Opinion
Nos. 78-3139, 78-3595 and 80-3260.
Argued October 9, 1980.
Decided December 9, 1980. Rehearing Denied February 9, 1981.
William C. Potter, Jr., Fischer, Franklin, Ford, Simon Hogg, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner in all cases.
Francis E. Bentley, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner in 78-3139 and 78-3595.
R.L. Davis, Senior Atty., Michigan Division, Dow Chemical Co., Midland, Mich., for petitioner in 78-3139 and 80-3260.
Dorothy M. Attermeyer, Asst. Regional Counsel, E.P.A., Chicago, Ill., Lydia N. Wegman, Christina Kaneen, General Counsels, E.P.A., Washington, D.C., for respondents in 78-3139 and 78-3595.
Charlotte Uram, Pollution Control Section, Land Natural Resources Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondents in all cases.
Lee F. Nute, Midland, Mich., for petitioner in 78-3595.
Environmental Protection Agency, General Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C., for respondents in 80-3260.
Petition for review from the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
Before EDWARDS, C.J., and PHILLIPS and PECK, Senior Circuit Judges.
We deal here with three petitions filed by The Dow Chemical Company seeking review of decisions of respondent, United States Environmental Protection Agency, under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (Supp. II 1978). These decisions designated Midland County as a "nonattainment area" (Appeal Nos. 78-3139 and 78-3595) and refused to approve a state approved revision of Michigan's "State Implementation Plan" (Appeal No. 80-3260). These appeals were consolidated by order of this court when it became apparent that they presented basically the same issue.
We recognize at the outset that this case is not comparable to the many clean air petitions which have previously been heard by this court. In these prior cases, many industries have demonstrated obdurate resistance to the national effort to achieve national air quality standards. Cincinnati Gas Electric Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114, 99 S.Ct. 1017, 59 L.Ed.2d 72 (1979); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 278, 58 L.Ed.2d 256 (1978).
In contradistinction, this record shows that even before the 1970 Clean Air Act was adopted, Dow Chemical laid plans for a permanent solution to its then and currently existing sulfur dioxide pollution problems. At the same time, Dow recognized that it would take years to achieve the permanent solution by which Dow committed itself to one-third participation in the building of Consumers Power's nuclear power plant to supply all the power needed for Dow's Midland plants. As a result, Dow also put in operation an alternative to the burning of high sulfur coal in its old power plants in the form of a Supplementary Control System (SCS) for temporary use of low sulfur oil on occasions when its normal emission of SO[2] pollutants would otherwise occasion the atmospheric pollution in Midland County to exceed national air quality standards. The parties agree that this SCS, geared to 24-hours-a-day and 7-days-a-week meteorological control through satellite weather observation, has succeeded in preventing any monitor-recorded instance of actual violation of national air quality standards in Midland County during the interim years.
It is an interesting contrast to note that at least 20 counties and portions of counties in Ohio are listed by EPA as in violation of national air quality standards. In Michigan, EPA lists no county in the state, except Midland County, as in violation of national air quality standards. And Midland is in violation only because, according to United States EPA, Congress has refused to accept any intermittent or temporary remedial measures as effective for purposes of determining national air quality standards.
From this description of our current problem, it might be deduced that the panel which heard this case is inclined by its previous contrasting experiences toward exercise of any judicial discretion it might have favorably to Dow. While this is true, unfortunately for Dow, our review of this record and the applicable statutory provisions indicates that Congress, in the exercises of its legislative powers, has dealt specifically with the identical issue raised by Dow and has foreclosed judicial relief.
As we see the issues in these appeals, they should be phrased as follows:
1) Did Congress in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act prohibit consideration of any intermittent system designed to reduce excessive pollution emissions temporarily in United States EPA's determination of achievement of national air quality standards?
2) If so, was it arbitrary and capricious for United States EPA to refuse to approve a revision to the Michigan State Implementation Plan to which the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission had consented?
We answer the first of these questions in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
As to the first issue in this case, Dow claims basically that Midland County should have been and should now be designated as an "attainment area" because there have been no monitored violations since Dow began to use its supplementary low sulfur oil burning system. As indicated above, whatever logic this argument may have, United States EPA argues that Dow cannot be in compliance and that Midland County cannot be granted an attainment designation, since Dow does not continuously limit sulfur dioxide pollution from its stacks.
It is EPA's position, strongly disputed by Dow, that the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act adopted by Congress were designed to clarify the 1970 Clean Air Act so as to show that national standards must be met by constant control of emissions.
As to this issue the confrontation between the parties is over whether or not Dow's SCS is in fact one which "limits the quantity, rate or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis. . . ." Dow also argues, however, that while "constant controls are the preferred means to obtain compliance," intermittent controls used on an interim basis are permissible where there is a showing that constant controls are economically or technologically infeasible. Citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 1217 (D.Nev. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978). In relation to this issue, the EPA cited and relied on Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 1665, 48 L.Ed.2d 176 (1976); and Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1663, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976). As to these cases, Dow argues that they "expressly hold" that an interim system like Dow's can be used where there is no other "economically and/or technologically feasible alternative."
We do not attempt to resolve this dispute, since these cases were all decided before 1977 and in our view, Congress resolved the argument contrary to Dow's contention in the 1977 Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k) (1978) now provides:
The terms "emission limitation" and "emission standard" mean a requirement established by the State or the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis, including any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction.
In addition, in 1977 Congress added a new Section 123(a) ( 42 U.S.C. § 7423(a)) stating that "[t]he degree of emission limitation required" by a SIP "shall not be affected in any manner" by the use of excessive stack heights or "any other dispersion technique" and a new Section 123(b) ( 42 U.S.C. § 7423(b)) defining "dispersion technique" to include " any intermittent or supplemental control of air pollutants varying with atmospheric conditions." (Emphasis added.)
We have read and considered the language relied on by Dow from House and Senate legislative history written prior to adoption of the 1977 Amendments. We recognize that some of the language relied upon by Dow does seem to conflict with what we believe to be the obvious and unambiguous language of the 1977 statutory provisions quoted above.
It is, however, a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that the courts do not turn to legislative history to shed light on the meaning of easily understandable and unambiguous statutory enactments. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 1280, 6 L.Ed.2d 575 (1961).
We do not believe that other sections of this complicated statute relied on by Dow convey discretion to United States EPA to approve as an SIP revision the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission's grant of a variance under the facts recorded here. Dow is now emitting from its aging power plants 39,809 tons of SO[2] per year. Due to dispersion among a number of stacks and to relatively low SO[2] pollution from other sources in the same county, Dow's emissions have not caused Midland County monitors to show violations of national air quality standards.
The total quantity of Dow's emissions, however, is not being reduced — nor will it be — until 1984 at the earliest. This means, of course, that absent EPA's order, Dow's SO[2] pollutants will continue to damage the air and the environment both in Midland County and downwind therefrom until Consumer's nuclear plant comes on line. This appears to be the exact sort of fact situation which Congress had in mind in adopting the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-87, 128-33, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News, pp. 1077, 1162-65, 1207-11. See Appendix following.
Since we find §§ 123(a) and (b) ( 42 U.S.C. § 7423(a) and (b) (1978)), to be clear and unambiguous, we hold that these amendments required the United States EPA's decision, and now require our approval thereof. The holding requires the answer we have already set forth to the two questions posed by this case.
The petitions for review are denied.