Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-294.
November 2, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of November, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff on Plaintiff's Claims for Punitive Damages only.
The law is clear that punitive damages are not available at all against SEPTA, as it is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and this immunity extends to the causes of action alleged here. See Generally, Feingold v. SEPTA, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270, 1299 (1986);Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 830-31 (3d Cir. 1991); Hovington v. SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 02-2226, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6431 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 11, 2004); Poli v. SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 97-6766, 1998 WL 405052 (E.D.Pa. July 7, 1998).
In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
The standards to be applied by district courts in ruling on motions for summary judgment are clearly set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which states, in pertinent part:
. . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Under this rule, a court is compelled to look beyond the bare allegations of the pleadings to determine if they have sufficient factual support to warrant their consideration at trial. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones Co., 838 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed.2d 51 (1988); Aries Realty, Inc. v. AGS Columbia Associates, 751 F.Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In considering a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences from the facts must be drawn in favor of that party as well.Troy Chemical Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 126 (3rd Cir. 1994); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3rd Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Kensington Hospital, 760 F.Supp. 1120 (E.D.Pa. 1991).
Material facts are those facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the substantive law governing the claims made. An issue of fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party in light of the burdens of proof required by substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); The Philadelphia Musical Society, Local 77 v. American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, 812 F.Supp. 509, 514 (E.D.Pa. 1992). Thus, a non-moving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial. Gleason v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001).
In this case, there is ample record evidence to support the Plaintiff's discrimination claims and from which a jury may conclude that the specific individual acts of discrimination of which Plaintiff complains were part of an ongoing and continuous pattern and practice by Officer Dowd's immediate supervisor and by those officers who supervised Sgt. Reynolds. Given that there is also ample evidence that this ongoing pattern of racial discrimination was either sanctioned or ignored by both the Transportation Authority itself and its Police Department, we deny the Defendant's motion in all other respects.