Summary
affirming "the district court's conclusion that [a defendant's] two prior Minnesota convictions for first-degree aggravated robbery qualified as 'violent felon[ies]' for purposes of section 924(e)" (footnote omitted)
Summary of this case from Johnson v. United StatesOpinion
No. 17-3422
03-11-2019
John Joseph Douglas Petitioner - Appellant v. United States of America Respondent - Appellee
Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis [Unpublished] Before BENTON, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM.
John Douglas was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he was sentenced to 240 months in prison. His sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (felon in possession who has three prior convictions for "violent felony" shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years). Douglas later filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his sentence as an armed career criminal. The motion was denied, based in part on the district court's conclusion that Douglas's two prior Minnesota convictions for first-degree aggravated robbery qualified as "violent felon[ies]" for purposes of section 924(e). The district court then granted Douglas a certificate of appealability regarding that conclusion, and he appeals.
The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. --------
After careful de novo review, we conclude that Douglas's prior convictions were properly classified as "violent felon[ies]." See United States v. Libby, 880 F.3d 1011, 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2018) (by its terms, first-degree aggravated robbery under Minnesota law minimally requires that defendant communicate threat of violent force; as such, elements of offense categorically present "violent felony"); see also United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1060 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009) (for purposes of determining whether prior conviction qualified as "violent felony," it was irrelevant that prior conviction was premised on aiding-and-abetting theory of liability). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.