Dover v. McDonald

4 Citing cases

  1. Robinson v. O'Rourke

    891 F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir. 2018)   Cited 7 times
    Applying CRST and affirming determination that appellant was not a prevailing party under EAJA where "the remand reflects the Veterans Court’s discretionary decision to allow a waived argument to proceed"

    Thus, the Court noted that, while judgments on the merits and consent decrees generally confer prevailing-party status, minimal relief resembling an interlocutory ruling that reverses a dismissal for failure to state a claim generally does not. Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 604–05, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ; Dover v. McDonald , 818 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Applying the rule set forth in Buckhannon , we have held that remand to an administrative agency for further proceedings can provide the requisite relief required to confer prevailing-party status, but only if the remand is predicated—either explicitly or implicitly—on administrative error.See, e.g. , Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 672 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("[W]e have held that remands not rooted in agency error do not result in prevailing party status."); Gurley , 528 F.3d at 1327 ("[T]he remand must be based on an administrative error in order for the appellant to qualify as a prevailing party."); Davis , 475 F.3d at 1364 ("In order for Davis to prevail on this argument, we must conclude that the Remand Order was either explicitly or implicitly predicated on administrative error."); Eady v. Shinseki , 321 Fed.Appx. 971, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("In order for the party to be considered ‘prevailing,’ the remand order must have been either explicitly or

  2. Winters v. Wilkie

    898 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018)   Cited 2 times

    Robinson , 891 F.3d at 983.Winters’s reliance on our decision in Dover v. McDonald , 818 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) is misplaced. In Dover , "the parties agree[d] that the remand was necessitated by agency error, and the remanding court did not retain jurisdiction.

  3. Bly v. Shulkin

    883 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018)   Cited 1 times
    In Bly v. Shulkin, 883 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018), we explained that the time for filing an EAJA application is "within thirty days of final judgment in the action."

    We have previously established that remand orders from the Veterans Court may in some cases entitle veterans to EAJA fees and expenses. See, e.g. , Dover v. McDonald , 818 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ; Thompson v. Shinseki , 682 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), such EAJA applications must be made "within thirty days of final judgment in the action."

  4. Wood v. Burwell

    837 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2016)   Cited 32 times
    Finding plaintiffs to be prevailing parties based on remand to agency predicated on a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and plaintiffs challenged the agency determination on that ground

    We decline to adopt the Federal Circuit's prevailing party analysis, which requires the district court to relinquish jurisdiction unless the party ultimately succeeds on the merits. See Former Emps. of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States , 336 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ; see also Dover v. McDonald , 818 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (granting attorney's fees where the district court did not retain jurisdiction, remanded to the agency, and ordered further agency proceedings); Thompson v. Shinseki , 682 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the plaintiff secures a remand requiring further agency proceedings because of alleged error by the agency, the plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party ... without regard to the outcome of the agency proceedings where there has been no retention of jurisdiction by the court.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).