] Therefore, we conclude that [Georgia] did not have jurisdiction to modify the custody determination because of . . . the [Tennessee] court's consent to [Georgia's] jurisdiction in this case." Long v. Long, 439 N.W.2d 523, 525 (N. D. 1989). Accord Douse v. Douse, 157 Ga. App. 524, 525 ( 277 S.E.2d 807) (1981). For a Georgia case so holding, see Gouse v. Wilson, 207 Ga. App. at 574.

See OCGA §§ 19-9-1(a)(3)(B), 19-9-3(a) (4.1). Father cannot complain on appeal, as he did not raise this issue below or present any evidence of the child's desires. See Bigham v. Bigham, 243 Ga. 171, 172 ( 253 S.E.2d 91) (1979); Douse v. Douse, 157 Ga. App. 524, 525 ( 277 S.E.2d 807) (1981). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, J., who concurs specially.

Because Surratt and the children have the closest connection with their home state of North Carolina and none of the UCCJA bases for jurisdiction apply to Georgia, the trial court correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction over Dyer's request for modification of custody. See Kemp v. Sharp, 261 Ga. 600, 601 (2) ( 409 S.E.2d 204) (1991); Douse v. Douse, 157 Ga. App. 524, 526 ( 277 S.E.2d 807) (1981). Judgment affirmed.

From the evidence of record, it appears that Florida, which has adopted the UCCJA, was the proper forum for bringing this action. See Craighead v. Davis, 162 Ga. App. 145 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 358) (1982); Douse v. Douse, 157 Ga. App. 524 ( 277 S.E.2d 807) (1981). Cf. Tirado v. Shelnutt, 159 Ga. App. 624 (1) ( 284 S.E.2d 641) (1981).

According to the record, the Colorado charges had been dismissed and custody restored to appellant in January 1982, two months before the petition for permanent custody was filed in the Richmond Superior Court. See Douse v. Douse, 157 Ga. App. 524 ( 277 S.E.2d 807) (1981). There is no evidence in this case that the Richmond Superior Court complied with the provisions of OCGA §§ 19-9-46, 19-9-48, 19-9-49, and 19-9-56 (Code Ann. §§ 74-507, 74-509, 74-510, 74-517), supra.

The result is that, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction to decide questions concerning custody, Jennifer had no "home state." See Garcia v. Martinez, 642 P.2d 53, 54 (Colo.App. 1982); Douse v. Douse, 157 Ga. App. 524, 277 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1981). Since, as far as Jennifer is concerned, no state has jurisdiction under section 11.53(a)(1) as her home state, we turn our attention to section 11.52(a)(2), which is applicable when no other state has jurisdiction under section 11.53(a)(1). Under these circumstances, jurisdiction may be exercised "when it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction" because "(A) the child . . . and at least one contestant have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence in this state; and (B) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; . . ."