417); Hamilton v. Lockridge, 123 Ga. App. 609 (1) ( 181 S.E.2d 910); Carroll County Gas Co. v. Parker, 125 Ga. App. 27 ( 189 S.E.2d 913); Cheney v. Syntex Laboratories, 277 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ga.); Anno. 4 ALR3rd 821.

[Cits.]" Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290, 292 (1) ( 39 S.E.2d 576). The tragic circumstances of counsel's terminal cancer do not operate to extend the applicable two-year time limit established by OCGA § 9-3-33 under a theory of "excusable neglect." Nor do these unfortunate events invoke the provisions of OCGA § 9-3-91, which by its express terms apply personally to the party with the "right of action.

OCGA § 9-3-33. The statute of limitation commenced on the day of the collision, and expired on December 24, 1984. Reese v. Henderson, 156 Ga. App. 809 ( 275 S.E.2d 664) (1980); Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 (1) ( 39 S.E.2d 576) (1946). As noted above, the clerk marked the complaint as filed on December 26, 1984, after the statute of limitation had expired.

The appellant's contention that his complaint was filed hours before an actual year had passed from the accrual of the cause of action has previously been heard and rejected by this court. Reese v. Henderson, supra; Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 ( 39 S.E.2d 576) (1946). Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint.

A contrary ruling would effectively repeal that statute of limitation in automobile accident cases, or would at least give the plaintiff inordinate flexibility in determining when the cause of action arose. The appellee's cause of action arose on the date of the collision in which her injuries were sustained. See Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 229 Ga. 798 (2) ( 194 S.E.2d 425) (1972); Carroll County Gas Co. v. Parker, 126 Ga. App. 27 (1) ( 189 S.E.2d 913) (1972); Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 (2) ( 39 S.E.2d 576) (1946). Judgment reversed. Deen, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.

Brewer v. Southern Gas Corp., 90 Ga. App. 81 ( 82 S.E.2d 171) (1954). See Gould v. Palmer Read, 96 Ga. 798 ( 22 S.E. 583) (1894); Riser v. Livsey, 138 Ga. App. 615 ( 227 S.E.2d 88) (1976); Schaefer v. Mayor c. of Athens, 120 Ga. App. 301 ( 170 S.E.2d 339) (1969); Sicklesmith v. Citizens Bank of Hapeville, 101 Ga. App. 533 ( 114 S.E.2d 319) (1960); Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628 ( 86 S.E.2d 649) (1955); Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290 ( 39 S.E.2d 576) (1946). Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues.